Blog containing a database of articles, reports, blogger's notes and photos of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Balkans region. The compilation and material was created by Aleksandra Miletić-Šantić, a lawyer, social scientist, human rights activist, journalist and interpreter.
UNDP Rejects False Accusations About Surplus Salw And Ammunition Stock Destruction
28/04/2010 - Following several false accusations and the incorrect and misleading information on the alleged abuse of the role of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP BIH) in the surplus weapons and ammunication destruction process, which were carried by some media outlets in BIH, and after UNDP asked Ms. Majkic to explain her groundless accusations, UNDP decided to send an open letter to all the media to clarify all the procedures taken within the Arms Control Project in BiH.
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) launched in 2003 the Small Arms Project for Bosnia and Herzegovina to assist BiH authorities at all levels in reducing the immediate threat posed to human life by SALW. In 2005, the Project was endorsed by the Council of Ministers of BIH, and later reviewed and endorsed one more time on December 3, 2008.
The Project activities are taken within three Project components: Development of Institutional Capacity for SALW Control; SALW and Weapon Systems Destruction; and Ammunition Demilitarization.
Within the Development of Institutional Capacity Component, activities are taken toward enhancing the SALW and ammunition control and management expertise and practical knowledge of institutions. UNDP supports the Coordination Board and the relevant institutions helping them prepare for taking over and performing the arms control functions in the future. Moreover, UNDP provides support through the Project to all relevant institutions in harmonizing the legislation with the EU directives and regulations for civilian possession of firearms, as well as the EU Code of Conduct on exports and imports of arms, military equipment and dual-use items.
Furthermore, UNDP provided support to the former entity Defense Ministries and the Defense Ministry of BIH in building capacity for the destruction of small-caliber ammunition and arms. In this regard, in 2005-2006, over 86,000 pieces of SALW from military stocks were destroyed in cooperation with the Defense Ministry of Republika Srpska and the Defense Ministry of the Federation of BIH. The small arms owned by the RS Defense Ministry were smelted at the Banja Luka Jelsingrad Steel Mill, and the small arms owned by the Defense Ministry of the Federation of BIH were smelted at the Zenica Steel Works. In 2006, with UK Government support, UNDP procured and installed a rotary kiln burner for small caliber ammunition, less than 14.7 mm in caliber, at the Doboj Military Workshop. The value of the environmental protection machine, manufactured in accordance with the EU standards, was US$ 400,000.
Together with all relevant institutions, and BIH Defense Ministry in particular, UNDP coordinated its activities toward improving potential defense and industrial capacities necessary for the destruction of ammunition. UNDP chose industrial demilitarization of ammunition, instead of destruction of ammunition by open detonation, primarily for the protection of people and environment, and encouragement of local economies.
In view of the amounts and surpluses of unstable ammunition, international institutions and ministries in BiH jointly proposed that the ammunition destruction capacities should be expanded, and new sites were selected in conformity with a specialized assessment: TROM Doboj, Pretis, Vitezit and Binas.
With the European Union support in the amount of EUR 2,7 million, UNDP procured sophisticated equipment for the destruction of ammunition of different calibers, and personal protective equipment for the workers who were trained in UK.
In addition to the agreed 3,000 tons, under the contract signed with Pretis, UNDP has so far destroyed 1,300 tons of ammunition, and over 3,600 tons of ammunition have been destroyed at TROM Doboj. Accordingly, UNDP and the Defense Ministry of BIH have signed a Memorandum of Understanding which regulates details of transportation, loading, unloading and manipulation of ammunition from storage sites to Pretis and TROM Doboj.
In the end, we want to emphasize that control and supervision over the destruction of ammunition and arms, which is the subject of the contract between UNDP and Pretis, were done by a combined team of UNDP, EUFOR, OSCE and NATO representatives. Moreover, the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Relations carries out quarterly inspections at the Pretis, under the Law on the Manufacture of Firearms and Military Equipment. The inspection teams supervise the ammunition destruction and storage, as well as secondary materials.
Nakon što je Evropska komisija zvanično odobrila plan restruktuiranja Hipo grupe u Hipo Alpe Adria banci BiH, podružnice ove banke na Balkanu nastavljaju stabilno sa svojim poslovanjem, rečeno je Srni u Hypo banci u Banjaluci.
U Hypo banci kažu da to znači da će u naredne dvije godine moći da procijene ko je najbolji novi vlasnik za njihovu mrežu.
- Klijenti Hypo banke u BiH dobijaće iste usluge i širok asortiman proizvoda na koji su navikli, tak da i dalje nastavljamo sa svojim stabilnim poslovanjem - rekli su ovoj banci.
Odluka Evropske komisije o restruktuiranju Hipo Alpe Adria grupacije, koji podrazumijeva, između ostalog, i prodaju poslovne mreže u jugoistočnoj Evropi do 2015. godine, odražava ono što se očekivalo i što se uzimalo u obzir u toku posljednjih nekoliko mjeseci.
- Za Hypo podružnice u jugoistočnoj Evropi, prije svega u BiH, to znači da nema više opasnosti od bilo kakvih brzinskih prodaja ili postepenih gašenja poslovanja. Imamo jasne izglede, a koje odobrava Evropska unija, za razvijanje poslovanja i nastavljanje sa struktuisanim i dobrim procesom privatizacije, što upravo i činimo do 2015. godine - navode u Hipo Alpe Adria banci u Banjaluci.
BANJALUKA, Na posebnom escrow računu na koji se prikupljaju prihodi od privatizacije i sukcesije Republike Srpske, sa 30. junom ove godine nalazilo se samo 12,8 miliona KM, saznaje poslovni portal CAPITAL.
Na escrow račun Vlada mora da vrati pozajmljenih 122,2 miliona KM.
Najveći iznos je 70 miliona KM uzetih odlukama Vlade za izmirenje tekućih budžetskih obaveza.
Zatim 17 miliona KM za rekonstrukciju nove bolnice u Bijeljini, 14,5 miliona zajma za Fond zdravstvenog sistema, 14,5 miliona pozajmljenih Robnim rezervama RS, te 4,5 miliona za izmirenje preostalih obaveza Rafinerije nafte Brod.
Vlada nema obavezu da vrati sav uzeti novac sa escrow računa.
Na primjer, samo ove godine uzetih tri miliona KM za dokapitalizaciju preduzeća „Nikola Tesla“ , kao i 9,4 miliona KM po projektima iz Razvojnog programa RS.
Na escrow računu 2007. godine uplaćeno je 646 miliona evra od prodaje Telekoma Srpske, kao i prihod od prodaje Rafinerije nafte Brod, ali i ostalih državnih preduzeća.
BANJALUKA, Vlada i javne institucije Republike Srpske ubjedljivo najviše posluju preko NLB Razvojne banke. Računi javnih prihoda su otvoreni kod osam banka, ali ubjedljivo najveći promet, više od 50 odsto, se pravi preko računa u NBL Razvojnoj banci koja je u većinskom vlasništvu (99,8%) Nove Ljubljanske banke, državne banke Slovenije, saznaje poslovni portal CAPITAL.
Za prvih šest mjeseci preko računa javnih prihoda u NBL Razvojnoj banci naplaćeno je 536 miliona KM, a raspoređeno 531 miliona KM, što je tri puta više od sledeće banke preko koje se vrši naplata.
Preko računa u Novoj banci naplaćeno je 151 miliona KM javnih prihoda, Unikredit banke Banjaluka 74,6 miliona, Bobar banke 50 miliona KM, Hipo Alpe Adria banke 43 miliona KM, Komercijalne banke 34 miliona, Balkan Investment Banke 14 miliona, a Pavlović banke 18,8 miliona KM.
Zanimljivo da preko Bobar banke, čiji je vlasnik Gavrilo Bobar narodni poslanik i visoki funkcioner SNSD-a, javne institucije prave znatno veći promet nego preko nekih drugih banka koji imaju višestruko veću aktivu i veću mrežu poslovnica na teritoriji RS.
Iz cetiri najvece bosanskohercegovacke firme, negdje i uz pomoc IFOR-a, tokom reintegracije Sarajeva Srbi su odnijeli masine i opremu u vrijednosti od najmanje milijardu i po maraka. Radnici se ljute, Vlada uglavnom suti, a u OHR-u tvrde kako oni ne prave razliku izmedju steta nastalih od ratnih dejstava i onih do kojih je doslo tokom reintegracije, kada su topovi uveliko zasutjeli. Je li posrijedi tajni dejtonski dogovor po kojem je Sarajevo pripalo Bosnjacima, a sva pokretna imovina sarajevskih tvornica Srbima?
