Prikazani su postovi s oznakom Oružje i vojska/ Arms and military. Prikaži sve postove
Prikazani su postovi s oznakom Oružje i vojska/ Arms and military. Prikaži sve postove

utorak, 19. srpnja 2022.

Iranian Arms Shipments to Bosnia: 1994 (https://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/ops/bosnia-arms.htm)


 Iranian Arms Shipments to Bosnia: 1994 (https://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/ops/bosnia-arms.htm)

The Balkan war began in 1991 when a conservative Serbian coalition in Belgrade, led by Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and including the commanders of the old Yugoslavian army, decided to use all means fair and foul to keep Yugoslavia together. Croatia, which declared its independence at the same time, put up unexpected resistance. Serbs see themselves as the historically aggrieved party, as brave and sturdy defenders of an authentic Slavic culture against Turks and Teutons alike. Croats regard Serbs as non-European barbarians who lived so long under the Turks they became like them. Croats regard themselves as Central European rather than Balkan and heirs to centuries of Habsburg high culture and civilization. Outsiders can't tell them apart.

The Croats were terribly outgunned, relying on the meager arsenals of the territorial defense forces that had been set up in the old Yugoslavia. Croatia continued to mobilize and purchase equipment through a leaky arms embargo. Analysts claim that large amounts of Soviet-type arms and munitions from the defunct East German Volksarmee reached Croatia via a sympathetic Hungary. Germany clearly favored Croatia and pushed the rest of West Europe into diplomatic recognition of Zagreb in late 1991.

Bosnian Croats and Muslims claimed to have patched things up with the US-brokered agreement signed in Washington in March 1994. They agreed to form a Croat-Muslim federation within Bosnia and then confederate this with Croatia proper. This solidified Croatian power in Herzegovina and provides Bosnian Muslims with much-improved access to arms and munitions. The improved relations mean that Croatian airfields and ports serve as conduits for war materiel from sympathetic Islamic states. Quickly, outside support flowed into Bosnia via Croatia. The first week of May 1994, for example, an Iranian air force transport landed with 60 tons of explosives at Zagreb [See John Pomfret, "Iran Ships Material for Arms to Bosnians," The Washington Post, 13 May 1994, p. A1.]

In April 1996, the Los Angeles Times published an article alleging that in 1994 the Clinton administration had given a "green light" to the government of Croatia to allow Iranian arms destined for Bosnian Muslims fighting in theformer Yugoslavia to transit its country. At the time, a UN arms embargo was in effect forbidding shipments of arms to the former Yugoslavia, an embargo the United States had pledged to uphold. The press account also speculated the US government was engaged in a covert action, not reported to the congressional oversight committees, to facilitate the flow of arms from Iran to the Muslims in Bosnia.

As Reprasentative Diaz-Balart posed the question, "did the White House permit a mortal enemy of the United States to establish a military presence in Europe, or did the White House inspire a mortal enemy of the United States to establish a military presence in Europe? That is the essence of the question that this Congress will be investigating in the next months and that we at this time are authorizing funding for, the select subcommittee of the Committee on International Relations.

"The administration's policy, No. 1, directly contradicts the stated position of the Government of the United States. This Congress repeatedly tried to lift the arms embargo against Bosnia, and the administration opposed us, and the President vetoed our attempts to do so. The policy was also not revealed to the Congress, nor to the American people, and it has allowed the terrorist government of Iran to gain a strategic presence in Europe.

"The administration now admits that despite the fact that it opposed our attempts to openly permit the arming of the Bosnian people by the United States directly or through our allies or responsible Muslim governments, instead of doing that the administration opposed congressional efforts and engaged in this tactic of secretly giving a green light to the arming of the Bosnians by one of the most horrendous enemies of the American people."

House Speaker Newt Gingrich said 11 April 1996 that he, Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole (R-Kan.) and other lawmakers had many meetings with Clinton about U.S. Bosnia policy over the last three years--while the United States was publicly upholding the international arms embargo against Bosnia. Never, he said, did Clinton indicate that the administration had given a green light to Iranian arms smuggling. Gingrich said that congressional leaders who supported lifting an arms embargo -- or who might have approved of covert U.S. efforts to encourage Muslim countries friendly to the United States to secretly arm the Bosnians -- were repeatedly rebuffed by the president. Clinton told them that such efforts would antagonize European allies and violate international agreements.

House Speaker Newt Gingrich said 26 April 1996 that the Clinton administration's secret policy of allowing Iranian arms shipments to Bosnia-Herzegovina may have violated covert-action laws. "President Clinton's policy of virtually inviting Iran into Europe could have disastrous results for America," Mr. Gingrich said in announcing the formation of a special committee to investigate the policy.

Both intelligence committees began investigations at the request of their respective leaderships. Ultimately, the committees found that the US ambassador to Croatia, when asked by Croatian government officials whether the United States would object to the transit of Iranian arms through the country, had responded that he had "no instructions" from Washington on the matter. This response, in turn, led the Croatian government to believe that the United States had no objection, and the flow of Iranian arms through its country expanded significantly.

DCI James Woolsey later contended that CIA had not been advised of the ambassador's response or of any change in the US position of support for the embargo. Indeed, as the Agency began to see signs of the expanded arms flow its own officers raised concerns that the United States might be covertly facilitating the flow of such arms, contrary to the UN embargo.

Beyond this, the committees reached somewhat differing conclusions. The HPSCI found that the US government had had no role in facilitating the arms flow, and thus no covert action had taken place. While the failure of the US ambassador to object to the transshipments had encouraged Croatia to allow them, HPSCI saw his conduct as "traditional diplomatic activity" rather than as covert action. The SSCI, on the other hand, was unable to reach agreement on whether a covert action had occurred but specifically rejected the notion that the ambassador's response to the Croatians constituted "traditional diplomatic activity." Both committees lauded the CIA officers for having raised their concerns to higher levels in the US government.

srijeda, 23. veljače 2022.

Mogherini i Pendeš potpisale Okvirni sporazum o učešću BiH u operacijama EU za upravljanje kriznim situacijama (15.09.2015.)

 https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=946923118684200&id=163322863710900

(objavljeno 15.09.2015. na Facebook stranici Evropske unije u Bosni i Hercegovini) 

 

Visoka predstavnica i potpredsjednica Europske komisije Federica Mogherini i ministrica odbrane Bosne i Hercegovine (BiH), Marina Pendeš, potpisale su danas u Briselu Okvirni sporazum o učešću Bosne i Hercegovine u operacijama Europske unije za upravljanje kriznim situacijama.
Sporazumom se utvrđuje pravni okvir za moguće buduće učešće Bosne i Hercegovine u cijelom nizu vojnih operacija i civilnih misija za upravljanje krizama, koje vodi Europska unija. Nadalje, Sporazum predstavlja korak naprijed ka većoj razini strukturirane saradnje između Europske unije i Bosne i Hercegovine u oblasti sigurnosti.
Europska unija već ima bliske veze sa Bosnom i Hercegovinom u ovoj oblasti, imajući u vidu da je EUPM, kao prva policijska misija u okviru zajedničke sigurnosne i odbrambene politike Europske unije, pokrenuta u Bosni i Hercegovini 2003. godine, sa zadatkom pružanja podrške policijskim strukturama do juna 2012. godine. U zemlji je još uvijek prisutna vojna operacija Europske unije pod nazivom EUFOR Althea, koja je pokrenuta 2004. godine i koja podržava napore BiH na očuvanju sigurnog okruženja kao i propratnu izgradnju kapaciteta i obuku Ministarstva obrane BiH i Oružanih snaga BiH.
Novi okvirni instrument će omogućiti, ovisno od slučaja do slučaja, nesmetano uključivanje Bosne i Hercegovine u postojeće i buduće napore Europske unije na upravljanju krizama širom svijeta. Time će se izbjeći nepotrebna odlaganja, u slučajevima gdje je Bosna i Hercegovina pozvana i saglasna da učestvuje u operacijama Europske unije. Instrument će također ponuditi i bolju učinkovitost i fleksibilnost u odgovoru na buduće krize te dodatno potvrđuje sve veću ulogu i zalaganje BiH da djeluje kao faktor sigurnosti, posebno u svjetlu njenog trenutačnog doprinosa mirovnim operacijama UN-a.
 


 

America used Islamists to arm the Bosnian Muslims (The Guardian, 22 April, 2002) by Richard J Aldrich

 https://amp.theguardian.com/world/2002/apr/22/warcrimes.comment?fbclid=IwAR2n8L3llMx7R7B8q0rKYq4YLJUEaWfYIhUpwviBqowNMXa9x8UEv3GxQHk

 

 The Srebrenica report reveals the Pentagon's role in a dirty war

The official Dutch inquiry into the 1995 Srebrenica massacre, released last week, contains one of the most sensational reports on western intelligence ever published. Officials have been staggered by its findings and the Dutch government has resigned. One of its many volumes is devoted to clandestine activities during the Bosnian war of the early 1990s. For five years, Professor Cees Wiebes of Amsterdam University has had unrestricted access to Dutch intelligence files and has stalked the corridors of secret service headquarters in western capitals, as well as in Bosnia, asking questions.

