Land Registry Certificate for PRETIS listing all mortgages and bank loans by 28/10/2009

Kako se zadužuje državna imovina i kako padaju giganti pogledajte na primjeru PRETIS-a. U prilogu je prepis posjedovnog lista i zemljišnoknjižni izvadak za Pretis d.d. Vogošća na kojem se mogu vidjeti svi krediti (iznosi, svrha i banke) koji su uzimani na hipoteku do 28/10/2009. U isto vrijeme, PRETIS nije redovno isplaćivao lične dohotke radnicima, a za uvezivanje staža (malobrojnim) radnicima je dobivao pomoć od vlada FBiH i KS. Zaduživanja su izlistana u teretnom listu C.

UNDP Rejects False Accusations About Surplus Salw And Ammunition Stock Destruction (28/04/2010)

Zanimljivo je da situacija u Pretisu i malverzacije o kojima se uveliko pisalo u medijima nisu omele UNDP u BiH da zaključi ugovor sa Pretisom, nego je naprotiv UNDP uputio otvoreno pismo javnosti i medijima pozitivno prikazujući cijeli proces uništavanja viška naoružanja i municije u okviru svog projekta kontrole naoružanja u BiH ( 28/04/2010).

28/04/2010 Following the public allegations on the abuse of the role of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP BIH) in the surplus weapons and ammunication destruction process, UNDP decided to send an open letter to all the media to clarify all the procedures taken within the Arms Control Project in BiH.

UNDP Rejects False Accusations About Surplus Salw And Ammunition Stock Destruction

28/04/2010 - Following several false accusations and the incorrect and misleading information on the alleged abuse of the role of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP BIH) in the surplus weapons and ammunication destruction process, which were carried by some media outlets in BIH, and after UNDP asked Ms. Majkic to explain her groundless accusations, UNDP decided to send an open letter to all the media to clarify all the procedures taken within the Arms Control Project in BiH.

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) launched in 2003 the Small Arms Project for Bosnia and Herzegovina to assist BiH authorities at all levels in reducing the immediate threat posed to human life by SALW. In 2005, the Project was endorsed by the Council of Ministers of BIH, and later reviewed and endorsed one more time on December 3, 2008.

The Project activities are taken within three Project components: Development of Institutional Capacity for SALW Control; SALW and Weapon Systems Destruction; and Ammunition Demilitarization.

Within the Development of Institutional Capacity Component, activities are taken toward enhancing the SALW and ammunition control and management expertise and practical knowledge of institutions. UNDP supports the Coordination Board and the relevant institutions helping them prepare for taking over and performing the arms control functions in the future. Moreover, UNDP provides support through the Project to all relevant institutions in harmonizing the legislation with the EU directives and regulations for civilian possession of firearms, as well as the EU Code of Conduct on exports and imports of arms, military equipment and dual-use items.

Furthermore, UNDP provided support to the former entity Defense Ministries and the Defense Ministry of BIH in building capacity for the destruction of small-caliber ammunition and arms. In this regard, in 2005-2006, over 86,000 pieces of SALW from military stocks were destroyed in cooperation with the Defense Ministry of Republika Srpska and the Defense Ministry of the Federation of BIH. The small arms owned by the RS Defense Ministry were smelted at the Banja Luka Jelsingrad Steel Mill, and the small arms owned by the Defense Ministry of the Federation of BIH were smelted at the Zenica Steel Works. In 2006, with UK Government support, UNDP procured and installed a rotary kiln burner for small caliber ammunition, less than 14.7 mm in caliber, at the Doboj Military Workshop. The value of the environmental protection machine, manufactured in accordance with the EU standards, was US$ 400,000.

Together with all relevant institutions, and BIH Defense Ministry in particular, UNDP coordinated its activities toward improving potential defense and industrial capacities necessary for the destruction of ammunition. UNDP chose industrial demilitarization of ammunition, instead of destruction of ammunition by open detonation, primarily for the protection of people and environment, and encouragement of local economies.

In view of the amounts and surpluses of unstable ammunition, international institutions and ministries in BiH jointly proposed that the ammunition destruction capacities should be expanded, and new sites were selected in conformity with a specialized assessment: TROM Doboj, Pretis, Vitezit and Binas.

With the European Union support in the amount of EUR 2,7 million, UNDP procured sophisticated equipment for the destruction of ammunition of different calibers, and personal protective equipment for the workers who were trained in UK.