“Nikad nismo u potpunosti razumjeli zasto je Milosevic odlucio dati Sarajevo Muslimanima…" Ovo je, izmedju ostalog, u svojoj knjizi Zavrsiti rat zapisao Richard Holbrooke, arhitekta bosanskog kompromisa zvanog Dejtonski sporazum. "Nikada necemo u potpunosti shvatiti zasto je medjunarodna zajednica mirno posmatrala masovnu pljacku opreme iz nasih tvornica i nije poduzela nista… Mozda je sve to vec bilo dogovoreno u Daytonu?" Ovako, pak, razmisljaju radnici Pretisa, Energoinvesta, Famosa, Tasa… koji su prije rata radili za oko hiljadu maraka mjesecno, a sada su na cekanju i nisu u stanju prehraniti svoje porodice. Da su Srbi sprijeceni u nosenju vrijedne opreme iz dijelova ovih kompanija koji su nakon Daytona vraceni svojim maticnim kucama, vjerovatno bi danas mnogi od njih razmisljali drugacije.
"Ne bi bilo onoliko posla kao prije rata, ali bi sigurno bilo puno vise uposlenih nego danas", gotovo uglas govori grupa radnika koju je ekipa Dana zatekla u ociglednom dokolicarenju na ulazu u Pretis.
"Posla nema ni za lijeka", porucuju onako usput, psujuci rat, mir, drzavu, direktore, potencijalne strane partnere kojih nema… U preduzecima metalne industrije lociranim na podrucju Sarajeva, prije rata radilo je 50.000 radnika, i to najveci dio u spomenutim tvornicama. Trenutno ih radi oko dvije i po hiljade, dok ih je blizu deset hiljada na cekanju. Ostali su sretniju buducnost potrazili sirom Evrope,SAD-a, Kanade…, ili su zauvijek odlucili promijeniti djelatnost i okusati se u nekom drugom poslu. Vogosca, mala sarajevska opcina, u miru je bila poznata po "golfovima", a u ratu po sistematskim silovanjima i mucenjima Bosnjaka. Prije rata bila je jedna od najrazvijenijih opcina u cijeloj BiH, ako nista, a ono barem po vrijednosti i sirem drustvenom znacaju tvornica koje su locirane na njenoj teritoriji. Preko 15.000 ljudi radilo je u Pretisu, koji je tada imao najsavremenije masine u Evropi; preko 3.500 radilo ih je Tasu, koji je jedini proizvodio vozila Volkswagena i bio njegov ovlasteni distributer za cijelu SFRJ; nekoliko hiljada u UTL-u, gdje su se proizvodili lezajevi tako kvalitetno da je poznati svedski proizvodjac lezajeva SKF ulozio svoj novac u zajednicku proizvodnju. Danas, jedva da ih se u svim nabrojanim tvornicama moze skupiti hiljada. Reintegracija okupiranih podrucja Sarajeva i njihovo vracanje tamo gdje pripadaju bio je najslozeniji i najtraljavije izveden zadatak kojeg je medjunarodna zajednica preuzela na sebe nakon potpisivanja Dejtonskog sporazuma. "Druze Tito, mi ti se kunemo…" Preduzece Tito - Sarajevo, puni je naziv Pretisa, koji je, po mnogim pokazateljima, bio najveca tvornica namjenske industrije u bivsoj Jugoslaviji. Valjalo je zasluziti Titovo ime! No, Pretis nije bio poznat samo ratnicima. Njegov originalni izum pretis-lonac (lonac za ekspres kuhanje) osvojio je svojevremeno srca i novcanike hiljadama domacica sirom bivse nam domovine. Nakon svega, u tvornickom kompleksu dugom 11 kilometara ostao je samo grafit s likom druga Tita ispod kojeg velikim slovima pise:TITOV PUT - NAS PUT. Nazalost, tek obicni grafit jedina je konstanta u tvornici koja je prije rata pravila milion granata godisnje u skladu sa onom Titovom "Zivimo kao da ce vjecno biti mir, naoruzavajmo se kao da ce sutra izbiti rat". Danas se proizvodi tek nekoliko stotina celicnih "kosulja" granata za Austrijance. Pretis je bukvalno razoruzan preko noci. Kada su vogoscanski Srbi saznali za Holbrookeovu dilemu s pocetka price, panicno odvozenje svega sto vrijedi je pocelo. Vogosca je reintegrirana u cik zore, 22. februara 1996. godine. Avdu Hebiba, tadasnjeg ministra unutarnjih poslova Federacije BiH koji je na zgradu svake reintegrisane sarajevske opcine svojom rukom zakacio grb sa ljiljanima, u Vogosci su to jutro docekale puste ulice, pokoji autobus prepun civila srpske nacionalnosti koji su panicno bjezali i potpuno opljackane tvornice. Samo koji dan ranije, jer su mnogi Srbi u Vogosci do posljednjeg dana vjerovali da se Holbrooke sali, u Pretisu su se jos pravile granate za Vojsku Republike Srpske, a u Tasu sklapali preostali golfovi za mnogobrojnu "rodbinu" SDS-a. Sto se nije moglo odnijeti, unisteno je na licu mjesta, "da ne bi palo u ruke mrskog neprijatelja". Prije rata u ovoj tvornici radilo je pet hiljada radnika, a granate i druga vojna oprema izvozene su kao lude u Irak, nesvrstane zemlje i drugdje po svijetu gdje su diktatori kupovali svoj mir. Samo od izvoza zaradjivalo se 140 miliona dolara godisnje. Tada je Pretis bio jedno, a danas je podijeljen na dvoje, namjensku i civilnu industriju sa jedva dvije stotine radnika. Niksic Hilmija, ratni direktor Pretisa, zajedno sa pomalo vec zaboravljenim medjunarodnim koordinatorom za obnovu Sarajeva Williamom Eagltonom, posjetio je pogone ove tvornice 7. februara 1996. godine, nekoliko dana prije reintegracije.
"Bilo je maglovito jutro, u krugu je bilo malo radnika, ali puno kamiona. Sreo sam svog dojucerasnjeg komsiju Zivka Terzica kako komanduje velikim viljuskarom kojim su na kamion tovarili jednu od velikih masina. Javio sam mu se, ali je on samo odmahnuo rukom", kaze Niksic. Vise nije uspio vidjeti jer su ga, kako rece, zajedno sa Eagltonom izbacili iz kruga tvornice policajci Jovan Mangafic i Brano Djordjic. Sa jedne od najvecih proizvodnih hala Srbi su skinuli 3.000 metara kvadratnih krova kako bi helikopterima mogli izvuci velike masine. Baterija za kovanje LASKO 1250 t bila je jedna od najsavremenijih masina u Evropi za proizvodnju granata i dijelova za Mercedes i FAP. Bogami, i jedna od najvecih, jer su svojevremeno prvo postavili masinu pa tek onda zidali zgradu. Nestala je neposredno pred reintegraciju Vogosce, a 1985. godine njena trzisna cijena bila je oko 13 miliona maraka. Ovo je samo jedna od ukupno 21 masine odnesene iz ove firme, a cija trzisna vrijednost se tokom 80-ih kretala izmedju nekoliko stotina hiljada i desetinu miliona maraka. Da se Srbi nisu tako ponasali prema imovini koju su i sami godinama stvarali, danas bi vrijednost Pretisa bila veca za, najmanje, 600 miliona maraka, ne uzimajuci u obzir cijenu svakog radnog mjesta koje je izgubljeno, te stete od NATO zracnih udara po srpskim polozajima tokom 1995. godine "Ne mogu da vjerujem da IFOR nije vidio da oni helikopterima odnose velike masine", cudi se Nerkez Tanovic, jedan od direktora danasnjeg Pretisa. IFOR je, ocigledno, progledao kroz prste i oprema Pretisa zavrsila je u Kadinom Selu, Mjesna zajednica Mokro, opcina Pale. Da budemo jos precizniji, oprema vrijedna 600 miliona maraka dijelom je ugradjena u pogone etnicki ciste firme Pretis-Holding Srpsko Sarajevo, ciji pogon Alatnica se nalazi u krugu bivsih fabrika Gumitehnika i Zoimerc. Uz nesebicnu pomoc Vlade Republike Srpske u zavrsnoj fazi je izgradnja objekta u kojem ce se, uz pomoc opreme odnesene iz Vogosce, proizvoditi hidraulicni cilindri. Dobar dio opreme, pak, hrdja po okolnim livadama i skoro da je neupotrebljiv. Dani posjeduju dokument namijenjen SFOR-u, te entitetskim ministarstvima odbrane u kojem bivsi direktor "srpskog Pretisa" Milorad Motika, koji je rukovodio delozacijom masina iz Vogosce, pljacku tesku 600 miliona maraka naziva ovako: "Nakon potpisivanja Dejtonskog sporazuma preduzece Pretis je promijenilo lokaciju na podrucju Srpsko Sarajevo, Pale - Mokro. Veci dio proizvodno-tehnoloskih kapaciteta je dislociran na novu lokaciju." Dani su pokusali kontaktirati Motiku, ali nam je receno da on vise nije direktor. Novog direktora, gospodina Ljubu Mrdu, Dani su upitali kako onda objasnjava cinjenicu da se gotovo 200 radnika koji su "dislocirali" opremu iz Vogosce sada prijavilo za povratak u istu tu Vogoscu i u stari Pretis. "Nazalost, ne mogu odgovoriti ni na jedno vase pitanje jer ja sam tek preuzeo funkciju i bojim se da ne ispustim nesto znacajno. Milorad Motika je kompetentniji da govori na ovu temu", bile su Mrdine rijeci. Esdeesomobili
Prije rata, svake cetiri minute iz Tvornice automobila Sarajevo(TAS) izlazio je po jedan automobil. Otprilike istom tom dinamikom je u ratu razduzivan vozni park od oko 2.166 gotovih automobila koje je SDS-ova "demokratska" vlast, na nesrecu, zatekla u fabrickom krugu. Ako uzmemo da je svaki automobil (uglavnom "golfovi") u prosjeku kostao oko 17.000 maraka, onda se lako moze izracunati da je SDS, samo u automobilima, podijelio 37 miliona maraka. Pored toga, ostalo je na stotine automobila koji su trebali biti sklopljeni i isporuceni kupcima, hiljade komada rezervnih dijelova… Kompletna linija za proizvodnju i montiranje auto-kablova prenesena je u Rudo. Informacije do kojih su dosli Dani govore da ta oprema sada lezi potpuno beskorisna, jer se tehnologija u proizvodnji auto-kablova potpuno promijenila. Da je ostala u Tasu, vjerovatno bi vise koristila, jer bi se mogla tehnoloski doraditi. Za razliku od ostalih reintegrisanih sarajevskih tvornica, stete u sarajevskoj tvornici automobila mjere se u broju odvezenih vozila i "dislociranih" rezervnih dijelova.