His findings are set out in "Intelligence and the war in Bosnia, 1992-1995". It includes remarkable material on covert op
erations, signals interception, human agents and double-crossing by dozens of agencies in one of dirtiest wars of the new world disorder. Now we have the full story of the secret alliance between the Pentagon and radical Islamist groups from the Middle East designed to assist the Bosnian Muslims - some of the same groups that the Pentagon is now fighting in "the war against terrorism". Pentagon operations in Bosnia have delivered their own "blowback".

In the 1980s Washington's secret services had assisted Saddam Hussein in his war against Iran. Then, in 1990, the US fought him in the Gulf. In both Afghanistan and the Gulf, the Pentagon had incurred debts to Islamist groups and their Middle Eastern sponsors. By 1993 these groups, many supported by Iran and Saudi Arabia, were anxious to help Bosnian Muslims fighting in the former Yugoslavia and called in their debts with the Americans. Bill Clinton and the Pentagon were keen to be seen as creditworthy and repaid in the form of an Iran-Contra style operation - in flagrant violation of the UN security council arms embargo against all combatants in the former Yugoslavia.

 

The result was a vast secret conduit of weapons smuggling though Croatia. This was arranged by the clandestine agencies of the US, Turkey and Iran, together with a range of radical Islamist groups, including Afghan mojahedin and the pro-Iranian Hizbullah. Wiebes reveals that the British intelligence services obtained documents early on in the Bosnian war proving that Iran was making direct deliveries.

Arms purchased by Iran and Turkey with the financial backing of Saudi Arabia made their way by night from the Middle East. Initially aircraft from Iran Air were used, but as the volume increased they were joined by a mysterious fleet of black C-130 Hercules aircraft. The report stresses that the US was "very closely involved" in the airlift. Mojahedin fighters were also flown in, but they were reserved as shock troops for especially hazardous operations.

Light weapons are the familiar currency of secret services seeking to influence such conflicts. The volume of weapons flown into Croatia was enormous, partly because of a steep Croatian "transit tax". Croatian forces creamed off between 20% and 50% of the arms. The report stresses that this entire trade was clearly illicit. The Croats themselves also obtained massive quantities of illegal weapons from Germany, Belgium and Argentina - again in contravention of the UN arms embargo. The German secret services were fully aware of the trade.

Rather than the CIA, the Pentagon's own secret service was the hidden force behind these operations. The UN protection force, UNPROFOR, was dependent on its troop-contributing nations for intelligence, and above all on the sophisticated monitoring capabilities of the US to police the arms embargo. This gave the Pentagon the ability to manipulate the embargo at will: ensuring that American Awacs aircraft covered crucial areas and were able to turn a blind eye to the frequent nightime comings and goings at Tuzla.

Weapons flown in during the spring of 1995 were to turn up only a fortnight later in the besieged and demilitarised enclave at Srebrenica. When these shipments were noticed, Americans pressured UNPROFOR to rewrite reports, and when Norwegian officials protested about the flights, they were reportedly threatened into silence.

Both the CIA and British SIS had a more sophisticated perspective on the conflict than the Pentagon, insisting that no side had clean hands and arguing for caution. James Woolsey, director of the CIA until May 1995, had increasingly found himself out of step with the Clinton White House over his reluctance to develop close relations with the Islamists. The sentiments were reciprocated. In the spring of 1995, when the CIA sent its first head of station to Sarajevo to liaise with Bosnia's security authorities, the Bosnians tipped off Iranian intelligence. The CIA learned that the Iranians had targeted him for liquidation and quickly withdrew him.

Iranian and Afghan veterans' training camps had also been identified in Bosnia. Later, in the Dayton Accords of November 1995, the stipulation appeared that all foreign forces be withdrawn. This was a deliberate attempt to cleanse Bosnia of Iranian-run training camps. The CIA's main opponents in Bosnia were now the mojahedin fighters and their Iranian trainers - whom the Pentagon had been helping to supply months earlier.

 

Meanwhile, the secret services of Ukraine, Greece and Israel were busy arming the Bosnian Serbs. Mossad was especially active and concluded a deal with the Bosnian Serbs at Pale involving a substantial supply of artillery shells and mortar bombs. In return they secured safe passage for the Jewish population out of the besieged town of Sarajevo. Subsequently, the remaining population was perplexed to find that unexploded mortar bombs landing in Sarajevo sometimes had Hebrew markings.

The broader lessons of the intelligence report on Srebrenica are clear. Those who were able to deploy intelligence power, including the Americans and their enemies, the Bosnian Serbs, were both able to get their way. Conversely, the UN and the Dutch government were "deprived of the means and capacity for obtaining intelligence" for the Srebrenica deployment, helping to explain why they blundered in, and contributed to the terrible events there.

 

Secret intelligence techniques can be war-winning and life-saving. But they are not being properly applied. How the UN can have good intelligence in the context of multinational peace operations is a vexing question. Removing light weapons from a conflict can be crucial to drawing it down. But the secret services of some states - including Israel and Iran - continue to be a major source of covert supply, pouring petrol on the flames of already bitter conflicts.

· Richard J Aldrich is Professor of Politics at the University of Nottingham. His 'The Hidden Hand: Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence' is published in paperback by John Murray in August.

richard.aldrich@nottingham.ac.uk

 

srijeda, 26. siječnja 2022.

BOSNIA - INSIDE THE MIND OF KOMSIC'S CHIEF OF STAFF (WikiLeaks Cables https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07SARAJEVO1177_a.html?fbclid=IwAR1L7bDjcgWMy1HVoVld3cAfRNLkBwwBRzUArNKd7g5NqIG7zd62Sc0on68)