In addition to the agreed 3,000 tons, under the contract signed with Pretis, UNDP has so far destroyed 1,300 tons of ammunition, and over 3,600 tons of ammunition have been destroyed at TROM Doboj. Accordingly, UNDP and the Defense Ministry of BIH have signed a Memorandum of Understanding which regulates details of transportation, loading, unloading and manipulation of ammunition from storage sites to Pretis and TROM Doboj.

In the end, we want to emphasize that control and supervision over the destruction of ammunition and arms, which is the subject of the contract between UNDP and Pretis, were done by a combined team of UNDP, EUFOR, OSCE and NATO representatives. Moreover, the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Relations carries out quarterly inspections at the Pretis, under the Law on the Manufacture of Firearms and Military Equipment. The inspection teams supervise the ammunition destruction and storage, as well as secondary materials.

Kako su otjerani Nijemci iz vogošćanskog "Pretisa": SDA stopirala milionske strane investicije! (Avaz, 05/08/2012.)

"Kako su ministri iz kriminalizirane SDA u Vladi FBiH planski uništavali i spriječavali ulazak stranih investicija na bh. tržište govori i podatak da je vogošćanskom "Pretisu" na dan pregovora sa njemačkim partnerom "JOST Werkerom" koji je bio spreman uložiti desetine miliona eura, isključena struja, te blokirani svi žiro računi."


Kako su otjerani Nijemci iz vogošćanskog "Pretisa": SDA stopirala milionske strane investicije!
Na dan pregovora s Nijemcima o velikim ulaganjima u namjensku industriju "Pretisu" isključena struja 

Autor M. AŠČIĆ | Objavljeno 05.08.2012. u 06:07 
"Pretis": Radnici bez plaća, novih ulaganja ni na vidiku 
Kako su ministri iz kriminalizirane SDA u Vladi FBiH planski uništavali i spriječavali ulazak stranih investicija na bh. tržište govori i podatak da je vogošćanskom "Pretisu" na dan pregovora sa njemačkim partnerom "JOST Werkerom" koji je bio spreman uložiti desetine miliona eura, isključena struja, te blokirani svi žiro računi.

Tražili sastanak

No, nekoliko dana prije sastanka 22. marta 2011. godine, bivša Uprava "Pretisa" tražila je sastanak sa resornim ministrom energije, rudarstva i industrije Erdalom Trhuljom kako bi ga obavijestili o dolasku ino partnera u BiH, te značaju ove kompanije za namjensku industriju naše zemlje. 

Izvor blizak bivšoj Upravi "Pretisa" kaže za "Avaz" da su pregovori sa Nijemcima trajali puna četiri mjeseca, u koje je bila uključena i Ambasada Njemačke u BiH.

- Sve se skoro dogovorilo. Nijemci su prihvatili našu ponudu i saradnju. Ostalo je još da se vide mogućnosti naše firme i da potpišemo ugovor. No, odjednom je je stigao poziv da je "Pretisu" isključena struja. Taj dan smo bili na sastanku u Ambasadi Njemačke u BiH. To je SDA predvođena ministrom Trhuljom planski uradilla kako bi spriječili dolazak Nijemaca u "Pretis". Izgubili smo ugovore vrijedne stotine miliona maraka - kaže naš izvor.

Sve otkazano

On tvrdi da je slično desilo i sa gigantima vojne industrije, španskom firmom "EXPAL" i francuskom "NEXTER".

- Svjesno su minirali te ponude, čak ih nisu htjeli ni razmatrati. Francuzi su već bili ponudili dva miliona dolara, a obećali uložiti preko sto miliona. Sve je to SDA stopirala zarad nekih svojih ličnih interesa. Nijemci su odmah otkazali svaki vid saradnje - kaže on.

SDA želi graditi hotel

- Prema nekim informacija, čelni ljudi vrha SDA namjeravaju totalno ugasiti proizvodnju u "Pretisu", što je najbolji primjer stopiranjem stranih investicija. Na taj način, oni žele na lokaciji "Pretisa" graditi hotele, golf terene. Njih namjenska industrija ne zanima. Ta lokacija im je idealna za hotele - kaže naš sagovornik.

Poruke "Pretisa" - Avaz, 03/08/2012

"Prisjetimo se samo skandala s narudžbom oružja za Pakistan. SDA - SBiH vlast uradila je sve da zataška aferu i zaštiti svoje lopove." 