"Automobili iz Tasa nisu se odvozili samo prije reintegracije. Rasipanje nase imovine pocelo je onog momenta kada ga je preuzela srpska vlast. Medjutim, upravna zgrada unistena je potpuno, neposredno prije reintegracije. U urgentne opravke krova i minimalno osposobljavanje ulozili smo tri miliona maraka", kazu u Tasu, koji danas uposljava jedva dvadesetak ljudi. Ova firma zvanicno se gasi 30. juna 2001. godine, a svu njenu imovinu vec je preuzela njemacko-bosanska kompanija Volkswagen - Sarajevo.
Suradnik Dana svojim je ocima vidio bogatu dokumentaciju, koja bi vjerovatno koristila i Haskom tribunalu, iz koje nedvojbeno proizilazi zakljucak: za pljacku Tasa najodgovorniji su: Radovan Karadzic, Nikola Poplasen, ratni direktor Tasa Milan Stokuca, Jovan Tintor, te nekadasnji predsjednik srpske opcine Vogosca Rajko Koprivica… Predstavnici Tasa nisu bili voljni ustupiti dio dokumentacije kako se ne bi "poremetili odnosi sa njemackim partnerom". U dokumentu kojeg je potpisao Radovan Karadzic trazi se dodjela cetiri "golfa" za potrebe Komisije RS-a koja istrazuje genocid nad srpskim narodom. Nikola Poplasen, povjerenik srpskog predsjednistva za Vogoscu, potezom pera dodjeljuje jednog "golfa" gospodjici Biljani Plavsic, a Jovan Tintor sa racuna Tasaisto tako prebacuje 500 miliona ondasnjih dinara i rasporedjuje ih samo on zna gdje. Potom, jedan od dokumenata pokazuje kako je Poplasen izuzeo dvije gume s felgama, pa rezervne dijelove koji su otisli za potrebe Vogoscanske brigade VRS… Dovoljno je kazati da ovakvih dopisa ima na stotine pa da se shvati s kolikom ozbiljnoscu se razduzivao Tas. Famosna pljacka
Fabrika motora Sarajevo (FAMOS) jos jedan je od giganata sarajevske reintegracije. Bolje receno, ova firma je uistinu bila gigant sve dok nije dosla reintegracija. Od ukupne ratne stete procijenjene na 480 miliona maraka, cak 85 posto napravljeno je nakon rata, tokom reintegracije. Procjenu stete uradila je njemacka firma Projektierungs und Gutroling Gesellschaft mBH - Dresden. A da bi se shvatilo o kakvoj pljacki se radi, najbolje je zaviriti u internu statistiku. Ovaj holding (posebna vrsta dionickog preduzeca) prije rata je zaposljavao 12.000radnika u dvanaest fabrika sirom BiH, a cak polovina ih je bila zaposlena u proizvodnom kompleksu u Hrasnici kod Sarajeva. Savremene masine, koje se sada nalaze na privremenom radu u SR Jugoslaviji, izradjivale su dizel-motore, mjenjace, spojnice, oklopna borbena vozila, alate… Godisnja prodaja bila je vrijedna 400 miliona dolara, a svake godine zaradjivano je petnaest miliona dolara samo od prodaje motora i dijelova Mercedes-Benzu.
Sve to je lijepo rastavljeno, potrpano na kamione i odvezeno u Republiku Srpsku prije 12. marta 1996. godine, kada je Sarajevu zvanicno vracena opcina Ilidza.
"Francuski vojnici u sastavu IFOR-a pomagali su Srbima u odvozenju opreme. O tome svjedoce i videosnimke koje su pohranjene u Arhivu Cetvrte motorizirane brigade Vojske Federacije… Nisu nam dali da pridjemo ni blizu hala sve dok i posljednja masina nije rasklopljena i odvezena. Pojedinim dijelovima fabrickih hala nismo mogli prici ni do 12. maja jer je dejtonska linija razgranicenja bila povucena tako da polovi Famos u Hrasnici. Kasnije je nekim dogovorima i taj dio vracen Federaciji. Cak su nas natjerali da cekamo tri dana duze, kako bi Srbima dali vremena da odnesu sve i uniste ono sto nisu mogli odnijeti", kaze generalni direktor danasnjeg Famosa Safet Daut. On veli kako su u noci 11/12. marta Srbi zapalili pet objekata, a francuski vojnici njemu i kolegama nisu dali da pridju ni blizu kako bi ugasili pozar koji je progutao vrijednu dokumentaciju i kancelarijsku opremu. Preseljenjem Famosa, kako veli Daut, rukovodio je Miroslav Berjan, koji je kasnije poginuo u saobracajnoj nesreci, a pomagali su njegovi najblizi suradnici: Risto Dabic,Zarko Elez, Zdravko Zirojevic, Dusan Stjepanovic i Dusan Siljegovic. Suradnik Dana pokusao je stupiti u kontakt s nekim od nabrojanih, ali bezuspjesno.
"Pisao sam Visokom predstavniku Carlu Bildtu. Molio sam ga da zaustavi ociglednu pljacku, ali nikada nisam dobio odgovor, niti je bilo sta ucinjeno."