B. SARAJEVO 674 
Classified By: DCM Judith Cefkin. 
Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
1. (C) SUMMARY: On July 6, Zeljko Komsic, the Croat member of Bosnia's Tri-Presidency, will take over the rotating chairmanship of the Presidency from the Serb member, Nebojsa Radmanovic. Radmanovic has, in our estimation, turned in a solid performance. Komsic's chairmanship comes at a particularly sensitive time given Bosnia's heated political environment and our expectation that the Presidency will take up several issues of crucial importance to our bilateral relationship, including issues associated with Bosnia's Iraq deployment. Our dealings with President Komsic and his staff to date raise questions in our mind about how effective Komsic might be as Presidency Chairman. Recent conversations with Komsic's Chief of Staff Amir Ibrovic, during which he outlined what he claimed was Komsic's political strategy, have done nothing to allay those concerns. END SUMMARY. Radmanovic Turns in Positive Performance --------------------------------------- 
2. (C) The rotating chairmanship of the Bosnian Tri-Presidency will shift from Bosnian-Serb President Nebojsa Radmanovic to Bosnian-Croat President Zeljko Komsic on July 6. While the position carries few additional responsibilities, the Presidency Chairman plays an important role in setting the Presidency's agenda. Ideally, the Chairman should also play the role of consensus builder among his colleagues. While the political climate in Bosnia has steadily worsened since the 2006 elections, we have been largely pleased with Radmanovic's performance. Although he overreacted to Bosniak member of the Tri-Presidency Haris Silajdzic's attempts to confront Serbia over the February 26 International Court of Justice (ICJ) verdict (Ref A), Radmanovic has been instrumental in securing Presidency approval for several key items on our bilateral agenda, including extending the Bosnian military deployment to Iraq, arranging the Presidency visit to Iraq, and donating of surplus arms to the Afghan National Army. We have also found his staff to be competent and professional. Komsic Prepares to Take Charge ------------------------------ 
3. (C) We expect our engagement with the Presidency to be at least as intense under Komsic's chairmanship as it was under Radmanovic's. There will be a continuing need to encourage the Presidency to a play a constructive role in the myriad political crises plaguing Bosnia. We also anticipate dealing with Komsic on a range of important bilateral issues, such as possible change of mission scenarios for Bosnia's Iraq deployment, further implementation of defense reform, and insulating Bosnia from political fallout associated with the Kosovo final status process. Thus far, our dealings with Komsic and his staff do not suggest that they possess the political maturity or gravitas required to manage effectively these or other issues. His staff are politically inexperienced and several hold second jobs, which appear to take priority over their presidential responsibilities. They are also often unable or unwilling to engage in serious substantive discussions (Ref B). Our concerns have been reinforced by our exchanges with Radmanovic's and Silajdzic's aides, who complain to us regularly about the performance of Komsic's staff - one of the few matters on which they agree. 
 Amir Ibrovic - Komsic's "Strategist" and Chief of Staff --------------------------------------------- ---------- 4. (C) Komsic's Chief of Staff, childhood friend, campaign manager, and owner of Sarajevo's popular "Tito Bar," controls Komsic's "cabinet." Komsic gave Ibrovic carte blanche to assemble his Presidency team, and Ibrovic freely admits he chose to hire close friends rather than experienced political operatives, most of whom do not have strong ties to Komsic's Social Democratic Party (SDP). In several exchanges with us, Ibrovic claimed that Komsic does not view himself as particularly indebted to SDP, one reason Ibrovic felt no obligation to staff his office from within the party. He SARAJEVO 00001177 002 OF 003 also said that Komsic has often rebuffed requests by SDP Chairman Zlatko Lagumdzija to toe the party line. According to Ibrovic, Komsic wants to be seen as a unifying political figure capable of serving as President or Prime Minister of a post-Dayton Bosnian state. Ibrovic argued that this is possible if Komsic exploits his image as a "war hero" and presents himself as a decisive leader, who rises above the country's ethnic divisions a la Tito (Note: Komsic has cited Tito as a role model, and his office is decorated with a large portrait of Tito. End Note.) 5. (C) Ibrovic pointed to several recent events that were designed to demonstrate this, including Komsic's appearance at a military ceremony wearing his Golden Lilly decoration from the Bosniak Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina (ABiH) and his trip to Iraq with other members of the Presidency, during which he wore a specially-designed military uniform. Even before the Presidency returned from Iraq, the weekly newsmagazine Slobodna Bosna prominently featured Komsic's "Diary from Baghdad," that included an almost minute by minute summary of his travel along with numerous pictures of Komsic -- in uniform -- in Iraq. Ibrovic also sees Komsic repeated calls for a full investigation into allegations of war crimes in Bugojno in 1993 as crucial to establishing his cross-ethnic appeal, particularly among Croats, many of whom consider him a traitor for fighting with the ABiH rather than the Croat Defense Council (HVO) during the 1992-1995 war. The Bugojno case, which involves the disappearance of Bosnian-Croats from the town, has repeatedly ensnared Defense Minister Selmo Cikotic, who was serving as ABiH commander in the region at the time. The World According to Komsic (According to Ibrovic) --------------------------------------------- ------- 6. (C) Ibrovic, echoing previous statements by Komsic to the Ambassador, told us that Komsic believes it would be foolish to openly challenge Silajdzic at this time. Political reality required Komsic enable rather than confront the Bosniak member of the Tri-Presidency, Ibrovic explained. Komsic's strategy was "to wait out" Silajdzic, who he anticipated would inevitably overreach, which he was already perilously close to doing over Srebrenica. Ibrovic argued that feelings of moral and political culpability were behind Siljadzic's position on Srebrenica. Ibrovic claimed that Bosnian lawyers managing the ICJ case against Serbia had access to documents from the Yugoslav Defense Council, despite their public assertions to the contrary, but that the lawyers chose not to use them because the documents included references to discussions about territorial divisions between Belgrade and former Bosnia President Alija Izbetgovic and Silajdzic. (Comment: Accusations that the Bosniak leadership "sacrificed" Srebrenica to the Serbs surfaced immediately after the enclave's fall. Regardless of their truth, Silajdzic may feel some guilt for presiding over Srebenica's fall - he was PM and FM at the time. Ibrovic's claims that Bosniak lawyers intentionally covered up documents that would have incriminated Silajdzic do not strike us as credible. End Comment.) Radmanovic the Communist ------------------------ 7. (C) Ibrovic said that he and Komsic respected Radmanovic and see him as a partner on most issues. Ibrovic and Komsic believe he is angling to fill the RS leadership vacuum "after Dodik inevitably overreaches." (Comment: Silajdzic's staff have also claimed that Radmanovic's long-term political aim was to challenge Dodik. End Comment.) Ibrovic said that in his and his boss's assessment, Radmanovic was a "Communist, not a Serb." To illustrate this point, Ibrovic said that Radmanovic used the traditional Serb military greeting "God help you, heroes" during the ceremony for the Bosnian army's RS regiment, but afterwards personally apologized to Komsic. According to Ibrovic, Radmanovic said Dodik had "forced" him to use the greeting, but that he personally found it distasteful. Radmanovic's uncomfortable relationship with Serb nationalism would make it difficult for him to usurp Dodik's political position, Ibrovic asserted. Comment SARAJEVO 00001177 003 OF 003 ------- 8. (C) Ibrovic believes he has created a "brilliant" political strategy for positioning Komsic as Bosnia's savior once the current storm of ethQc politics runs its course. Ibrovic is a mercurial character given to theatrical, angry outbursts and widely rumored to be an alcoholic, so we take some of his claims with a grain of salt. Nonetheless, Radmanovic's and Silajdzic's staff confirm that Ibrovic is the only advisor to whom Komsic really listens. In this context, Ibrovic's perceptions may matter more than political reality, and it certainly is true that Komsic used the Presidency's Iraq trip for some political showboating. In any case, Komsic's performance to date has not fulfilled the high hopes we and many others had for him in the wake of the October 2006 general elections. It is difficult to imagine Komsic, in his current incarnation, as an effective chairman of the Presidency, which is likely to further complicate efforts to accomplish our objectives in Bosnia over the next 8 months. MCELHANEY

utorak, 6. travnja 2021.

Clinton-Approved Iranian Arms Transfers Help Turn Bosnia into Militant Islamic Base (16 January, 1997 - PARS Times, Greater Iran and Beyond)

 

U.S. Senate Republican Policy Committee - Larry E. Craig, Chairman - Jade West, Staff Director

Extended Bosnia Mission Endangers U.S. Troops

Clinton-Approved Iranian Arms Transfers Help Turn Bosnia into Militant Islamic Base

January 16, 1997

"'There is no question that the policy of getting arms into Bosnia was of great assistance in allowing the Iranians to dig in and create good relations with the Bosnian government,' a senior CIA officer told Congress in a classified deposition. 'And it is a thing we will live to regret because when they blow up some Americans, as they no doubt will before this . . . thing is over, it will be in part because the Iranians were able to have the time and contacts to establish themselves well in Bosnia.'" ["Iran Gave Bosnia Leader $500,000, CIA Alleges: Classified Report Says Izetbegovic Has Been 'Co-Opted,' Contradicting U.S. Public Assertion of Rift," Los Angeles Times, 12/31/96. Ellipses in original. Alija Izetbegovic is the Muslim president of Bosnia.]

"'If you read President Izetbegovic's writings, as I have, there is no doubt that he is an Islamic fundamentalist,' said a senior Western diplomat with long experience in the region. 'He is a very nice fundamentalist, but he is still a fundamentalist. This has not changed. His goal is to establish a Muslim state in Bosnia, and the Serbs and Croats understand this better than the rest of us.'" ["Bosnian Leader Hails Islam at Election Rallies," New York Times, 9/2/96]

Introduction and Summary

In late 1995, President Bill Clinton dispatched some 20,000 U.S. troops to Bosnia-Hercegovina as part of a NATO-led "implementation force" (IFOR) to ensure that the warring Muslim, Serbian, and Croatian factions complied with provisions of the Dayton peace plan. [NOTE: This paper assumes the reader is acquainted with the basic facts of the Bosnian war leading to the IFOR deployment. For background, see RPC's "Clinton Administration Ready to Send U.S. Troops to Bosnia, "9/28/95," and Legislative Notice No. 60, "Senate to Consider Several Resolutions on Bosnia," 12/12/95] Through statements by Administration spokesmen, notably Defense Secretary Perry and Joint Chiefs Chairman General Shalikashvili, the president firmly assured Congress and the American people that U.S. personnel would be out of Bosnia at the end of one year. Predictably, as soon as the November 1996 election was safely behind him, President Clinton announced that approximately 8,500 U.S. troops would be remaining for another 18 months as part of a restructured and scaled down contingent, the "stabilization force" (SFOR), officially established on December 20, 1996.

SFOR begins its mission in Bosnia under a serious cloud both as to the nature of its mission and the dangers it will face. While IFOR had successfully accomplished its basic military task -- separating the factions' armed forces -- there has been very little progress toward other stated goals of the Dayton agreement, including political and economic reintegration of Bosnia, return of refugees to their homes, and apprehension and prosecution of accused war criminals. It is far from certain that the cease-fire that has held through the past year will continue for much longer, in light of such unresolved issues as the status of the cities of Brcko (claimed by Muslims but held by the Serbs) and Mostar (divided between nominal Muslim and Croat allies, both of which are currently being armed by the Clinton Administration). Moreover, at a strength approximately one-third that of its predecessor, SFOR may not be in as strong a position to deter attacks by one or another of the Bosnian factions or to avoid attempts to involve it in renewed fighting: "IFOR forces, despite having suffered few casualties, have been vulnerable to attacks from all of the contending sides over the year of the Dayton mandate. As a second mandate [i.e., SFOR] evolves, presumably maintaining a smaller force on the ground, the deterrent effect which has existed may well become less compelling and vulnerabilities of the troops will increase." ["Military Security in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Present and Future," Bulletin of the Atlantic Council of the United States, 12/18/96]