Poruke "Pretisa"
Autor Sead NUMANOVIĆ 2012-08-03 06:01:00 

Potencijali vojne industrije i znanje i iskustvo njenih ljudi mogu izvući BiH iz duboke krize

"Pretis" Vogošća, "Pobjeda" Goražde, BNT Novi Travnik, "Zrak" Sarajevo, "Igman" Konjic, "Binas" Bugojno... samo su neki od nekadašnjih giganata vojne industrije Bosne i Hercegovine. Većina ovih firmi danas je u smrtnom hropcu, radnici godinama nisu primali plaće, oni koji imaju uvjete za penziju ne mogu je ostvariti jer im dosadašnje vlasti nisu uplaćivale doprinose. 

Nekada ponos BiH, danas su mjesta užasne agonije. 

Odgovornost za ovakvo stanje u najvećem je dijelu na SDA i Stranci za BiH. Oni su godinama uništavali nekadašnju kičmu bh. industrije.

Radnici "Pretisa" s pravom su uprli prstom u takvu pogubnu politiku. Ove dvije stranke godinama su na čelo Federalne direkcije za namjensku industriju postavljali kompromitirane i nesposobne kadrove čiji je jedini zadatak bio da dodatno devastiraju vojnu industriju BiH i u stranačke kase donesu novi reket. 

Ova direkcija nikada nije organizirala fabrike i odvela ih na ijedan bitan međunarodni sajam, a kamoli da je donijela vrijedne poslove. 

Prisjetimo se samo skandala s narudžbom oružja za Pakistan. SDA - SBiH vlast uradila je sve da zataška aferu i zaštiti svoje lopove. 

Nova vlast, koja je još u nastanku, mora se odlučno obračunati s mafijom i u ovom segmentu. Jer, potencijali vojne industrije i znanje njenih ljudi mogli bi BiH više nego uspješno izvući iz krize. 

Radnike "Pretisa" na ulicu otjerala politika SDA i SBiH Uprave pod kontrolom bivših saziva vlada uništile proizvodnju (Avaz)

"Posebna su priča tržišta Malezije i Pakistana, preko kojih je Uprava "Pretisa", potpomognuta bivšom SDA - SBiH vladom, godinama pravila štetne ugovore za poslove koje nije imala mogućnosti da radi.

- Uzeli su milionski avans koji su potrošili, a nisu mogli obaviti isporuku. Obećavali su proizvodnju svijetlećih raketa koje proizvode možda dvije firme na svijetu, a sve je to išlo preko BBI banke i njenog direktora Amera Bukvića. Ništa nije moglo da se obavi bez Bukvića, koji je iz tekućih računa plaćao provizije, što je nevjerovatno - priča naš sagovornik."

Gdje je završilo 20 tona čeličnih kalupa?

Radnike "Pretisa" na ulicu je otjerala politika SDA i SBiH Uprave pod kontrolom bivših saziva vlada uništile proizvodnju

Autor M. AŠČIĆ | Objavljeno 02.08.2012. u 09:10 
S jučerašnjih protesta radnika: Para nema, radnici gladni (Foto: M. Kadrić) Nekadašnji gigant namjenske industrije, vogošćanski "Pretis" nalazi se pred kolapsom za koji je zaslužna kriminalna hobotnica predvođena strankama SDA i SBiH koje su ovu kompaniju godinama planski uništavale, a radnike ostavljale bez ikakvih primanja i uvjeta za život. 

Uništavani ugovori

Na težak položaj u preduzeću jučer je upozorilo više od oko 120 nezadovoljnih radnika koji su se okupili ispred zgrade Vlade FBiH. Radnici, većinom bivši pripadnici ARBiH, tvrde da su dovedeni pred zid te da dolazak pješice iz Vogošće pred Vladu pokazuje da su ogorčeni i godinama obespravljeni, vođeni lošom politikom prethodnih uprava, ali i vlade koja je postavljala direktore. Ibrahim Hrvat, predsjednik Sindikata "Pretisa", kazao je za "Avaz" da je stanje u preduzeću katastrofalno. 

- Problemi u "Pretisu" traju već godinama. Grantovi koje je Vlada davala su potrošeni. Više nema ni para ni vremena. Vlada je kriva što je godinama na čelo postavljala pogrešne uprave i nadzorne odbore. Ovo je čista agonija. Ljudi su godinama bez primanja i uvjeta za život - rekao je Hrvat. 