Postoji bezbroj dokaza da je vecina masina iz Hrasnice zavrsila u srpskom Famosu u Lukavici kraj Sarajeva, ali je dobar dio otpremljen u susjednu SR Jugoslaviju u tvornice: "21. maj" iz Beograda, FAP iz Priboja, "14. oktobar" iz Krusevca, Crvena zastava iz Kragujevca, Zeljezara iz Niksica…. "Kada sam 1999. godine predvodio delegaciju Sindikata BiH u posjeti sindikalcima Srbije, bio sam u prilici da posjetim i sindikalce Crvene zastave. Tada mi je bio zabranjen ulazak u prostorije gdje se nalaze proizvodni pogoni. Kasnije sam doznao da je jedini razlog bio da ne prepoznam postrojenja opljackana iz Sarajeva i odnesena u Srbiju tokom rata", kaze predsjednik Sindikata BiH Sulejman Hrle, koji je svojevremeno i sam trazio od OHR-a da poduzmu nesto. Dani posjeduju dokument koji na najbolji nacin potvrdjuje glasine o tome da se Famosove masine nalaze u Jugoslaviji. Iako su, vjerovatno, unistene tokom zracnih udara NATO snaga po tvornicama namjenske industrije u SR Jugoslaviji, to nikoga ne amnestira od odgovornosti za ociglednu pljacku Sarajeva. Jedan od Famosovih partnera iz Slovenije poslao je u Sarajevo papir koji je raznim prijateljskim kanalima stigao cak od njemackog proizvodjaca masina Klingelberg. Naime, predstavnici "21. maja" iz Beograda trazili su od ove njemacke kompanije da im isporuci rezervne dijelove za nekoliko masina, medju kojima Gratomat 300 HG, koji je prije petnaestak godina kostao dva miliona maraka. Da bi znali o kojem rezervnom dijelu se radi, Nijemci su trazili da im se posalje registarski broj masina. Kada su ih, nakon kraceg ustezanja, dobili i provjerili u svojoj arhivi, shvatili su da su to masine koje su tokom osamdesetih isporucili sarajevskom Famosu. Tat-aratira
Energoinvest je imao ni manje ni vise nego 150 hektara pokrivene povrsine sa preko 60 objekata razlicite namjene na Stupu, naselju na zapadnom prilazu Sarajevu. Najveci dio, oko 50 hektara, pripadao je Tvornici termoaparata (TAT). Nema te rafinerije, benzinskog ili gasnog terminala, hidro i termoelektrane na podrucju bivse Jugoslavije i sire a da u njih nije ugradjen barem jedan dio napravljen u TAT-u. Sve sto je bilo glomazno, komplikovano i na neki nacin specificno, proizvodilo se u ovoj tvornici. Tamo se nekada proizvodila i oprema za nuklearne elektrane, sto je kasnije potaknulo razne price o tome kako Jugoslavija pravi atomsku bombu. Fabrika je neposredno pred rat zaposljavala hiljadu i dvjesto radnika i biljezila izvozni bilans od 110 miliona dolara (!) godisnje. Imali su sve, pa cak i Momcila Krajisnika za direktora finansija. Jest da je Momo kasnije zaglavio u zatvoru zbog finansijskih malverzacija, ali je vrlo brzo rehabilitiran i vracen na odgovornu funkciju. TAT je docekala rat sa svjetskim referencama, opremom vrijednom 130 miliona maraka i Krajisnikom na funkciji predsjednika Skupstine SR BiH. Nakon reintegracije njena vrijednost procijenjena je na oko 50 miliona maraka. Direktna steta na gradjevinskim objektima krece se negdje oko osam miliona maraka. Nije tesko izracunati da su Srbi tokom reintegracije odnijeli, delozirali, dislocirali masine, repromaterijal i dokumentaciju u vrijednosti od oko 70 miliona maraka. Gdje? Od dijela te opreme formiran je srpski TAT u Lukavici pokraj Sarajeva, nesto je zavrsilo u Srbiji, a nesto pak zahrdjalo na livadama oko vojnog kompleksa bivse JNA u Lukavici.
"Bio sam prosle godine u tom srpskom TAT-u i vidio dosta nase opreme. Puno toga lezi na okolnim livadama, a vecinu nisam ni mogao vidjeti, jer nisu dali", kaze direktor TAT-a Muamer Mulovic, koji danas rukovodi ekipom od nekih 250 zaposlenih. Srbi su dobili masine, Bosnjaci zemlju i srusene zgrade. Svi su dobili nesto, samo je TAT izgubio sve. Partnere u inostranstvu, velike poslove, prestiz, milionski prihod. Posla nemaju ni oni sto su odnijeli masine, a ni oni sto su dobili staru lokaciju. Srbi koji su ucestvovali u odnosenju opreme, sada koriste blagodati clana 143. federalnog Zakona o radu i traze otpremninu od "muslimanskog TAT-a", kako ovu tvornicu i danas zovu. Da bi TAT sada profunkcionirao punim kapacitetom, a, kazu, imali bi gdje prodati svoje proizvode, potrebna je investicija od nekih 30 miliona maraka. Taman polovina od onoga sto je odneseno, ili mozda bas onoliko koliko je zahrdjalo po livadama.
Na kraju price namece se sasvim jednostavno pitanje: koliko je kostala reintegracija Sarajeva? Tacan odgovor na ovo pitanje ne moze dati niko ziv, jer koliko god je reintegracija bila kompleksna politicko-diplomatska zavrzlama, toliko je, a mozda jos i vise, elemenata koji bi se mogli ubrojati kao direktna i indirektna steta. Ko je pazljivo procitao ovaj prilog, mogao je i sam izracunati da je u najboljem slucaju reintegracija Sarajeva, u samo cetiri firme, kostala najmanje milijardu i po maraka,ili skoro dva godisnja budzeta Federacije BiH. I to pod uslovom da se u tu cifru ne uracunaju sve gradjevinske stete, potom stete na preduzecima koja nisu obuhvacena ovim istrazivanjem, zatim izgubljena radna mjesta i izgubljena trzista. Ako bi se napravila tako siroka kalkulacija, a mogla bi, onda bi cijena "prodaje" sarajevskih tvornica presla fantasticnu sumu od pet milijardi maraka koje je medjunarodna zajednica obecala za ekonomski i socijalni oporavak cijele BiH. Ostaju pitanja na koje jos dugo niko nece naci odgovora. Medju njima i pitanje svih pitanja: da li je u Daytonu dogovoreno da Srbi tokom reintegracije ponesu sve sto se ponijeti moze i stvore svoj, paralelni, "metalni svijet"? Kakav god da je odgovor, medjunarodna zajednica, a mozda i bh. pregovaraci u Daytonu, ne mogu biti amnestirani od odgovornosti za pljacku zbog koje hiljade ljudi u Sarajevu danas nemaju posla, a niti ce ga imati u dogledno vrijeme.
“Hrle, nemoj svasta pricat’...”
"Neposredno prije rata imao sam saznanja da se sprema pljacka namjenske industrije u BiH. Javno sam tada upozoravao na opasnost da masine iz nasih fabrika zavrse u Srbiji. Zao mi je sto se ispostavilo da sam bio u pravu. Tada su mi neki savjetovali da zacepim usta. Govorili su mi: 'Hrle, nemoj svasta pricat', satrat ce te auto'", kaze Sulejman Hrle.
A Zeljezara?
Suradnik Dana kontaktirao je bivseg Visokog predstavnika u BiH Carla Bildta posredstvom e-maila s molbom da razmijene misljenja o reintegraciji Sarajeva. Gospodin Bildt je pristao i zatrazio da mu se posalju pitanja. Nakon sto je upitan zasto nije sprijecio odnosenje opreme iz fabrika, Bildt vise nikada nije odgovorio.
Danasnji OHR, kako istice jedan od njegovih glasnogovornika Oleg Milisic, ne pravi nikakvu razliku izmedju steta nastalih u fabrikama prije ili poslije reintegracije. Zbog toga OHR nije niti ima namjeru praviti bilo kakve procjene o stetama nastalim tokom reintegracije.
U Uredu Visokog predstavnika smatraju da ce ovo pitanje rijesiti privatizacija. Kada je suradnik Dana podsjetio Milisica na cinjenicu da bi cijena ovih kompanija, da je na vrijeme sprijeceno odnosenje opreme, u privatizaciji bila mnogo veca i da bi bilo vise mogucnosti za zaposljavanje, Milisic je odgovorio:
"Slazem se, da je ostala oprema, da bi bilo vise sansi za radna mjesta. Ali sta je sa Zeljezarom u Zenici? Tamo, koliko znam, nije bilo reintegracije i odnosenja opreme, pa opet imamo probleme."
Objavljeno u broju 165 DANA, 28. juli / srpanj 2000.
Nakon objavljivanja imena i tvrtki dovedenih u vezu sa "šećernom aferom" Petar Ćorluka
izjavljuje:
Project Code: Scoping_HH_BiH
Publication: Večernji.hr
Provider: Večernji list digital d.o.o.
July 22, 2004
Istraga Europske komisije pokazat će istinu
Autor: Valentina Rupčić
GRUDE - Najnoviji događaj koji posljednjih dana potresa BiH jest tzv. šećerna afera, koja je,
kako se navodi, dobila zamah pa je i Europska komisija s mjerodavnim institucijama BiH
pokrenula opsežnu istragu. Naime, tvrdi se da je prema europskim podacima u BiH izvezeno
60 tisuća tona šećera više nego što je prikazano u podacima o uvozu. Ako je šećer iz BiH
ponovno uvezen u Europu, proračun zemalja Europske unije znatno je oštećen, na što je
Europska komisija morala reagirati. Kako bi priča imala središte zbivanja, spomenulo se i
nekoliko imena koja su izravno optužena za sudjelovanje u šećernoj aferi. Tvrtka Prodex iz
Gruda jedan je od najvećih uvoznika šećera u BiH i spomenuta je u kontekstu istrage, ali i
velike mogućnosti da je s još nekolicinom uvoznika iz BiH odgovorna za sva te događaje.