The Iranian Connection

Perhaps most threatening to the SFOR mission -- and more importantly, to the safety of the American personnel serving in Bosnia -- is the unwillingness of the Clinton Administration to come clean with the Congress and with the American people about its complicity in the delivery of weapons from Iran to the Muslim government in Sarajevo. That policy, personally approved by Bill Clinton in April 1994 at the urging of CIA Director-designate (and then-NSC chief) Anthony Lake and the U.S. ambassador to Croatia Peter Galbraith, has, according to the Los Angeles Times (citing classified intelligence community sources), "played a central role in the dramatic increase in Iranian influence in Bosnia." Further, according to the Times, in September 1996 National Security Agency analysts contradicted Clinton Administration claims of declining Iranian influence, insisting instead that "Iranian Revolutionary Guard personnel remain active throughout Bosnia." Likewise, "CIA analysts noted that the Iranian presence was expanding last fall," with some ostensible cultural and humanitarian activities "known to be fronts" for the Revolutionary Guard and Iran's intelligence service, known as VEVAK, the Islamic revolutionary successor to the Shah's SAVAK. [LAT, 12/31/96] At a time when there is evidence of increased willingness by pro-Iranian Islamic militants to target American assets abroad -- as illustrated by the June 1996 car-bombing at the Khobar Towers in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, that killed 19 American airmen, in which the Iranian government or pro-Iranian terrorist organizations are suspected ["U.S. Focuses Bomb Probe on Iran, Saudi Dissident," Chicago Tribune, 11/4/96] -- it is irresponsible in the extreme for the Clinton Administration to gloss over the extent to which its policies have put American personnel in an increasingly vulnerable position while performing an increasingly questionable mission.

Three Key Issues for Examination

This paper will examine the Clinton policy of giving the green light to Iranian arms shipments to the Bosnian Muslims, with serious implications for the safety of U.S. troops deployed there. (In addition, RPC will release a general analysis of the SFOR mission and the Clinton Administration's request for supplemental appropriations to fund it in the near future.) Specifically, the balance of this paper will examine in detail the three issues summarized below:

1. The Clinton Green Light to Iranian Arms Shipments (page 3): In April 1994, President Clinton gave the government of Croatia what has been described by Congressional committees as a "green light" for shipments of weapons from Iran and other Muslim countries to the Muslim-led government of Bosnia. The policy was approved at the urging of NSC chief Anthony Lake and the U.S. ambassador to Croatia Peter Galbraith. The CIA and the Departments of State and Defense were kept in the dark until after the decision was made.

2. The Militant Islamic Network (page 5): Along with the weapons, Iranian Revolutionary Guards and VEVAK intelligence operatives entered Bosnia in large numbers, along with thousands of mujahedin ("holy warriors") from across the Muslim world. Also engaged in the effort were several other Muslim countries (including Brunei, Malaysia, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Turkey) and a number of radical Muslim organizations. For example, the role of one Sudan-based "humanitarian organization," called the Third World Relief Agency, has been well-documented. The Clinton Administration's "hands-on" involvement with the Islamic network's arms pipeline included inspections of missiles from Iran by U.S. government officials.

3. The Radical Islamic Character of the Sarajevo Regime (page 8): Underlying the Clinton Administration's misguided green light policy is a complete misreading of its main beneficiary, the Bosnian Muslim government of Alija Izetbegovic. Rather than being the tolerant, multiethnic democratic government it pretends to be, there is clear evidence that the ruling circle of Izetbegovic's party, the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), has long been guided by the principles of radical Islam. This Islamist orientation is illustrated by profiles of three important officials, including President Izetbegovic himself; the progressive Islamization of the Bosnian army, including creation of native Bosnian mujahedin units; credible claims that major atrocities against civilians in Sarajevo were staged for propaganda purposes by operatives of the Izetbegovic government; and suppression of enemies, both non-Muslim and Muslim.

The Clinton Green Light to Iranian Arms Shipments

Both the Senate Intelligence Committee and the House Select Subcommittee to Investigate the United States Role in Iranian Arms Transfers to Croatia and Bosnia issued reports late last year. (The Senate report, dated November 1996, is unclassified. The House report is classified, with the exception of the final section of conclusions, which was released on October 8, 1996; a declassified version of the full report is expected to be released soon.) The reports, consistent with numerous press accounts, confirm that on April 27, 1994, President Clinton directed Ambassador Galbraith to inform the government of Croatia that he had "no instructions" regarding Croatia's decision whether or not to permit weapons, primarily from Iran, to be transshipped to Bosnia through Croatia. (The purpose was to facilitate the acquisition of arms by the Muslim-led government in Sarajevo despite the arms embargo imposed on Yugoslavia by the U.N. Security Council.) Clinton Administration officials took that course despite their awareness of the source of the weapons and despite the fact that the Croats (who were themselves divided on whether to permit arms deliveries to the Muslims) would take anything short of a U.S. statement that they should not facilitate the flow of Iranian arms to Bosnia as a "green light."

The green light policy was decided upon and implemented with unusual secrecy, with the CIA and the Departments of State and Defense only informed after the fact. ["U.S. Had Options to Let Bosnia Get Arms, Avoid Iran," Los Angeles Times, 7/14/96] Among the key conclusions of the House Subcommittee were the following (taken from the unclassified section released on October 8):

"The President and the American people were poorly served by the Administration officials who rushed the green light decision without due deliberation, full information and an adequate consideration of the consequences." (page 202)

"The Administration's efforts to keep even senior US officials from seeing its 'fingerprints' on the green light policy led to confusion and disarray within the government." (page 203)

"The Administration repeatedly deceived the American people about its Iranian green light policy." (page 204)

Clinton, Lake, and Galbraith Responsible

While the final go-ahead for the green light was given by President Clinton -- who is ultimately accountable for the results of his decision -- two Clinton Administration officials bear particular responsibility: Ambassador Galbraith and then-NSC Director Anthony Lake, against both of whom the House of Representatives has referred criminal charges to the Justice Department. Mr. Lake, who personally presented the proposal to Bill Clinton for approval, "played a central role in preventing the responsible congressional committees from knowing about the Administration's fateful decision to acquiesce in radical Islamic Iran's effort to penetrate the European continent through arms shipments and military cooperation with the Bosnian government." ["'In Lake We Trust'? Confirmation Make-Over Exacerbates Senate Concerns About D.C.I.-Designate's Candor, Reliability," Center for Security Policy, Washington, D.C., 1/8/97] His responsibility for the operation is certain to be a major hurdle in his effort to be confirmed as CIA Director: "The fact that Lake was one of the authors of the duplicitous policy in Bosnia, which is very controversial and which has probably helped strengthen the hand of the Iranians, doesn't play well," stated Senate Intelligence Chairman Richard Shelby. ["Lake to be asked about donation," Washington Times, 1/2/97]

For his part, Ambassador Galbraith was the key person both in conceiving the policy and in serving as the link between the Clinton Administration and the Croatian government; he also met with Imam Sevko Omerbasic, the top Muslim cleric in Croatia, "who the CIA says was an intermediary for Iran." ["Fingerprints: Arms to Bosnia, the real story," The New Republic, 10/28/96; see also LAT 12/23/96] As the House Subcommittee concluded (page 206): "There is evidence that Ambassador Galbraith may have engaged in activities that could be characterized as unauthorized covert action." The Senate Committee (pages 19 and 20 of the report) was unable to agree on the specific legal issue of whether Galbraith's actions constituted a "covert action" within the definition of section 503(e) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. Sec. 413(e)), as amended, defined as "an activity or activities . . . to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly."

The Militant Islamic Network

The House Subcommittee report also concluded (page 2): "The Administration's Iranian green light policy gave Iran an unprecedented foothold in Europe and has recklessly endangered American lives and US strategic interests." Further --

" . . . The Iranian presence and influence [in Bosnia] jumped radically in the months following the green light. Iranian elements infiltrated the Bosnian government and established close ties with the current leadership in Bosnia and the next generation of leaders. Iranian Revolutionary Guards accompanied Iranian weapons into Bosnia and soon were integrated in the Bosnian military structure from top to bottom as well as operating in independent units throughout Bosnia. The Iranian intelligence service [VEVAK] ran wild through the area developing intelligence networks, setting up terrorist support systems, recruiting terrorist 'sleeper' agents and agents of influence, and insinuating itself with the Bosnian political leadership to a remarkable degree. The Iranians effectively annexed large portions of the Bosnian security apparatus [known as the Agency for Information and Documentation (AID)] to act as their intelligence and terrorist surrogates. This extended to the point of jointly planning terrorist activities. The Iranian embassy became the largest in Bosnia and its officers were given unparalleled privileges and access at every level of the Bosnian government." (page 201)

Not Just the Iranians

To understand how the Clinton green light would lead to this degree of Iranian influence, it is necessary to remember that the policy was adopted in the context of extensive and growing radical Islamic activity in Bosnia. That is, the Iranians and other Muslim militants had long been active in Bosnia; the American green light was an important political signal to both Sarajevo and the militants that the United States was unable or unwilling to present an obstacle to those activities -- and, to a certain extent, was willing to cooperate with them. In short, the Clinton Administration's policy of facilitating the delivery of arms to the Bosnian Muslims made it the de facto partner of an ongoing international network of governments and organizations pursuing their own agenda in Bosnia: the promotion of Islamic revolution in Europe. That network involves not only Iran but Brunei, Malaysia, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan (a key ally of Iran), and Turkey, together with front groups supposedly pursuing humanitarian and cultural activities.