Istovremeno, prema pouzdanim podacima našeg lista, firma je u dugovima većim od 30 miliona KM te, bez inozemnih ugovora i kupaca kojih uopće nema ni na vidiku, nema ni izlaza za preduzeće koje je bilo ponos namjenske industrije BiH. Sagovornik "Avaza", čije je ime poznato redakciji, kazao nam je da je "Pretis" uništen pogrešnom politikom osovine SDA - SBiH, koja je unazad 20 godina kontrolirala ovu kompaniju.

- "Pretis" je trebao biti, i vjerujem da može postati, najbolja kompanija u državi, jer je to zlatna koka. Iz "Pretisa" su godinama izvlačili pare, pravili i prave loše ugovore na štetu države, a radnike niko ništa nije pitao - podvlači naš sagovornik. 

Propali su poslovi u Maleziji, Pakistanu, Egiptu... 

Mutni poslovi

Otjerane su vodeće svjetske kompanije "Nexter" iz Francuske i "Expal" iz Španije. 

- Stopirali su stotine miliona maraka koje su ove firme namjeravale uložiti. Radi se o kompanijama s više od 50.000 uposlenika. No, Nadzorni odbor, u konsultaciji s resornim ministrom Erdalom Trhuljom, o tome nije htio ni raspravljati. Sve su stopirali. Kada su strani investitori vidjeli s kim imaju posla, odustali su - tvrdi on. 

Posebna su priča tržišta Malezije i Pakistana, preko kojih je Uprava "Pretisa", potpomognuta bivšom SDA - SBiH vladom, godinama pravila štetne ugovore za poslove koje nije imala mogućnosti da radi.

- Uzeli su milionski avans koji su potrošili, a nisu mogli obaviti isporuku. Obećavali su proizvodnju svijetlećih raketa koje proizvode možda dvije firme na svijetu, a sve je to išlo preko BBI banke i njenog direktora Amera Bukvića. Ništa nije moglo da se obavi bez Bukvića, koji je iz tekućih računa plaćao provizije, što je nevjerovatno - priča naš sagovornik.

Gdje je završilo 20 tona čeličnih kalupa?

Naš sagovornik se pita kako je moguće da je iz preduzeća izvučeno 20 tona čeličnih kalupa za izradu granata te da o tome, iako se to desilo u aprilu prošle godine, svi šute.

- To je posao za SIPA-u i tužilaštvo. Nije to mala stvar. Radi se o kalupima za proizvodnju eksploziva i raketa - prenio nam je naš izvor.

Radnicima obećano po 350 KM

Radnicima „Pretisa" koji su jučer protestirali, nakon sastanka u Vladi FBiH, obećana je finansijska pomoć u iznosu od po 350 KM, poslije čega su se vratili kućama.

- Rekli su nam da će pare dati do petka te da ćemo pregovore nastaviti opet u ponedjeljak - rekao je Hrvat

Izvještaj parlamentarne istražne komisije za provjeru zakonitosti uništavanja MiMES (PRETIS) 25/02/2012

Izvještaj parlamentarne istražne komisije za provjeru zakonitosti uništavanja MiMES-a (PRETIS) - 25/07/2012.
Tokom provjere zakonitosti procesa uništavanja municije i minsko-eksplozivnih sredstava, naoružanja i vojne opreme postojale su nepravilnosti. Uništavanje višaka nlje pratilo materijalno razduženje vojnih skladišta, tako da se uništena sredstva i dalje vode na stanju. Za velike količine eksploziva dobivene procesom delaboracije ne postoje podaci gdje je završio i kako se njime prometovalo u komercijalne svrhe.
Istražna komisija nije uspjela u potpunosti rasvijetliti ulogu UNDP-a, koji je u proces uništavanja nestabilne municije i MiMES-a bio uključen od 1995. godine i koji je bez prethodno definiranih procedura od strane Ministarstva odbrane BiH preuzeo na sebe cijeli proces uništavanja MiMES-a, na osnovu Memoranduma o razumijevanju, potpisanog 2005. godine. Ministarstvo odbrane BiH i UNDP su potpisali Memorandum retroaktivno.
Memorandum o razumijevanju o uništavanju MiMES-a je potpisan između UNDP-a i firme ,,Unis-Pretis", ali ne i između Pretisa i Ministarstva odbrane, što je dovelo do toga da se cijeli proces uništavanja MiMES-a obavljao mimo procedura i kontrole Ministarstva odbrane BiH. Utvrđeno je da je Ministarstvo odbrane BiH, i pored upozorenja Sektora za nabavku i logistiku, potpisalo dokument kojim se izbjegava plaćanje PDV-a za opremu namijenjenu delaboraciji u komercijalnim kapacitetima, čime je oštećen budžet institucija BiH.