Petar Ćorluka, Prodexov vlasnik i direktor, u telefonskom je razgovoru za Večernji list
objasnio Prodexovu ulogu u BiH. Naime, Ćorluka tvrdi kako jest jedan od najvećih uvoznika
šećera u BiH, ali da sav uvezeni šećer prodaje u BiH te da nisu izvezli niti jedan kilogram u
zemlje Europske unije. - Robu carinimo u BiH i ona se prodaje kupcima u BiH. Kako mi u
državi ne proizvodimo šećer, logično je da ga uvozimo, ali po kojoj bismo ga logici ponovno
izvozili? - pita Ćorluka. - Onaj tko je izvezao šećer, trebao bi imati certifikat o dozvoli izvoza
i toga bi trebalo pitati, ali i one koji su dopustili izvoz. Ne bježim od odgovornosti jer znam da
je naše poslovanje u redu i nemamo se zbog čega brinuti. Zatražio sam demanti zbog objave
moga imena i imena tvrtke u medijima i žao mi je što se na takav način pokušava dovesti u
kontekst nešto što je dobro za BiH - kaže Ćorluka. Ćorluka tvrdi kako je oduševljen što će
istragu voditi Europska komisija jer, kako kaže, valjda će biti objektivna i korektna u istrazi i
pokazati njegovu neupletenost u cijeli slučaj, a javnosti pokazati istinu. Bjelodano je da se
loptica želi prebaciti tamo gdje prioblema nema i stvoriti zamršenu situaciju, i to nepotpunim
podacima. Naime, javnosti nije predočen uvozno-izvozni list, podaci o točnim imenima
uvoznika i izvoznika, datum kada je sporni šećer izvezen, čime i kojim putem. Direktor
Carinske uprave Želimir Rebac izjavio je kako je protiv tvrtke Prodex prošle godine potpisao
kaznenu prijavu za carinske prijevare i dostavio je Tužiteljstvu BiH. Tužiteljstvo je tim činom
upozoreno da Prodex uvozi velike količine šećera i da to treba dobro ispitati. Ćorluka na tu
izjavu nije imao komentara osim konstatacije da nikada nije doznao za prijavu niti je dobio
obavijest kako je protiv njega podnijeta kaznena prijava. Priču da je Prodex paravan koji,
kako se navodi, stoji iza svih tvrtki koje su navedene kao izvoznici šećera, Ćorluka također
kategorično odbija govoreći kako su mu upravo te tvrtke konkurencija i da s njima nema
nikakva kontakta. - Vjerojatno nekome smeta to što smo mi najveći uvoznici šećera, što
upošljavamo ljude i radimo normalno - dodaje Ćorluka, ogorčen zbog dovođenja njegove
tvrtke i imena u vezu s nečim nelegalnim. - Prodex je nastavio normalno poslovati i nismo
osjetili bitne razlike u radu jer nas takve neistinite afere neće tako lako poljuljati i izbaciti s
tržišta BiH - ponavlja Petar Ćorluka, Prodexov vlasnik i direktor.
More than five years after the war, reconciliation, economic development, refugee return, and institutional reform are moving ahead at a very slow pace and at high cost in Bosnia and Herzegovina . Without strong international presence, the country would still break up. International political and military presence will be necessary for decades more to come and the development of a stronger civil society will most likely take as long as that. Nevertheless, local conflict transformation organizations exist and are growing stronger.
Bosnia and Herzegovina is situated in the center of the old Yugoslav territory. It is bordered by Croatia to the west, Serbia to the east, and Montenegro to the southeast. Its population is traditionally ethnically mixed with 44 percent Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks), 31 percent Bosnian Serbs, 17 percent Bosnian Croats, and 8 percent others, according to the 1991 census.
The conflict in Bosnia should be understood as an escalated political conflict between ethnonationalist elites drawing upon popular fears based on an unresolved past. As communism never dealt with the atrocities of World War II, but rather repressed a debate on them, this left ample room for abuse by the new ethnic elites that rose at the end of the 1980s. Their rise was facilitated by a strong downturn in the economy at the time.
In November 1990, the first postcommunist elections were held in Bosnia and Herzegovina . Although all established in the year of the elections, the three main nationalist parties representing the three main ethnic groups attained an overwhelming victory. Bosnian Muslims voted mainly for the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), Bosnian Croats for the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), and Bosnian Serbs for the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS). This victory is in part a result of their de facto electoral alliance against the former League of Communists, which transformed itself into the Social Democratic Party (SDP).
After their electoral victory, the SDA, HDZ, and SDS formed a governmental coalition in November 1990. All levels of government, central and otherwise, in virtually all locations were divided up between the three coalition partners. Friction between them started to develop from the very beginning.
The three nationalist parties were fast to develop a tight grip on the armed forces, police, judiciary, humanitarian aid, media, economy, and other crucial sectors of society in their own territorial sectors within Bosnia and Herzegovina.1 The new ethnonationalist elite kept escalating ethnic tensions, using mass media to carry their message, while gaining support from various groups in society such as religious leaders and intellectuals.
Schools and universities started to differentiate curricula and to promote intolerance. As a result, three totally independent understandings of the conflict developed. Significant parts of influential groups in society, such as the church and academia, contributed to the escalation of tension. Various religious leaders (Orthodox, Catholic, and Muslim) supported the ethnic-nationalist political leaderships and thereby legitimized their rule. Also, many academics played an escalating role in the conflict. Many took active positions in ethnic-nationalist parties or promoted ethnic hatred through doubtful "academic" publications. Although some independent, alternative media and progressive religious leaders and intellectuals were active throughout the conflict, they failed to draw the mass appeal that would have been necessary to stop the vicious circle of escalation.
Meanwhile, the increasing nationalism in neighboring Serbia and Croatia strongly increased tensions in Bosnia and Herzegovina . The institutionalized nationalism of Tudjman and Milosevic further encouraged ethnic-nationalist politicians within Bosnia and Herzegovina to pursue their path of escalation. They also got direct support from the nationalist Croatian and Serb leadership.
In March 1991, Tudjman and Milosevic met secretly in the town of Karadjordjevo , where they discussed the partitioning of Bosnia and Herzegovina . Under this external and internal pressure, Bosnia and Herzegovina gravitated to war.2 Within Bosnia and Herzegovina , tension increased, especially between the SDA and HDZ on the one side, and the Serb-led SDS on the other side. Whereas the SDS wanted to remain within a future Yugoslavia , the SDA and HDZ opted for independence of the republic. SDS leader Karadzic increased tension by organizing a referendum and in November 1991 the Bosnian Serbs overwhelmingly voted to remain in a common state with neighboring Serbia and Montenegro . The tension built up further, when subsequently, on 9 January 1992, Serb deputies of the old Bosnian Assembly adopted a separate constitution and thereby attempted to create a new state called the " Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina ."
On 15 January 1992, Croatia and Slovenia were internationally recognized as independent states. Bosnia and Herzegovina now had to choose between independence or staying in a rump Yugoslavia under the control of Serbia . Faced with this dilemma, the Bosnian parliament, on 25 January 1992, adopted a plan to hold a referendum on the sovereignty of the republic, a session that was boycotted by the Bosnian Serb parties. In the referendum, held from 29 February through 1 March, 99.4 percent of those voting (63 percent) voted for independence. It was mostly Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats who voted. The vast majority of Bosnian Serbs (who comprised 31 percent of the population) boycotted the referendum on a call by the SDS. The leader of the largest Bosnian Serb party (SDS), Radovan Karadzic, declared that "we will not accept an independent Bosnia and Herzegovina ." The Bosnian Serbs still wanted to remain part of Yugoslavia . However, on 3 March 1992, the Bosnian government in Sarajevo declared independence. Subsequently, the Bosnian Serbs declared the independence of a Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina on 25 March 1992. Throughout the war, the SDS hoped to continue the integration of the areas under its controls with neighboring Serbia , Montenegro , and Serbian-controlled areas in Croatia (Krajina and eastern and western Slavonia ), in effect creating a "Greater Serbia."
Bosnia and Herzegovina was recognized as a sovereign state by the EU and the United States on 6 and 7 April 1992, respectively. The Sarajevo government was recognized as its legitimate representative. It was in this month that the SDS leadership, supported by the Yugoslav National Army, in conjunction with the Serbian regime, started fighting in Bosnia and Herzegovina on a large scale. The ill-prepared local territorial defense forces of the Bosnian government (part of which had already been dismantled by the Yugoslav National Army) attempted to mount some resistance. The police force was also used for this purpose. Strongest resistance came from the Bosnian Croat paramilitary formations, supported by the regular Croatian army.