For example, one such group about which details have come to light is the Third World Relief Agency (TWRA), a Sudan-based, phoney humanitarian organization which has been a major link in the arms pipeline to Bosnia. ["How Bosnia's Muslims Dodged Arms Embargo: Relief Agency Brokered Aid From Nations, Radical Groups," Washington Post, 9/22/96; see also "Saudis Funded Weapons For Bosnia, Official Says: $300 Million Program Had U.S. 'Stealth Cooperation'," Washington Post, 2/2/96] TWRA is believed to be connected with such fixtures of the Islamic terror network as Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman (the convicted mastermind behind the 1993 World Trade Center bombing) and Osama Binladen, a wealthy Saudi emigre believed to bankroll numerous militant groups. [WP, 9/22/96] (Sheik Rahman, a native of Egypt, is currently in prison in the United States; letter bombs addressed to targets in Washington and London, apparently from Alexandria, Egypt, are believed connected with his case. Binladen was a resident in Khartoum, Sudan, until last year; he is now believed to be in Afghanistan, "where he has issued statements calling for attacks on U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf." [WP, 9/22/96])

The Clinton Administration's "Hands-On" Help

The extent to which Clinton Administration officials, notably Ambassador Galbraith, knowingly or negligently, cooperated with the efforts of such front organizations is unclear. For example, according to one intelligence account seen by an unnamed U.S. official in the Balkans, "Galbraith 'talked with representatives of Muslim countries on payment for arms that would be sent to Bosnia,' . . . [T]he dollar amount mentioned in the report was $500 million-$800 million. The U.S. official said he also saw subsequent 'operational reports' in 1995 on almost weekly arms shipments of automatic weapons, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, anti-armor rockets and TOW missiles." [TNR, 10/28/96] The United States played a disturbingly "hands-on" role, with, according to the Senate report (page 19), U.S. government personnel twice conducting inspections in Croatia of missiles en route to Bosnia. Further --

"The U.S. decision to send personnel to Croatia to inspect rockets bound for Bosnia is . . . subject to varying interpretations. It may have been simply a straightforward effort to determine whether chemical weapons were being shipped into Bosnia. It was certainly, at least in part, an opportunity to examine a rocket in which the United States had some interest. But it may also have been designed to ensure that Croatia would not shut down the pipeline." (page 21)

The account in The New Republic points sharply to the latter explanation: "Enraged at Iran's apparent attempt to slip super weapons past Croat monitors, the Croatian defense minister nonetheless sent the missiles on to Bosnia 'just as Peter [i.e., Ambassador Galbraith] told us to do,' sources familiar with the episode said." [TNR, 10/28/96] In short, the Clinton Administration's connection with the various players that made up the arms network seems to have been direct and intimate.

The Mujahedin Threat

In addition to (and working closely with) the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and VEVAK intelligence are members of numerous radical groups known for their anti-Western orientation, along with thousands of volunteer mujahedin ("holy warriors") from across the Islamic world. From the beginning of the NATO-led deployment, the Clinton Administration has given insufficient weight to military concerns regarding the mujahedin presence in Bosnia as well as the danger they pose to American personnel. Many of the fighters are concentrated in the so-called "green triangle" (the color green symbolizes Islam) centered on the town of Zenica in the American IFOR/SFOR zone but are also found throughout the country.

The Clinton Administration has been willing to accept Sarajevo's transparently false assurances of the departure of the foreign fighters based on the contention that they have married Bosnian women and have acquired Bosnian citizenship -- and thus are no longer "foreign"! -- or, having left overt military units to join "humanitarian," "cultural," or "charitable" organizations, are no longer "fighters." [See "Foreign Muslims Fighting in Bosnia Considered 'Threat' to U.S. Troops," Washington Post, 11/30/95; "Outsiders Bring Islamic Fervor To the Balkans," New York Times, 9/23/96; "Islamic Alien Fighters Settle in Bosnia," Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 9/23/96; "Mujahideen rule Bosnian villages: Threaten NATO forces, non-Muslims," Washington Times, 9/23/96; and Yossef Bodansky, Offensive in the Balkans (November 1995) and Some Call It Peace (August 1996), International Media Corporation, Ltd., London. Bodansky, an analyst with the House Republican Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare, is an internationally recognized authority on Islamic terrorism.] The methods employed to qualify for Bosnian citizenship are themselves problematic: "Islamic militants from Iran and other foreign countries are employing techniques such as forced marriages, kidnappings and the occupation of apartments and houses to remain in Bosnia in violation of the Dayton peace accord and may be a threat to U.S. forces." ["Mujaheddin Remaining in Bosnia: Islamic Militants Strongarm Civilians, Defy Dayton Plan," Washington Post, 7/8/96]

The threat presented by the mujahedin to IFOR (and now, to SFOR) -- contingent only upon the precise time their commanders in Tehran or Sarajevo should choose to activate them -- has been evident from the beginning of the NATO-led deployment. For example, in February 1996 NATO forces raided a terrorist training camp near the town of Fojnica, taking into custody 11 men (8 Bosnian citizens -- two of whom may have been naturalized foreign mujahedin -- and three Iranian instructors); also seized were explosives "built into small children's plastic toys, including a car, a helicopter and an ice cream cone," plus other weapons such as handguns, sniper rifles, grenade launchers, etc. The Sarajevo government denounced the raid, claiming the facility was an "intelligence service school"; the detainees were released promptly after NATO turned them over to local authorities. ["NATO Captures Terrorist Training Camp, Claims Iranian Involvement," Associated Press, 2/16/96; "Bosnian government denies camp was for terrorists," Reuters, 2/16/96; Bodansky Some Call It Peace, page 56] In May 1996, a previously unknown group called "Bosnian Islamic Jihad" (jihad means "holy war") threatened attacks on NATO troops by suicide bombers, similar to those that had recently been launched in Israel. ["Jihad Threat in Bosnia Alarms NATO," The European, 5/9/96]

Stepping-Stone to Europe

The intended targets of the mujahedin network in Bosnia are not limited to that country but extend to Western Europe. For example, in August 1995, the conservative Paris daily Le Figaro reported that French security services believe that "Islamic fundamentalists from Algeria have set up a security network across Europe with fighters trained in Afghan guerrilla camps and [in] southern France while some have been tested in Bosnia." [(London) Daily Telegraph, 8/17/95] Also, in April 1996, Belgian security arrested a number of Islamic militants, including two native Bosnians, smuggling weapons to Algerian guerrillas active in France. [Intelligence Newsletter, Paris, 5/9/96 (No. 287)] Finally, also in April 1996, a meeting of radicals aligned with HizbAllah ("Party of God"), a pro-Iran group based in Lebanon, set plans for stepping up attacks on U.S. assets on all continents; among those participating was an Egyptian, Ayman al-Zawahiri, who "runs the Islamist terrorist operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina from a special headquarters in Sofia, Bulgaria. His forces are already deployed throughout Bosnia, ready to attack US and other I-FOR (NATO Implementation Force) targets." ["State-Sponsored Terrorism and The Rise of the HizbAllah International," Defense and Foreign Affairs and Strategic Policy, London, 8/31/96] Finally, in December 1996, French and Belgian security arrested several would-be terrorists trained at Iranian-run camps in Bosnia. ["Terrorism: The Bosnian Connection," (Paris) L'Express, 12/26/96]

The Radical Islamic Character of the Sarajevo Regime

Underlying the Clinton Administration's misguided policy toward Iranian influence in Bosnia is a fundamental misreading of the true nature of the Muslim regime that benefitted from the Iran/Bosnia arms policy: "The most dubious of all Bosniac [i.e., Bosnian Muslim] claims pertains to the self-serving commercial that the government hopes to eventually establish a multiethnic liberal democratic society. Such ideals may appeal to a few members of Bosnia's ruling circle as well as to a generally secular populace, but President Izetbegovic and his cabal appear to harbor much different private intentions and goals." ["Selling the Bosnia Myth to America: Buyer Beware," Lieutenant Colonel John E. Sray, USA, U.S. Army Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, KS, October 1995]

The evidence that the leadership of the ruling Party of Democratic Action (SDA), and consequently, the Sarajevo-based government, has long been motivated by the principles of radical Islam is inescapable. The following three profiles are instructive:

Alija Izetbegovic: Alija Izetbegovic, current Bosnian president and head of the SDA, in 1970 authored the radical "Islamic Declaration," which calls for "the Islamic movement" to start to take power as soon as it can overturn "the existing non-Muslim government . . . [and] build up a new Islamic one," to destroy non-Islamic institutions ("There can be neither peace nor coexistence between the Islamic religion and non-Islamic social institutions"), and to create an international federation of Islamic states. [The Islamic Declaration: A Programme for the Islamization of Muslims and the Muslim Peoples, Sarajevo, in English, 1990] Izetbegovic's radical pro-Iran associations go back decades: "At the center of the Iranian system in Europe is Bosnia-Hercegovina's President, Alija Izetbegovic, . . . who is committed to the establishment of an Islamic Republic in Bosnia-Hercegovina." ["Iran's European Springboard?", House Republican Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare, 9/1/92] The Task Force report further describes Izetbegovic's contacts with Iran and Libya in 1991, before the Bosnian war began; he is also noted as a "fundamentalist Muslim" and a member of the "Fedayeen of Islam" organization, an Iran-based radical group dating to the 1930s and which by the late 1960s had recognized the leadership of the Ayatollah Khomeini (then in exile from the Shah). Following Khomeini's accession to power in 1979, Izetbegovic stepped-up his efforts to establish Islamic power in Bosnia and was jailed by the communists in 1983. Today, he is open and unapologetic about his links to Iran: "Perhaps the most telling detail of the [SDA's September 1, 1996] campaign rally . . . was the presence of the Iranian Ambassador and his Bosnian and Iranian bodyguards, who sat in the shadow of the huge birchwood platform. . . . As the only foreign diplomat [present], indeed the only foreigner traveling in the President's [i.e., Izetbegovic's] heavily guarded motorcade of bulky four-wheel drive jeeps, he lent a silent Islamic imprimatur to the event, one that many American and European supporters of the Bosnian Government are trying hard to ignore or dismiss." [NYT, 9/2/96] During the summer 1996 election campaign, the Iranians delivered to him, in two suitcases, $500,000 in cash; Izetbegovic "is now 'literally on their [i.e., the Iranians'] payroll,' according to a classified report based on the CIA's analysis of the issue." [LAT, 12/31/96. See also "Iran Contributed $500,000 to Bosnian President's Election Effort, U.S. Says," New York Times, 1/1/97, and Washington Times, 1/2/97] Adil Zulfikarpasic, a Muslim co-founder of the SDA, broke with Izetbegovic in late 1990 due to the increasingly overt fundamentalist and pro-Iranian direction of the party. [See Milovan Djilas, Bosnjak: Adil Zulfikarpasic, Zurich, 1994]

Hassan (or Hasan) Cengic: Until recently, deputy defense minister (and now cosmetically reassigned to a potentially even more dangerous job in refugee resettlement at the behest of the Clinton Administration), Cengic, a member of a powerful clan headed by his father, Halid Cengic, is an Islamic cleric who has traveled frequently to Tehran and is deeply involved in the arms pipeline. ["Bosnian Officials Involved in Arms Trade Tied to Radical States," Washington Post, 9/22/96] Cengic was identified by Austrian police as a member of TWRA's supervisory board, "a fact confirmed by its Sudanese director, Elfatih Hassanein, in a 1994 interview with Gazi Husrev Beg, an Islamic affairs magazine. Cengic later became the key Bosnian official involved in setting up a weapons pipeline from Iran. . . . Cengic . . . is a longtime associate of Izetbegovic's. He was one of the co-defendants in Izetbegovic's 1983 trial for fomenting Muslim nationalism in what was then Yugoslavia. Cengic was given a 10-year prison term, most of which he did not serve. In trial testimony Cengic was said to have been traveling to Iran since 1983. Cengic lived in Tehran and Istanbul during much of the war, arranging for weapons to be smuggled into Bosnia." [WP, 9/22/96] According to a Bosnian Croat radio profile: "Hasan's father, Halid Cengic . . . is the main logistic expert in the Muslim army. All petrodollar donations from the Islamic world and the procurement of arms and military technology for Muslim units went through him. He made so much money out of this business that he is one of the richest Muslims today. Halid Cengic and his two sons, of whom Hasan has been more in the public spotlight, also control the Islamic wing of the intelligence agency AID [Agency for Information and Documentation]. Well informed sources in Sarajevo claim that only Hasan addresses Izetbegovic with 'ti' [second person singular, used as an informal form of address] while all the others address him as 'Mr. President,'" a sign of his extraordinary degree of intimacy with the president. [BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 10/28/96, "Radio elaborates on Iranian connection of Bosnian deputy defense minister," from Croat Radio Herceg-Bosna, Mostar, in Serbo-Croatian, 10/25/96, bracketed text in original] In late 1996, at the insistence of the Clinton Administration, Hassan Cengic was reassigned to refugee affairs. However, in his new capacity he may present an even greater hazard to NATO forces in Bosnia, in light of past incidents such as the one that took place near the village of Celic in November 1996. At that time, in what NATO officers called part of a pattern of "military operations in disguise," American and Russian IFOR troops were caught between Muslims and Serbs as the Muslims, some of them armed, attempted to encroach on the cease-fire line established by Dayton; commented a NATO spokesman: "We believe this to be a deliberate, orchestrated and provocative move to circumvent established procedures for the return of refugees." ["Gunfire Erupts as Muslims Return Home," Washington Post, 11/13/96]

Dzemal Merdan: "The office of Brig. Gen. Dzemal Merdan is an ornate affair, equipped with an elaborately carved wooden gazebo ringed with red velvet couches and slippers for his guests. A sheepskin prayer mat lies in the corner, pointing toward Mecca. The most striking thing in the chamber is a large flag. It is not the flag of Bosnia, but of Iran. Pinned with a button of the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, Iran's late Islamic leader, the flag occupies pride of place in Merdan's digs -- displayed in the middle of the gazebo for every visitor to see. Next to it hangs another pennant, that of the Democratic Action Party, the increasingly nationalist Islamic organization of President Alija Izetbegovic that dominates Bosnia's Muslim region. . . . Merdan's position highlights the American dilemma. As head of the office of training and development of the Bosnian army, he is a key liaison figure in the U.S. [arm and train] program. . . . But Merdan, Western sources say, also has another job -- as liaison with foreign Islamic fighters here since 1992 and promoter of the Islamic faith among Bosnia's recruits. Sources identified Merdan as being instrumental in the creation of a brigade of Bosnian soldiers, called the 7th Muslim Brigade, that is heavily influenced by Islam and trained by fighters from Iran's Revolutionary Guards. He has also launched a program, these sources say, to build mosques on military training grounds to teach Islam to Bosnian recruits. In addition, he helped establish training camps in Bosnia where Revolutionary Guards carried out their work." ["Arming the Bosnians: U.S. Program Would Aid Force Increasingly Linked to Iran," Washington Post, 1/26/96, emphasis added] General Merdan is a close associate of both Izetbegovic and Cengic; the central region around Zenica, which was "completely militarized in the first two years of the war" under the control of Merdan's mujahedin, is "under total control of the Cengic family." ["Who Rules Bosnia and Which Way," (Sarajevo) Slobodna Bosna, 11/17/96, FBIS translation; Slobodna Bosna is one of the few publications in Muslim-held areas that dares to criticize the policies and personal corruption of the ruling SDA clique.] Merdan's mujahedin were accused by their erstwhile Croat allies of massacring more than 100 Croats near Zenica in late 1993. ["Bosnian Croats vow to probe war crimes by Moslems," Agence France Presse, 5/12/95]

The Islamization of the Bosnian Army

In cooperation with the foreign Islamic presence, the Izetbegovic regime has revamped its security and military apparatus to reflect its Islamic revolutionary outlook, including the creation of mujahedin units throughout the army; some members of these units have assumed the guise of a shaheed (a "martyr," the Arabic term commonly used to describe suicide bombers), marked by their white garb, representing a shroud. While these units include foreign fighters naturalized in Bosnia, most of the personnel are now Bosnian Muslims trained and indoctrinated by Iranian and other foreign militants -- which also makes it easier for the Clinton Administration to minimize the mujahedin threat, because few of them are "foreigners."