Local Police Certification Process

It wasn't Lajcak but Dodik who suspended the police officers (Oslobodjenje, 12/03/2009)

Oslobodjenje pg. 12 of 12 March 2009: OHR: It wasn't Lajcak but Dodik who suspended the police officers

- The Office of High Representative (OHR) for BiH reacted on yesterday's decision made by Zvornik Basic Court which decided that seven suspended police officers, suspected that they have participated in genocide against Bosniacs committed in Srebrenica in 1995, should be returning to work. OHR stated that it was not the High Representative in BiH, Miroslav Lajcak, who suspended the police officers, but the RS Ministry of Interior (MoI).

"Partially based on "Srebenica list" prepared by the RS Government, BiH Prosecutor ordered an investigation against 93 police officers. 36 of them are employed by RS Police. By operating in accordance with laws in RS and the promises by RS Prime Minister given in 2007, that any police officer that is being under investigation for committing war crimes, will be suspended, RS MoI suspended those police officers from their active service until the investigations against them are completed," stated the OHR. 

LJUDSKA PRAVA U BIH 2008 - Centar za ljudska prava Univerziteta u Sarajevu (uz finansijsku pomoć Fonda otvoreno društvo BiH)

Women's Participation in the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY): Transitional Justice for Bosnia and Herzegovina By Julie Mertus With Olja Hocevar Van Wely

The Institute for Inclusive Security

Nova Banka a.d. Bijeljina

OHR - decision removing Jovo Kosmajac

Odluka RS o davanju saglasnosti na kreditne sporazume Svetske banke

IFC Investment to Nova Banka a.d. Bijeljina

Report on the Meeting with Chief State Prosecutor (jurisdiction, strategy of prosecution of WC and truth commission)

Report on  the Meeting with Chief State Prosecutor Marinko Jurcevic

28^th June 2006 at 13:00 hrs at the State Prosecutor’s Office

Attended by:

MM,

A M-S

1. PURPOSE OF THE MEETING

The purpose of the meeting was to receive the perspective of the State Prosecutor’s Office on the most difficult aspects of prosecuting of WCs in BiH and to identify its position on the process of establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. In that respect three major topics were discussed:

A.              Jurisdiction as per territory and subject-matter of the prosecutor’s offices in BiH

B.              BiH Strategy and System of Support to the Prosecution of WCs in BiH

C.              The position of the State Prosecutor’s Office on the possible establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

2. ELABORATION ON THE TOPICS

A.              Jurisdiction as per territory and subject-matter of the prosecutor’s offices in BiH

The problem has appeared when the entity prosecutor’s offices started to apply the principle of universal jurisdiction (applicable in relations between states only) to the prosecution of the cases of WCs in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The major principle to determine the jurisdiction of the prosecutor’s office as provided by the BiH criminal legislation, once the jurisdiction as per subject-matter was established, is the place where the crime was committed[1]. Therefore, e.g. if the crime was committed in Zvornik, the public prosecutor’s office in Tuzla cannot be in charge of the prosecution of that crime. The Legal Opinion[2] provided by Legal Advisory Section of the Prosecutor’s Office clearly states that “the principle of universal jurisdiction may not be relied upon to initiate an investigation into international crimes committed in part of the territory within the same state.” On 26^th June 2006 therefore the meeting was held at the BiH Ministry of Justice in order to discuss this issue and take a joint position backed by the Minister Slobodan Kovac.

Apparently  there is no common position or practice in the prosecutor’s offices in BiH with regard to the interpretation of the CCP BiH Article 449 (2) referring to the cases pending before other courts or prosecutor’s offices in which the indictment is not legally effective or confirmed. This issue is important for the determination if the case will be prosecuted by the State Prosecutor's Office or other jurisdiction. Among the legal practitioners, there are two prevailing positions on the issue – one stream considers that the prosecutor's office with which the criminal complaint was filed should be in charge of the case, and the other that for the determination of the jurisdiction as per subject-matter, the crucial moment is passing of the order to conduct the investigation.