The war would last three-and-a-half years and lead to enormous atrocities. Europe had not experienced such atrocities since World War II, and many had hoped that those would never occur again. The death toll among civilians was high. One of the worst episodes of the conflict was the fall of the UN-protected enclave of Srebrenica. As a report of the UN Secretary-General on the fall of Srebrenica put it: "Srebrenica is the largest massacre since the Second World War, with a death toll in the thousands, possibly as high as 8,000. The great majority of those who were killed were not killed in combat . . . The fall of Srebrenica is shocking because the enclave's inhabitants believed that the authority of the United Nations Security Council, the presence of UNPROFOR peacekeepers, and the might of NATO air power, would ensure their safety."3
Another tragic aspect of the Bosnian war has been the widespread rape and sexual assault on women and men, which according to a UN report published in December 1994 has been strategically used in campaigns of ethnic cleansing. Rape and sexual assault were reported in 162 detention centers as well as outside these centers. The report concludes, inter alia, that "a systematic rape and sexual assault policy exists . . . one factor in particular that leads to this conclusion is the large number of allegations of rape and sexual assault which occur in places of detention."4
Conflict Dynamics
Not long after the international recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina , on 5 July 1992, the Bosnian Croats proclaimed their own quasi-state under the name Herceg-Bosna. Its aspiration was an eventual union with the independent state of Croatia . One of the first substantial international plans to resolve the conflict, the Vance-Owen Peace Plan, was presented on 2 January 1993, but like many other diplomatic initiatives, failed to stop the war.
In February 1993, the Croat-Muslim allies started fighting each other and by summer 1993, this developed into a war. During this conflict, regular army units of the Croatian army took part in the fighting. This military conflict officially ended with the creation of an unstable Muslim-Croat federation on 18 March 1994. The so-called Washington Agreement brokered by the United States , contained a preliminary agreement for a confederation with Croatia proper.
On 4 August 1995, the Croatian army started a successful offensive, covertly supported by the United States . Croatian forces swiftly took control of all territory in the Croatian Krajina, which had earlier been declared autonomous by local Serbian leaders. This opened the way for a large-scale offensive in Bosnia and Herzegovina , especially since on 1 September, NATO air strikes were launched against Bosnian Serb forces. In mid-September, a combined operation by Croatian, Bosnian-Croat, and Bosnian government forces started, again with political backing from the United States . Within weeks, the Bosnian-Serb army lost control over 15 percent of Bosnia-Herzegovina's territory.
Peace negotiations started in Dayton , Ohio , and on 21 November 1995 a General Framework Agreement was announced and subsequently signed in Paris on 14 December. The so-called Dayton Accords recognized Bosnia and Herzegovina as a sovereign state but divided it into two entities; the Republika Srpska (Serbian Republic), with 49 percent of the territory, and the Bosnian-Croat Federation (Bosnia and Herzegovina) with 51 percent of Bosnian-Herzegovinian territory.
In the first post-Dayton elections of 1996, the main three nationalist parties overwhelmingly won the elections and continued to wage war by political means. To date, the deliberate policy of the international community to hold elections frequently to accelerate the erosion of support for hard-line nationalist politicians has largely failed.5 The same nationalists not only overwhelmingly won the first postwar 1996 elections, but remained in control of the largest parties in the subsequent 1997 and 1998 elections. It took until the municipal and general elections of 2000 before one of the three main ethnic parties would seriously lose support. This happened when the SDP obtained a victory over the SDA.
A very worrying development is the escalation of tension between the international community and the political party of Croatians, HDZ. In October, prior to the general 2000 elections, the HDZ together with some smaller Croat parties formed the Croat National Congress, which organized a referendum on the same day as the national elections. The Bosnian Croat electorate was hereby asked whether "Croats should have their own political, educational, scientific, cultural and other institutions on the entire territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina ." The referendum was declared illegal by the OSCE, but went ahead as planned. According to the HDZ, over 70 percent of the registered Bosnian Croats voted, with 99 percent supporting the question asked in the referendum. This raised tensions between the international community and the HDZ.
The HDZ and its allies formed the so-called Croat Self-Government on 3 March 2001. Days later, the high representative removed the president of the HDZ, Ante Jelavic, from his post as Croat member of the Bosnian presidency. This tension was further aggravated when shortly after, NATO soldiers, UN security forces, Western auditors, and local financial police moved against the bank Hercegovacka Banka, allegedly a key source of financing for nationalist Bosnian Croat institutions and the HDZ party. This action caused widespread violence throughout Bosnian Croat majority areas in the federation. This situation was still far from resolved at the writing of this chapter and was expected to continue to pose a significant threat to the stability of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Official Conflict Management
In Bosnia and Herzegovina , four civil and one military international organization played a key role in conflict management. The civil organizations being the Office of the High Representative, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the International Police Task Force, and the International War Crimes Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. The military organization keeping the peace in Bosnia is the NATO Stabilization Force, which succeeded the highly criticized United Nations Protection Force. No official domestic conflict-management organizations exist at this point. In the future, however, a commission on truth and reconciliation might be established.
In February 1992, the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) was established by the UN Security Council. It was based in Sarajevo and its peacekeeping role in Croatia was extended to Bosnia and Herzegovina on 30 May 1992 under the enforcement provisions of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. During the conflict, the mandate of UNPROFOR was extended time and again. Being the largest and most expensive peacekeeping force deployed by the UN, its main problem was connected to its mandate that allowed it to keep a peace that did not exist. It had no peace-enforcement possibilities. The force was also hindered by a suffocating bureaucratic UN decisionmaking process.
As had been laid out in the Dayton Accords, UNPROFOR was succeeded by the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR). IFOR had a maximum strength of 60,000 troops from thirty-five countries and was mandated to supervise the military side of the Dayton agreement. Unlike UNPROFOR, it was mandated to use force to achieve its objectives, had the necessary means to use that military force, and was operating under a far swifter NATO command. In 1998, IFOR was renamed the Stabilization Force (SFOR) and reduced to 36,000 troops.
The Office of the High Representative (OHR) was mandated under Dayton to oversee the implementation of the civil aspects of the agreement and to coordinate the activities of the civilian organizations and agencies operating in the country. The high representative has no authority over SFOR. The OHR is the main civilian force keeping the Bosnian state together, and has imposed the most important state laws, such as those on the flag, coinage, passports, and the central bank.
The second most important international organization involved in conflict management in Bosnia and Herzegovina is the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). On 30 April 1992, Bosnia and Herzegovina was accepted as a member of the OSCE. OSCE's main role in Bosnia and Herzegovina started after the signing of the peace agreement in 1995. The UN Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina received three main tasks: supervising elections, monitoring and reporting on human-rights issues, and negotiating and implementing confidence- and security-building measures and arms control. The OSCE has been widely criticized for its conduct of the 1996 elections, which legitimized the rule of the three nationalist parties that obtained a major victory.
The International Police Task Force (IPTF) monitors and advises the local police. It "aims to restructure and reform the local police to create democratic and professional police forces which are multi-ethnic, effective, transparent, impartial, accountable, representative of the society they serve, and which will facilitate the return of refugees and displaced persons."6 It keeps local police officials under scrutiny and selects new officers from especially underrepresented ethnic and gender groups, and encourages the return and voluntary redeployment of experienced police officers. It is conducting training programs, for instance, in human rights, organized crime, drugs, crowd control, and major-incident management.
Another international organization worth mentioning here is the International War Crimes Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), which was established in May 1993 and has its seat in The Hague , Netherlands . Although it was slow to start, the tribunal has grown fast over the recent years and has succeeded to bring in a number of high-ranking suspects, including Slobodan Milosevic. To date, however, many important indicted war criminals remain at large. Reluctance of NATO to support the ICTY on the ground have made more widespread arrests infeasible. The extent to which the ICTY will succeed in bringing at least the most important war criminals (Karadzic, Mladic) to court is considered to be of crucial importance for establishing a sustainable peace as will be the acceptance of the court by all ethnic groups in the country. At present, the ICTY is perceived by especially the Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat leadership as biased, which inhibits its ability to serve as a conflict-resolution actor.
Multi Track Diplomacy
Local civil society in Bosnia and Herzegovina is slowly developing. Although not all local NGOs are efficient and have an impact, several larger, well-developed local NGOs exist. Most of them are oriented on humanitarian issues, and many also work indirectly on conflict transformation. A significant number of local organizations choose postconflict transformation as their core activity.
During the communist era, Yugoslavia had no political or humanitarian NGOs other than state-sponsored associations that operated under government control. The years preceding the war were characterized by increasing political freedoms, and nongovernmental sociopolitical organizations started to develop in Bosnia and Herzegovina . In the years after 1989, many political groups appeared on the scene, such as the Association for a Yugoslavian Democratic Initiative (UJDI), the Anti-War Campaign Sarajevo, the Helsinki Citizens Assembly, the Citizens Forum of Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina , and the People's Front. Various women's organizations were actively involved in the field of conflict prevention and conflict resolution as well.