Prior to 1996, there were three principal mujahedin units in the Bosnian army, the first two of which are headquartered in the American IFOR/SFOR zone: (1) the 7th Muslim Liberation Brigade of the 3rd Corps, headquartered in Zenica; (2) the 9th Muslim Liberation Brigade of the 2nd Corps, headquartered in Travnik (the 2nd Corps is based in Tuzla); and (3) the 4th Muslim Liberation Brigade of the 4th Corps, headquartered in Konjic (in the French zone). [Bodansky, Some Call It Peace, page 40] Particularly ominous, many members of these units have donned the guise of martyrs, indicating their willingness to sacrifice themselves in the cause of Islam. Commenting on an appearance of soldiers from the 7th Liberation Brigade, in Zenica in December 1995, Bodansky writes: "Many of the fighters . . . were dressed in white coveralls over their uniforms. Officially, these were 'white winter camouflage,' but the green headbands [bearing Koranic verses] these warriors were wearing left no doubt that these were actually Shaheeds' shrouds." [Some Call It Peace, page 12] The same demonstration was staged before the admiring Iranian ambassador and President Izetbegovic in September 1996, when white winter garb could only be symbolic, not functional. [NYT, 9/2/96] By June 1996, ten more mujahedin brigades had been established, along with numerous smaller "special units" dedicated to covert and terrorist operations; while foreigners are present in all of these units, most of the soldiers are now native Bosnian Muslims. [Some Call It Peace, pages 42-46]

In addition to these units, there exists another group known as the Handzar ("dagger" or "scimitar") Division, described by Bodansky as a "praetorian guard" for President Izetbegovic. "Up to 6000-strong, the Handzar division glories in a fascist culture. They see themselves as the heirs of the SS Handzar division, formed by Bosnian Muslims in 1943 to fight for the Nazis. Their spiritual model was Mohammed Amin al-Husseini, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem who sided with Hitler. According to UN officers, surprisingly few of those in charge of the Handzars . . . seem to speak good Serbo-Croatian. 'Many of them are Albanian, whether from Kosovo [the Serb province where Albanians are the majority] or from Albania itself.' They are trained and led by veterans from Afghanistan and Pakistan, say UN sources." ["Albanians and Afghans fight for the heirs to Bosnia's SS past," (London) Daily Telegraph, 12/29/93, bracketed text in original]

Self-Inflicted Atrocities

Almost since the beginning of the Bosnian war in the spring of 1992, there have been persistent reports -- readily found in the European media but little reported in the United States -- that civilian deaths in Muslim-held Sarajevo attributed to the Bosnian Serb Army were in some cases actually inflicted by operatives of the Izetbegovic regime in an (ultimately successful) effort to secure American intervention on Sarajevo's behalf. These allegations include instances of sniping at civilians as well as three major explosions, attributed to Serbian mortar fire, that claimed the lives of dozens of people and, in each case, resulted in the international community's taking measures against the Muslims' Serb enemies. (The three explosions were: (1) the May 27, 1992, "breadline massacre," which was reported to have killed 16 people and which resulted in economic sanctions on the Bosnian Serbs and rump Yugoslavia; (2) the February 5, 1994, Markale "market massacre," killing 68 and resulting in selective NATO air strikes and an ultimatum to the Serbs to withdraw their heavy weapons from the area near Sarajevo; and (3) the August 28, 1995 "second market massacre," killing 37 and resulting in large-scale NATO air strikes, eventually leading to the Dayton agreement and the deployment of IFOR.) When she was asked about such allegations (with respect to the February 1994 explosion) then-U.N. Ambassador and current Secretary of State-designate Madeleine Albright, in a stunning non sequitur, said: "It's very hard to believe any country would do this to their own people, and therefore, although we do not exactly know what the facts are, it would seem to us that the Serbs are the ones that probably have a great deal of responsibility." ["Senior official admits to secret U.N. report on Sarajevo massacre," Deutsch Presse-Agentur, 6/6/96, emphasis added]

The fact that such a contention is difficult to believe does not mean it is not true. Not only did the incidents lead to the result desired by Sarajevo (Western action against the Bosnian Serbs), their staging by the Muslims would be entirely in keeping with the moral outlook of Islamic radicalism, which has long accepted the deaths of innocent (including Muslim) bystanders killed in terrorist actions. According to a noted analyst: "The dictum that the end justifies the means is adopted by all fundamentalist organizations in their strategies for achieving political power and imposing on society their own view of Islam. What is important in every action is its niy'yah, its motive. No means need be spared in the service of Islam as long as one takes action with a pure niy'yah." [Amir Taheri, Holy Terror, Bethesda, MD, 1987] With the evidence that the Sarajevo leadership does in fact have a fundamentalist outlook, it is unwarranted to dismiss cavalierly the possibility of Muslim responsibility. Among some of the reports:

Sniping: "French peacekeeping troops in the United Nations unit trying to curtail Bosnian Serb sniping at civilians in Sarajevo have concluded that until mid-June some gunfire also came from Government soldiers deliberately shooting at their own civilians. After what it called a 'definitive' investigation, a French marine unit that patrols against snipers said it traced sniper fire to a building normally occupied by Bosnian [i.e., Muslim] soldiers and other security forces. A senior French officer said, 'We find it almost impossible to believe, but we are sure that it is true.'" ["Investigation Concludes Bosnian Government Snipers Shot at Civilians," New York Times, 8/1/95]

The 1992 "Breadline Massacre": "United Nations officials and senior Western military officers believe some of the worst killings in Sarajevo, including the massacre of at least 16 people in a bread queue, were carried out by the city's mainly Muslim defenders -- not Serb besiegers -- as a propaganda ploy to win world sympathy and military intervention. . . . Classified reports to the UN force commander, General Satish Nambiar, concluded . . . that Bosnian forces loyal to President Alija Izetbegovic may have detonated a bomb. 'We believe it was a command-detonated explosion, probably in a can,' a UN official said then. 'The large impact which is there now is not necessarily similar or anywhere near as large as we came to expect with a mortar round landing on a paved surface." ["Muslims 'slaughter their own people'," (London) The Independent, 8/22/92] "Our people tell us there were a number of things that didn't fit. The street had been blocked off just before the incident. Once the crowd was let in and had lined up, the media appeared but kept their distance. The attack took place, and the media were immediately on the scene." [Major General Lewis MacKenzie, Peacekeeper: The Road to Sarajevo, Vancouver, BC, 1993, pages 193-4; Gen. MacKenzie, a Canadian, had been commander of the U.N. peacekeeping force in Sarajevo.]

The 1994 Markale "Market Massacre": "French television reported last night that the United Nations investigation into the market-place bombing in Sarajevo two weeks ago had established beyond doubt that the mortar shell that killed 68 people was fired from inside Bosnian [Muslim] lines." ["UN tracks source of fatal shell," (London) The Times, 2/19/94] "For the first time, a senior U.N. official has admitted the existence of a secret U.N. report that blames the Bosnian Moslems for the February 1994 massacre of Moslems at a Sarajevo market. . . . After studying the crater left by the mortar shell and the distribution of shrapnel, the report concluded that the shell was fired from behind Moslem lines." The report, however, was kept secret; the context of the wire story implies that U.S. Ambasador Albright may have been involved in its suppression. [DPA, 6/6/96] For a fuller discussion of the conflicting claims, see "Anatomy of a massacre," Foreign Policy, 12/22/94, by David Binder; Binder, a veteran New York Times reporter in Yugoslavia, had access to the suppressed report. Bodansky categorically states that the bomb "was actually a special charge designed and built with help from HizbAllah ["Party of God," a Beirut-based pro-Iranian terror group] experts and then most likely dropped from a nearby rooftop onto the crowd of shoppers. Video cameras at the ready recorded this expertly-staged spectacle of gore, while dozens of corpses of Bosnian Muslim troops killed in action (exchanged the day before in a 'body swap' with the Serbs) were paraded in front of cameras to raise the casualty counts." [Offensive in the Balkans, page 62]

The 1995 "Second Market Massacre": "British ammunition experts serving with the United Nations in Sarajevo have challenged key 'evidence' of the Serbian atrocity that triggered the devastating Nato bombing campaign which turned the tide of the Bosnian war." The Britons' analysis was confirmed by French analysts but their findings were "dismissed" by "a senior American officer" at U.N. headquarters in Sarajevo. ["Serbs 'not guilty' of massacre: Experts warned US that mortar was Bosnian," (London) The Times, 10/1/95] A "crucial U.N. report [stating Serb responsibility for] the market massacre is a classified secret, but four specialists -- a Russian, a Canadian and two Americans -- have raised serious doubts about its conclusion, suggesting instead that the mortar was fired not by the Serbs but by Bosnian government forces." A Canadian officer "added that he and fellow Canadian officers in Bosnia were 'convinced that the Muslim government dropped both the February 5, 1994, and the August 28, 1995, mortar shells on the Sarajevo markets.'" An unidentified U.S. official "contends that the available evidence suggests either 'the shell was fired at a very low trajectory, which means a range of a few hundred yards -- therefore under [Sarajevo] government control,' or 'a mortar shell converted into a bomb was dropped from a nearby roof into the crowd.'" ["Bosnia's bombers," The Nation, 10/2/95]. At least some high-ranking French and perhaps other Western officials believed the Muslims responsible; after having received that account from government ministers and two generals, French magazine editor Jean Daniel put the question directly to Prime Minister Edouard Balladur: "'They [i.e., the Muslims] have committed this carnage on their own people?' I exclaimed in consternation. 'Yes,' confirmed the Prime Minister without hesitation, 'but at least they have forced NATO to intervene.'" ["No more lies about Bosnia," Le Nouvel Observateur, 8/31/95, translated in Chronicles: A Magazine of American Culture, January 1997]

Suppression of Enemies

As might be expected, one manifestation of the radical Islamic orientation of the Izetbegovic government is increasing curtailment of the freedoms of the remaining non-Muslims (Croats and Serbs) in the Muslim-held zone. While there are similar pressures on minorities in the Serb- and Croat-held parts of Bosnia, in the Muslim zone they have a distinct Islamic flavor. For example, during the 1996-1997 Christmas and New Year holiday season, Muslim militants attempted to intimidate not only Muslims but Christians from engaging in what had become common holiday practices, such as gift-giving, putting up Christmas or New Year's trees, and playing the local Santa Claus figure, Grandfather Frost (Deda Mraz). ["The Holiday, All Wrapped Up; Bosnian Muslims Take Sides Over Santa," Washington Post, 12/26/96] In general:

