B. SARAJEVO 674 
Classified By: DCM Judith Cefkin. 
Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
1. (C) SUMMARY: On July 6, Zeljko Komsic, the Croat member of 
Bosnia's Tri-Presidency, will take over the rotating 
chairmanship of the Presidency from the Serb member, Nebojsa 
Radmanovic.  Radmanovic has, in our estimation, turned in a 
solid performance.  Komsic's chairmanship comes at a 
particularly sensitive time given Bosnia's heated political 
environment and our expectation that the Presidency will take 
up several issues of crucial importance to our bilateral 
relationship, including issues associated with Bosnia's Iraq 
deployment.  Our dealings with President Komsic and his staff 
to date raise questions in our mind about how effective 
Komsic might be as Presidency Chairman.  Recent conversations 
with Komsic's Chief of Staff Amir Ibrovic, during which he 
outlined what he claimed was Komsic's political strategy, 
have done nothing to allay those concerns. END SUMMARY. 
 
Radmanovic Turns in Positive Performance 
--------------------------------------- 
2. (C) The rotating chairmanship of the Bosnian 
Tri-Presidency will shift from Bosnian-Serb President Nebojsa 
Radmanovic to Bosnian-Croat President Zeljko Komsic on July 
6.  While the position carries few additional 
responsibilities, the Presidency Chairman plays an important 
role in setting the Presidency's agenda.  Ideally, the 
Chairman should also play the role of consensus builder among 
his colleagues.  While the political climate in Bosnia has 
steadily worsened since the 2006 elections, we have been 
largely pleased with Radmanovic's performance.  Although he 
overreacted to Bosniak member of the Tri-Presidency Haris 
Silajdzic's attempts to confront Serbia over the February 26 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) verdict (Ref A), 
Radmanovic has been instrumental in securing Presidency 
approval for several key items on our bilateral agenda, 
including extending the Bosnian military deployment to Iraq, 
arranging the Presidency visit to Iraq, and donating of 
surplus arms to the Afghan National Army.  We have also found 
his staff to be competent and professional. 
 
Komsic Prepares to Take Charge 
------------------------------ 
3. (C) We expect our engagement with the Presidency to be at 
least as intense under Komsic's chairmanship as it was under 
Radmanovic's.  There will be a continuing need to encourage 
the Presidency to a play a constructive role in the myriad 
political crises plaguing Bosnia.  We also anticipate dealing 
with Komsic on a range of important bilateral issues, such as 
possible change of mission scenarios for Bosnia's Iraq 
deployment, further implementation of defense reform, and 
insulating Bosnia from political fallout associated with the 
Kosovo final status process.  Thus far, our dealings with 
Komsic and his staff do not suggest that they possess the 
political maturity or gravitas required to manage effectively 
these or other issues.  His staff are politically 
inexperienced and several hold second jobs, which appear to 
take priority over their presidential responsibilities.  They 
are also often unable or unwilling to engage in serious 
substantive discussions (Ref B).  Our concerns have been 
reinforced by our exchanges with Radmanovic's and Silajdzic's 
aides, who complain to us regularly about the performance of 
Komsic's staff - one of the few matters on which they agree. 
 Amir Ibrovic - Komsic's "Strategist" and Chief of Staff 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
4. (C) Komsic's Chief of Staff, childhood friend, campaign 
manager, and owner of Sarajevo's popular "Tito Bar," controls 
Komsic's "cabinet."  Komsic gave Ibrovic carte blanche to 
assemble his Presidency team, and Ibrovic freely admits he 
chose to hire close friends rather than experienced political 
operatives, most of whom do not have strong ties to Komsic's 
Social Democratic Party (SDP).  In several exchanges with us, 
Ibrovic claimed that Komsic does not view himself as 
particularly indebted to SDP, one reason Ibrovic felt no 
obligation to staff his office from within the party.  He 
 
SARAJEVO 00001177  002 OF 003 
 
 
also said that Komsic has often rebuffed requests by SDP 
Chairman Zlatko Lagumdzija to toe the party line.  According 
to Ibrovic, Komsic wants to be seen as a unifying political 
figure capable of serving as President or Prime Minister of a 
post-Dayton Bosnian state.  Ibrovic argued that this is 
possible if Komsic exploits his image as a "war hero" and 
presents himself as a decisive leader, who rises above the 
country's ethnic divisions a la Tito (Note: Komsic has cited 
Tito as a role model, and his office is decorated with a 
large portrait of Tito. End Note.) 
 