Many of them had mixed ethnic membership and called for moderation of politics in a period of escalating nationalism. Roundtable discussions were organized, petitions circulated, and press conferences held. Activities were mostly concentrated in the larger towns. They were often initiated by political parties, especially the social democratic–oriented parties SDP and the Union of Bosnian Social Democrats.
At that time, most of these local NGOs were ignored by both national and international policymakers. The initiatives were often taken by intellectuals or on a very local grass-roots level, and failed to gain mass support. When the war broke out, so-called Humanitarian Service Delivery Associations were established. They rapidly outnumbered sociopolitical initiatives and engaged themselves with issues such as displaced persons, war victims, humanitarian aid, and reconstruction. From early on, the local NGO sector was concentrated in the larger cities and set up by the urban middle class.
It is difficult to precisely determine the number of local and international associations and humanitarian organizations in Bosnia and Herzegovina today. Different sources provide different figures. The International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA) lists 173 international and 365 local NGOs in its 2000 directory. It should be noted, however, that by far not all existing initiatives are listed. In general, the number of NGOs is decreasing, mostly directly related to the decrease of international funding. Many international NGOs are "localizing" their efforts by transforming themselves into local organizations.
Some of the oldest, best-organized local NGOs, such as the Forum of Tuzla Citizens, Circle 99, and the Helsinki Committees, focus their activities on political advocacy. Through public campaigns, round tables, publications, and the like, they try to influence both government policymakers and public opinion.
The Forum of Tuzla Citizens, founded in 1993, received extensive support from citizens in Tuzla in support of its main objectives of building interethnic trust and preserving a multinational and multireligious society in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The forum organizes debates, roundtable discussions, and poster campaigns. Another important advocacy NGO is Circle 99, founded in 1992. Based in Sarajevo , it is run by the local Association of Independent Intellectuals, which rejects nationalism and supports a multicultural country. Recently, it published a full-page pamphlet in national newspapers, making clear policy recommendations to the newly elected government.
The Helsinki Committees in Sarajevo and Bijeljina, founded in 1995 and 1996 respectively, constantly monitor the human-rights situation, but do not shy away from joining or initiating political advocacy work. They often operate in a concerted effort with other organizations.
Most NGOs belong to broader cooperation structures. Two clear examples of these umbrella organizations are Citizens Alternative Parliament, founded in 1996, and the Alternative Ministers Council. The Citizens Alternative Parliament strives for a multiethnic state with autonomous, free, independent, and equal citizens and has thirteen member NGOs throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina . The Alternative Ministers Council is active in political circles and has both social-democratic parties and NGOs amongst its members.
A good example of a well-organized women's NGO is Medica Zenica. This organization provides professional multidisciplinary support to women, with a focus on traumatized survivors. It has provided support to rape victims in the Bosnian war and employs, inter alia, a score of doctors and psychologists. It has also engaged itself in political and policy-oriented advocacy work. For example, Medica is engaged in producing and spreading knowledge on the conflict and conflict resolution, publishing articles, and organizing seminars. It has its own information and documentation center.
Another level on which conflict-transformation NGOs are active is on the level of training and seminars. Three organizations worth mentioning in this respect are the Center for Nonviolent Action, the Nansen Dijalog Centar, and the hCa Youth Network.
The Nansen Dijalog Centar Mostar is part of the Nansen Network of Dialogue (NDC) operating Balkan-wide. It organizes workshops, seminars, round-table meetings and open discussions on peaceful conflict resolution as well as on the development of democratic processes and civic society in the region. Together with NDC Sarajevo, Banja Luka , Osijek , Montenegro , Belgrade , Pristina, and Skopje , it forms an expanding network of interdependent and cooperating offices. Each office is operated by ethnically mixed staff.
Established in early 1997, the hCa Youth Network aims to bring together youth from around Bosnia and Herzegovina in joined events. It consists of over one hundred local NGOs. The network publishes its magazine TNT, aimed at stimulating cooperation between youth groups from both entities. The hCa Youth Network organizes seminars, conferences, and nonviolent conflict-resolution training.
The Center for Nonviolent Action (CNA) organizes seminars in nonviolent conflict transformation. It supports other groups that are interested in organizing similar seminars. CNA puts its major focus on training NGO activists, teachers, media, and political-party representatives. Its network extends throughout the entire former Yugoslavia .
Other organizations active in the field are, amongst others, Protector, Open Society Institute, the Office for Human Rights, Zene Zenuma, Center for Civic Initiatives, and the International Multi-Religions and Intercultural Center .
A related but different sort of local organization is the Association of Citizens "Truth and Reconciliation," led by Jacob Finci, the leader of the Jewish community in Bosnia and Herzegovina . This association is lobbying for the establishment of an official state commission for truth and reconciliation. The association is comprised of representatives of leading conflict-resolution NGOs (such as the Forum of Tuzla Citizens, Circle 99, and the Helsinki Committee). The idea of a truth and reconciliation commission was initially launched by the U.S. Institute of Peace in 1997, but has developed into a local initiative. Since its conception, the ruling nationalist parties, although paying lip service to the idea, have never seriously supported the proposal in practice. The International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia is a supporter of the establishment of a truth and reconciliation commission.
The establishment of the Inter-Religious Council of Bosnia and Herzegovina dates back to October 1996, when for the first time since the war the World Conference on Religion and Peace brokered a meeting between the four principal leaders of the Jewish, Islamic, Catholic, and Orthodox religious communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The interreligious council, officially launched in June 1997, promotes religious tolerance and understanding. Jacob Finci was elected its first chairman. He was succeeded in 1999 by Cardinal Vinko Puljic, the Roman Catholic archbishop of Sarajevo . The establishment of the council was supported by the U.S. Institute of Peace. Although not extremely active, the council has an important moral weight and strong symbolic value.
Challenges for Local NGOs One of the most important threats to local NGOs is the absence of proper NGO legislation. NGOs cannot register to operate throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina , but only in one of the entities. The law does not distinguish between mutual and public benefit organizations, which is of vital importance for tax-deductible financial contributions and access to government grants and contracts. The norms that regulate the economic, income-generating activities of NGOs are also lacking or inappropriate. The absence of a proper legal framework seriously impedes the development of a sustainable NGO sector and frustrates the role of NGOs as actors of conflict resolution. It is most disturbing that although the OSCE and OHR have been working with local NGOs since as early as 1997 on drafts for such a law, it has not been passed as of yet.
At present, most local NGOs are underresourced and rely heavily on international funding. With the dwindling of this international funding, local organizations are finding it increasingly difficult to secure the resources necessary for their survival. Especially in the absence of a legal framework providing financial benefits, the poor state of the local economy, and the lack of international investors (and thus sponsors), observers fear for the sustainability of many local NGOs.
Another obstacle for local NGOs is their relationship to international NGOs and governmental international organizations. Some internationals are said to have adopted what is described as paternalistic behavior toward local NGOs. As many local NGOs rely on international funding, their agendas for action are often dictated by donor priorities. In some instances, this turns them into the role of cheap service-delivery organizations.
Local NGOs also have to improve themselves before they can expect to become an important factor in Bosnia and Herzegovina and to be taken seriously by international and local actors. Especially, coordination and cooperation between them could be improved. They have not been able, for example, to strongly unite behind a new NGO law and lobby for its passage. Too often, local organizations see each other as competitors over scarce funding, instead of as strategic partners.
Prospects
Recent violence in the Bosnian Croat majority areas continue to pose a threat to the stability of the country. It is clear that the process of democratization and the implementation of the Dayton Accords has made only limited progress. There are, however, also reasons for careful optimism.
In day-to-day life, things are slowly improving. Local NGOs in conflict transformation and resolution have been growing stronger. The citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina can travel freely throughout the country. The number of refugees returning is increasing. On the political level, progress can be observed as well. The 2000 municipal and national elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina have shown increasing support for moderate parties. Bosnia and Herzegovina , for the first time since the end of the war, has a nonnationalist government in both entities and at the national level.
In neighboring Croatia and Serbia , important political changes have occurred as well during 2000. In both countries, the leadership that has been actively engaged in the recent ethnic-nationalist wars has been replaced by more moderate ones that better respect the territorial integrity of the Bosnian state.
Within Bosnia and Herzegovina , however, strong obstacles still exist to a better future for the country. The recent violence in many Croatian majority areas and the weak position of the new nonnationalist government are major obstacles.
Recommendations
It is absolutely clear that the international community will have to stick to the implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords and will have to step up its efforts to make it work. To put the Dayton agreement up for renegotiations, as has been advocated by some, would cause too much unrest and is unrealistic at this time. In the long term, however, it will surely require alterations.