"Even in Sarajevo itself, always portrayed as the most prominent multi-national community in Bosnia, pressure, both psychological and real, is impelling non-Bosniaks [i.e., non-Muslims] to leave. Some measures are indirect, such as attempts to ban the sale of pork and the growing predominance of [Bosniak] street names. Other measures are deliberate efforts to apply pressure. Examples include various means to make non-Bosniaks leave the city. Similar pressures, often with more violent expression and occasionally with overt official participation, are being used throughout Bosnia." ["Bosnia's Security and U.S. Policy in the Next Phase: A Policy Paper, International Research and Exchanges Board, November 1996]

In addition, President Izetbegovic's party, the SDA, has launched politically-motivated attacks on moderate Muslims both within the SDA and in rival parties. For example, in the summer of 1996 former Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic, (a Muslim, and son of the former imam at the main Sarajevo mosque) was set upon and beaten by SDA militants. Silajdzic claimed Izetbegovic himself was behind the attacks. [NYT, 9/2/96] Irfan Mustafic, a Muslim who co-founded the SDA, is a member of the Bosnian parliament and was president of the SDA's executive council in Srebrenica when it fell to Bosnian Serb forces; he was taken prisoner but later released. Because of several policy disagreements with Izetbegovic and his close associates, Mustafic was shot and seriously wounded in Srebrenica by Izetbegovic loyalists. [(Sarajevo) Slobodna Bosna, 7/14/96] Finally, one incident sums up both the ruthlessness of the Sarajevo establishment in dealing with their enemies as well as their international radical links:

"A special Bosnian army unit headed by Bakir Izetbegovic, the Bosnian president's son, murdered a Bosnian general found shot to death in Belgium last week, a Croatian newspaper reported . . . citing well-informed sources. The Vjesnik newspaper, controlled by the government, said the assassination of Yusuf Prazina was carried out by five members of a commando unit called 'Delta' and headed by Ismet Bajramovic also known as Celo. The paper said that three members of the Syrian-backed Palestinian movement Saika had Prazina under surveillance for three weeks before one of them, acting as an arms dealer, lured him into a trap in a car park along the main highway between Liege in eastern Belgium and the German border town of Aachen. Prazina, 30, nicknamed Yuka, went missing early last month. He was found Saturday with two bullet holes to the head. 'The necessary logistical means to carry out the operation were provided by Bakir Izetbegovic, son of Alija Izetbegovic, who left Sarajevo more than six months ago,' Vjesnik said. It added that Bakir Izetbegovic 'often travels between Brussels, Paris, Frankfurt, Baghdad, Tehran and Ankara, by using Iraqi and Pakistani passports,' and was in Belgium at the time of the assassination. Hasan Cengic, head of logistics for the army in Bosnia-Hercegovina, was 'personally involved in the assassination of Yuka Prazina,' the paper said." [Agence France Presse, 1/5/94]

Conclusion

The Clinton Administration's blunder in giving the green light to the Iranian arms pipeline was based, among other errors, on a gross misreading of the true nature and goals of the Izetbegovic regime in Sarajevo. It calls to mind the similar mistake of the Carter Administration, which in 1979 began lavish aid to the new Sandinista government in Nicaragua in the hopes that (if the United States were friendly enough) the nine comandantes would turn out to be democrats, not communists, despite abundant evidence to the contrary. By the time the Reagan Administration finally cut off the dollar spigot in 1981, the comandantes -- or the "nine little Castros," as they were known locally -- had fully entrenched themselves in power.

To state that the Clinton Administration erred in facilitating the penetration of the Iranians and other radical elements into Europe would be a breathtaking understatement. A thorough reexamination of U.S. policy and goals in the region is essential. In particular, addressing the immediate threat to U.S. troops in Bosnia, exacerbated by the extention of the IFOR/SFOR mission, should be a major priority of the 105th Congress.

available on Clinton-Approved Iranian Arms Transfers Help Turn Bosnia into Militant Islamic Base (parstimes.com) 


petak, 16. listopada 2020.

Caina-Longbranch Defence Systems (about the company from the website: http://cainalongbranch.com/index.html) - Pretis

http://cainalongbranch.com/company_profile.html The #CainaLongbranchDefenceSystemsGroup of companies was established in 1985 and is in its 35th year of International Firearms, Ordnance and IMO / explosives production, sub-contracting, distribution and International shipping logistic experience. Their company in Bosnia i Herzegovina was formed in 2006. The company in Sarajevo also serves as the European daughter company and for other complimentary factories throughout Eastern Europe. A second company is being formed in Europe for Western European/NATO distribution Caina-Longbranch Defence Systems expanded to the United States in 2007 to further support the US Government business since 1994. Both North American companies are individually CCR and ORCA registered for U.S. Government military contracting and also certified under the Militarily Critical Technical Data Agreement by the U.S./Canada Joint Certification Office for Militarily Critical Technical Data. The office in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Caina-Longbranch Defence Systems & Engineering Industries (BH) d.o.o. Igmanska bb, Zgrada Unis Pretis Prvi Sprat, Suite #3 71320 Vogosca (Sarajevo) Bosna i Hercegovina Telephone: 1-613-253-0955 Facsimile: 1-613-253-3492 http://cainalongbranch.com/company_profile.html Although all sections listed are active and are at least partially populated this website has been evolving as of late 2010 when it was finally launched for the first time for our group of companies. Due to the range and complexity of our equipment line, if you do not see what you are looking for or need further information please contact us with additional specific requests until we are able to fully populate the website. For live links and more information please go to the Ordnance & Equipment side bar and click on the live links Some of our Western, Eastern, and International Standard Ordnance & Equipment line that we produce, co-produce, program manage (including OEM components and parts) or distribute include: Firearms / small arms / infantry weapons & related equipment Small arms ammunition, metallic links, primers, and components Machine Guns, cannons and their hydraulically buffered .50cal/12.7 mounts for helicopters (defensive), vehicles, patrol boats, and infantry ground mounts (sustained fire) along with optics and optic mounts. We Specialize in Legacy .50 Browning GAU-18/XM-218 aircraft machine guns, spare barrels and upgrades, & mounts, including for Rotary Wing Defensive Armament as a Forte. We also produce a wide array of .50cal - 12.7x99mm ammunition to support these guns with M-9, M-2 and M-15A2 metallic links Grenades, grenade launchers, and hand grenades Mortars and mortar ammunition with standard and advanced fuzes Artillery & tank guns and artillery & tank ammunition with standard and advanced fuzes Rocket launchers, rockets & rocket propelled grenades Guided anti-tank/anti-armor missiles & launchers Recoilless rifles & recoilless rifle ammunition Explosives; primarily military but including some commercial industrial including TNT, RDX, HMX, PETN, DNT combinations, ANFO explosives, detonators, and some related equipment Anti-tank mines, and some demolition charges Hand held parachute illuminating flares Aircraft bombs, bomb casings and fuzes Light B-7 armoured 19,500 lb. GVW 4,500lb payload 350 BHP turbo high sulphur tolerant diesel or gasoline Reconnaissance - Fast Attack RFA-10 vehicles with 141" wheelbase & cannon armament currently being hydraulically buffered and integrated Original Casspir MPV 4 x 4 armoured mine-protected 14 person troop transport vehicles, overhauled & optional upgrades and reconfigurations including recovery vehicles, manual or automatic & C-130 transportable We are currently looking at three air conditioning options for heavy AFVs (Armoured Fighting Vehicles) to fill an urgent operational requirement Specific full coverage level IIIA body armour & rifle strike plates for helicopter gunners, vehicle commanders & gunners in four weights We are also involved in a number of military and commercial aviation projects including specialized overhaul, program management, and systems integration. We provide both new production and also in stock and refurbished equipment parts, components and spare parts including on an OEM basis to other manufacturers. De-militarization of ordnance & ammunition in our manufacturing & production range including smallarms ammunition from 5.56 mm to 14.5 x 114 mm, cannon ammunition, rifle grenades, hand grenades, anti-tank mines, rocket propelled grenades, mortar, tank and artillery ammunition, aviation ordnance, and some larger un-guided rockets within our area of expertise. Whatever we can competently put together in the manufacturing process we can also take apart. Smallarms ammunition can be de-militarized at our facilities or on the customers site depending on the specific proposal. Our Company is also involved in design and development of firearms, ammunition and military ordnance; providing production and logistics management and consulting in the field of military ordnance; refurbishing and enhancing firearms and military ordnance. We also offer strategic/logistic planning and implementation in conjunction with the equipment that we provide within our areas of expertise. Since the inception of our group of companies we are also involved in counter-trade; exchanging surplus / obsolete ordnance and equipment , including some aircraft and some vehicles, for new ordnance and equipment. As defence budgets change this can be a significant boost to many new acquisitions.