5. (C) Ibrovic pointed to several recent events that were 
designed to demonstrate this, including Komsic's appearance 
at a military ceremony wearing his Golden Lilly decoration 
from the Bosniak Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina (ABiH) and his 
trip to Iraq with other members of the Presidency, during 
which he wore a specially-designed military uniform.  Even 
before the Presidency returned from Iraq, the weekly 
newsmagazine Slobodna Bosna prominently featured Komsic's 
"Diary from Baghdad," that included an almost minute by 
minute summary of his travel along with numerous pictures of 
Komsic -- in uniform -- in Iraq.  Ibrovic also sees Komsic 
repeated calls for a full investigation into allegations of 
war crimes in Bugojno in 1993 as crucial to establishing his 
cross-ethnic appeal, particularly among Croats, many of whom 
consider him a traitor for fighting with the ABiH rather than 
the Croat Defense Council (HVO) during the 1992-1995 war. 
The Bugojno case, which involves the disappearance of 
Bosnian-Croats from the town, has repeatedly ensnared Defense 
Minister Selmo Cikotic, who was serving as ABiH commander in 
the region at the time. 
 
The World According to Komsic (According to Ibrovic) 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
6. (C) Ibrovic, echoing previous statements by Komsic to the 
Ambassador, told us that Komsic believes it would be foolish 
to openly challenge Silajdzic at this time.  Political 
reality required Komsic enable rather than confront the 
Bosniak member of the Tri-Presidency, Ibrovic explained. 
Komsic's strategy was "to wait out" Silajdzic, who he 
anticipated would inevitably overreach, which he was already 
perilously close to doing over Srebrenica.  Ibrovic argued 
that feelings of moral and political culpability were behind 
Siljadzic's position on Srebrenica.  Ibrovic claimed that 
Bosnian lawyers managing the ICJ case against Serbia had 
access to documents from the Yugoslav Defense Council, 
despite their public assertions to the contrary, but that the 
lawyers chose not to use them because the documents included 
references to discussions about territorial divisions between 
Belgrade and former Bosnia President Alija Izbetgovic and 
Silajdzic. (Comment: Accusations that the Bosniak leadership 
"sacrificed" Srebrenica to the Serbs surfaced immediately 
after the enclave's fall.  Regardless of their truth, 
Silajdzic may feel some guilt for presiding over Srebenica's 
fall - he was PM and FM at the time.  Ibrovic's claims that 
Bosniak lawyers intentionally covered up documents that would 
have incriminated Silajdzic do not strike us as credible. End 
Comment.) 
 
Radmanovic the Communist 
------------------------ 
 
7. (C) Ibrovic said that he and Komsic respected Radmanovic 
and see him as a partner on most issues.  Ibrovic and Komsic 
believe he is angling to fill the RS leadership vacuum "after 
Dodik inevitably overreaches." (Comment: Silajdzic's staff 
have also claimed that Radmanovic's long-term political aim 
was to challenge Dodik. End Comment.) Ibrovic said that in 
his and his boss's assessment, Radmanovic was a "Communist, 
not a Serb."  To illustrate this point, Ibrovic said that 
Radmanovic used the traditional Serb military greeting "God 
help you, heroes" during the ceremony for the Bosnian army's 
RS regiment, but afterwards personally apologized to Komsic. 
According to Ibrovic, Radmanovic said Dodik had "forced" him 
to use the greeting, but that he personally found it 
distasteful.  Radmanovic's uncomfortable relationship with 
Serb nationalism would make it difficult for him to usurp 
Dodik's political position, Ibrovic asserted. 
 
Comment 
 
SARAJEVO 00001177  003 OF 003 
 
 
------- 
 
8. (C) Ibrovic believes he has created a "brilliant" 
political strategy for positioning Komsic as Bosnia's savior 
once the current storm of ethQc politics runs its course. 
Ibrovic is a mercurial character given to theatrical, angry 
outbursts and widely rumored to be an alcoholic, so we take 
some of his claims with a grain of salt.  Nonetheless, 
Radmanovic's and Silajdzic's staff confirm that Ibrovic is 
the only advisor to whom Komsic really listens.  In this 
context, Ibrovic's perceptions may matter more than political 
reality, and it certainly is true that Komsic used the 
Presidency's Iraq trip for some political showboating.  In 
any case, Komsic's performance to date has not fulfilled the 
high hopes we and many others had for him in the wake of the 
October 2006 general elections.  It is difficult to imagine 
Komsic, in his current incarnation, as an effective chairman 
of the Presidency, which is likely to further complicate 
efforts to accomplish our objectives in Bosnia over the next 
8 months. 
MCELHANEY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