The international community will have to keep dealing with the nationalist political parties HDZ, SDS, and SDA if it wants to see policy implemented in practice. It will not be an option to simply ignore their existence, as they still wield very strong influence throughout the country and are backed by very large proportions of the population.
The international community needs to be patient and should not move ahead too fast, or move too far beyond the Dayton framework, as this would play into the hands of the nationalist parties and could actually bolster their support. It will therefore be crucial for the success of the international community to recognize that the reality on the ground cannot be changed overnight, but that a persistent and continued, longer-term international presence will be required.
Following are some other concrete measures necessary for boosting stability and peace in the country:
Full implementation on all levels of the decision of the constitutional court of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the equality of three constituent peoples and all the citizens in the entire territory of the state. The constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina should be reformed to bring it into line with the international conventions on human rights and freedoms
Establishment of a truth and reconciliation commission for Bosnia and Herzegovina , closely working together with such commissions in Croatia and Yugoslavia
Reform of the educational sector—screening of educational curricula for inciting of hatred against other ethnic groups
Continued support for independent media and strict enforcement of regulations that forbid hate speech
Reduction of the military forces in the country in both staff and equipment
Development of a clear long-term strategy of entry of Bosnia-Herzegovina into the Council of Europe, NATO's Partnership for Peace, and the European Union
Passage of laws against violence and discrimination against women
Miscellaneous
Allcock, John B., Marko Milivojevic, and John J. Horton, Roots of Modern Conflict: Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia, Denver : ABC-CLIO, 1998; and Jan Ballast and Martin Roedbro, ECMM preelection special report An Overview of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Political Spectrum, 1 September 1998. D. A. Dyker and I. Vejvoda (eds.), Yugoslaviaand After: A Study in Fragmentation, Despair and Rebirth, Harlow, England, Longman Publishing Group, 1996, p. 99.
The classification of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina as either "civil war" or "war of aggression" is still very much dividing public opinion. Besides taking a stance on the emotional guilt issue, it is important to note that the issue has at its core an important international political dimension as well. Whereas it is possible to have an international intervention in a "war of aggression," or "international conflict," a "civil war" excludes the possibility of such an intervention. In the early days of the war, the SDS leadership was portraying the conflict as a civil war, whereas the SDA/HDZ government was promoting to have it accepted as an international one.
UN Document A/54/549, 15 November 1999, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 53/35/ The Fall of Srebrenica.
Rape and Sexual Assault, UN Security Council Report (Annex IX of Report S/1994/674/Add.2) (vol. V), 28 December 1994. Final report of the United Nations Commission of Experts, established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), under the chairmanship of M. Cherif Bassiouni. To be downloaded from http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/comexpert/ANX/IX.htm.
Report on the Conformity of the Legal Order of Bosnia and Herzegovina with the Council of Europe Standards, AS/But/Bosnia and Herzegovina (1999) 1rev., Strasbourg , 7 January 1999, p. 39.
Review of Free Thought (periodical), Circle 99, Sarajevo.
REPORTS AND ARTICLES:
International Crisis Group After Milosevic: A Practical Agenda for Lasting Balkans Peace, Brussels, April 2001. Bosnia: Reshaping the International Machinery, November 2001. Is Dayton Failing? Bosnia Four Years After the Peace Agreement, Balkans Report no. 80. International Council of Voluntary Organisations (ICVA), Directory of Humanitarian and Development Agencies Operating in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo, 2000. International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, "Human Rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina," from Human Rights in the OSCE Region: The Balkan, the Caucasus, Europe, Central Asia and North America, Report 2001 (events of 2000). Kvinna till Kvinna Foundation, Engendering the Peace Process. A Gender Approach to Dayton—and Beyond, Anna Lithhander (ed.), Halmstad, 2000. NGO Information Support Center Sarajevo (CIP), Directory of Local Non-Governmental Organisations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, first English edition, Sarajevo, December 1998. United States Institute of Peace, Bosnia's Next Five Years: Dayton and Beyond, Special Report, 3 November 2000.
OTHER PUBLICATIONS:
Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War, by Susan Woodward. Washington, DC, Times Books, 1995. Bosnia: A Short History, by Noel Malcolm. New updated edition. London, Papermac, 1996. "Civil Society and Peacebuilding in Bosnia and Herzegovina," by Roberto Belloni. Journal of Peace Research 38, no. 2, 2001. Guidelines for Laws Affecting Civic Organisations, by Zeke Volkert. New York, Open Society Institute, 1997. In Search of Politics: The Evolving International Role in Bosnia and Herzegovina, European Stability Initiative Discussion Paper, Berlin, 1 November 2001. Peace Journey: The Struggle for Peace in Bosnia, by Carl Bildt. London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1998. The Space Between Us: Negotiating Gender and National Identities in Conflict, by Cockburn. London, Zed Books, 1998. To End a War, by Richard Holbrooke. New York, Random House, 1998. Yugoslavia and After: A Study in Fragmentation, Despair and Rebirth, edited by D. A. Dyker and I. Vejvoda. Harlow, UK, Longman Publishing Group, 1996. Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse: Causes, Course and Consequences, by Christopher Bennett. London, Hurst & Company, 1995.
SELECTED INTERNET SITES:
www.crisisweb.org (International Crisis Group) www.icva-bh.org/eng/ (International Council of Voluntary Agencies) www.iwpr.net (Institute for War and Peace Reporting) www.ohr.int (Office of the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina) www.oscebih.org (OSCE mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina) www.ric.com.ba (Repatriation and return of refugees and displaced persons in Bosnia and Herzegovina)
RESOURCE CONTACTS:
Roberto Bellioni, research fellow, University of Denver, U.S., e-mail: rbelloni@du.edu Goran Bozicevic, MIRAMIDA, Croatia, e-mail: goranb@zamir.net Ivana Francovic, Center for Nonviolent Action Sarajevo/Belgrade, e-mail: cna.sarajevo@gmx.net Zdravko Grebo, director, Law Center, University of Sarajevo, e-mail: zdravko@soros.org.ba Jan ter Laak, Netherlands Helsinki Committee, e-mail: jtl@wxs.nl Jasna Malkoc, head of the Democratisation Department, OSCE Belgrade, e-mail: JMMalkoc@yahoo.de Vladimir Maric, Nansen Dialogue Center Mostar, e-mail: vladimir@ndcmostar.org Slavko Santic, secretary, Circle 99, Sarajevo, e-mail: cna.sarajevo@gmx.net Vehid Sehic, president, Forum of Tuzla Citizens, e-mail: tz@bih.net.ba Miriam Struyk, Interchurch Peace Council, The Hague, e-mail: mstruyk@ikv.nl Dubravka Zarkov, the Netherlands, e-mail: d.zarkov@chello.nl
Helsinki Citizens' Assembly Sarajevo Human Rights House of Sarajevo Antie Fijamenga 14b 71000 Sarajevo Tel./ Fax: + 387 33 666372 E-mail: hca-sa@bih.net.ba
Helsinki Citizens' Assembly Tuzla Hazi Bakirbega Tuzlica no. 1 75000 Tuzla Tel./Fax: + 387 35 250481 E-mail: hcatuzla@bih.net.ba www.hcamreza.org
Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in BiH Ante Fijamenga 14b Sarajevo Tel.: + 387 33 230809/ 231852 Fax: + 387 33 230811/ 230809 E-mail: info@bh-hchr.org www.bh-hchr.org
Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in RS Brace Gavrica 6 Bijeljina Tel.: + 387 55 472851/ 401532 Fax: + 387 55 401821 E-mail: helcomm@inecco.net
International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA) Obala Kulina Bana 4 71000 Sarajevo Tel.: + 387 33.210201 Fax: + 387 33.668297 E-mail: icva@bih.net.ba www.icva-bh.org/eng/
International Multi-Religious and Intercultural Center (IMIC) Obala Kulina Bana 39 71000 Sarajevo Tel.: + 387 33 440904/ 232310 Fax: + 387 33 446937 E-mail: zajedno@bih.net.ba
DATA ON THE FOLLOWING ORGANIZATIONS CAN BE FOUND IN THE DIRECTORY SECTION: Abraham, Center for Nonviolent Action, CIRCLE 99 Sarajevo, Human Rights Office Tuzla, United Nations Volunteers PIP, Women's Association Medica-Zenica, Youth Center Gornji Vakuf, Zene Zenama,
About the author
Yannick du Pont studied International Relations and Sociology at the University of Amsterdam . Presently he is chairperson of the Dutch NGO Academic Training Association, which supports higher-education reform and conflict transformation through education in Southeast Europe .