B.              BiH Strategy and System of Support to the Prosecution of WCs in BiH

           

The idea to draft the BiH Strategy and System of Support to the Prosecution of WCs in BiH is the result of the Assessment survey of the capacities of the prosecutor’s offices, courts and police bodies in BiH to act in the cases of WCs produced by a working group formed by the HJPC tasked to prepare an analysis and assessment of the capacities of the 1^st and 2^nd instances of the courts, prosecutor’s offices and police agencies. The lack of strategy at the BiH level to prosecute WCs was clearly identified as one of the factors with possible negative implications to the work of the above institutions on the prosecution of WCs and therefore the preparation of such strategy has been proposed as one of the measures to improve the process.

At this point the strategy is being drafted at the Prosecutor’s Office (Mr. Toby Cadman in charge) with the assistance of the OSCE BiH. The strategy should also incorporate the division and distribution of roles in the process of transitional justice (police, courts, prosecutors, NGOs, churches, etc.). There are two main objectives of the strategy: a) the state should stand behind the solving of the WC cases and therefore it should also create technical and other conditions for a quality work and b) to send a message to the world about what should be done by a state in the case of war. Once complete, it will be submitted to Council of Ministers to adopt it as an official paper.     

   

C.              The position of the State Prosecutor’s Office on the possible establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

In March, 2006 Mr. Jurcevic was approached by the representatives of the Dayton Project and “parliamentary” working group tasked to prepare the Draft Law on State Truth and Reconciliation Commission, to provide the opinion on several issues from the draft law related to the relationship between the prosecutor’s offices and the commission, concretely: a) if the commission should be vested a power of summoning (or requesting from a court to issue summons) under threat of sanctioning, in order to provide relevant evidence and statements of witnesses and b) if the commission should provide the information and evidence to the ICTY or courts in BiH and under which circumstances.   

The State Prosecutor’s Office sees the positive role of the possible commission, as it can provide a more complete report on the conflict, wider analysis, which cannot be obtained through the criminal procedure focused on individual responsibility of a limited number of the accused. Given the fact that only a limited number of victims will take part in the WC trials, it could also represent a major forum for the victims to share their experiences. Although the commission and criminal proceedings may be complementary, the commission must not be seen as a substitute for the criminal investigation and proceedings. Accordingly, the commission should not be focused on any concrete event, but should attempt to provide an overall picture of the committed crimes and violations of the international humanitarian law over a specific period. The commission and judicial institutions should operate mutually independently and the commission must not be authorized to assess individual criminal responsibility. In its work and mandate, the commission should be neutral, independent and unbiased.

The commission should not be vested a power of summoning (or requesting from a court to issue the summons) under threat of sanctioning in order to provide relevant evidence and statements of witnesses. The main reason is that the commission should not conduct quasi-judicial proceedings, as BiH already has its judiciary in place and such a situation could only create confusion. On the other hand, commission members are not “law enforcement officials” from the CPC authorized to take statements of witnesses. In parallel, the obligation to appear before the commission, might create a possibility of self-incrimination for an individual without any guarantees awarded in the judicial proceedings.

    The commission should provide the information to the State Prosecutor’s Office upon its request. However, the information should not be provided to the State Prosecutor’s Office automatically and systematically. Nevertheless, if the commission possesses the information of the core value for the delivery of justice, the prosecutor’s offices and courts should have access to such information. Under all circumstances, the self-incriminating statement of the person given before the commission should not be given to the court even in the case of her/his approval. Such statement can only be used in the proceedings against other individuals.

        

---

[1] In the early times after Dayton was signed, domestic prosecutors raised numerous indictments against members of other ethnic groups for war crimes committed elsewhere in the country: for example prosecutors based in Sarajevo raised indictments against Bosnian Serbs for crimes committed in Eastern Bosnia, which is contrary to the principle of territorial jurisdiction. As a result of these practices, which were seriously hindering the freedom of movement, the so called “rules of the road” were adopted. 

[2] Legal Opinion of the Legal Advisory Section of the Prosecutor’s Office of BiH on: Universal jurisdiction: applicability of this principle within BiH, Tuzilastvo-Tuziteljstvo BiH, Ref: A-RZ 98/06. 

BiH Communications Regulatory Agency Punishes RTV FBiH for Failure to Publish Demant on Allegations on Crna Ruka (Black Hand)

http://www.cra.ba/sr/print/print.aspx?cid=2686

Извјештај CRA о случајевима кршења правила и прописа у 2002. години

Wednesday, August 27, 2003

Извјештај CRA о случајевима кршења правила и прописа у 2002. години CRА, јули 2003. године

Одлука од 22. новембра 2002. године – кршење члана 2 “Право на одговор” и члана 1.4 “Праведно и непристрасно уређивање програма”

Санкција – новчана казна у износу од 3000 КМ

Дана 26. септембра 2002. године, ЦРА је примила приговор господина Рајка Дукића, а у вези са програмом који је емитовала РТВ ФБиХ у оквиру централне информативне емисије «Дневник» 17. септембра 2002. године. Спорни прилог од 17. септембра 2002. године бавио се наводним постојањем тајне терористичке организације под именом «Гаврило Принцип». Водитељ је направио увод у прилог сљедећим ријечима: «За терористичку организацију «Гаврило Принцип» први пут се чуло почетком ове године када су једном броју угледних Срба из Федерације, носилаца политичких и полицијских функција упућена писма у којима су им пријетили смрћу. У међувремену, ова организација почела је активније припреме за реализацију терористичких активности. Главно дјеловање организација планира на подручју Горажда и Копача, нападима на повратнике.» Након овог увода, репортер је дао објашњења гдје је ова организација основана, ко су њени главни организатори и сљедбеници, укључујући и услове који се морају испунити да би се постало чланом организације. У оквиру приче, новинар је такође дао информације о састанку одређене групе људи (њихова имена поменута у оквиру прилога) из Србије и РС, која је наводно планирала терористичке нападе на одређене званичнике из БиХ, Србије и чланове међународне заједнице и која је требала спријечити хапшење оптужених за ратне злочине Радована Караџића и Ратка Младића. Даље у прилогу је поменуто на који начин се ова организација финансира. У овом дијелу се такође спомиње неколико имена, међу којима је и господин који је уложио приговор на овај програм Рајко Дукић. Ниједна од тих особа није интервјуисана, нити је дато било какво објашњење о томе да ли је било покушаја да се обезбиједе њихова мишљења.
У свом писму приговора, г. Дукић је порицао наводе које је РТВ ФБиХ емитовала у поменутој емисији и обавијестио је ЦРА да се обраћао директно главном уреднику РТВ ФБиХ, тражећи интегрални текст емисије, са намјером да након тога пошаље званични деманти на овај прилог станици. Дана 26. септембра 2002. године, ЦРА је г. Дукићу доставила транскрипт спорног прилога. Дана 27. септембра 2002. године, г. Дукић се обратио станици са својим демантијем, чији је садржај такође достављен и ЦРА. Дана 01. октобра, г. Дукић послао је допис ЦРА, обавјештавајући Агенцију да његов деманти још није емитован од стране станице.
Дана 11. октобра 2002. године, ЦРА је послала допис станици, подсјећајући исту на обавезу поштивања члана 2 Кодекса о уређивању радио и ТВ програма, Право на одговор, као и на члан 24 Закона о Јавном РТВ сервису БиХ. Коначно, дана 18. октобра 2002. године, ЦРА је од станице затражила да одговори на потенцијално кршење члана 2 и члана 1.4 Кодекса о уређивању радио и ТВ програма.
Станица у спорној емисији није укључила и супротна мишљења. Станица је само навела одређене особе, повезујући исте са темом приче, а без икаквих покушаја успостављања било каквог директног контакта са тим особама. Тиме што није дала могућност поменутим особама да дају свој коментар станица је пропустила да задовољи стандарде професионалног новинарства и праведног извјештавања.
Поред тога, чињеница да се особа која је уложила приговор, г. Рајко Дукић, у два наврата обратила РТВ ФБиХ тражећи од станице да емитује његов деманти, и чињеница да се и ЦРА обратила станици два пута, подсјећајући је на члан 2 «Право на одговор» Кодекса о уређивању радио и ТВ програма, говори о немарности станице у смислу испуњавања обавеза једне јавне станице, што представља кршење Кодекса о уређивању радио и ТВ програма, члан 2 «Право на одговор». Установљено је да је РТВ ФБиХ прекршила Кодекс и кажњена је у износу од 3000 КМ.

"Human Rights Violations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Chances for Repatriation and Integration of Bosnian Refugees," conducted by the Vienna-based Ludwig Boltzmann Institute for Human Rights

PREFACE

This report was established within the framework of the project "Human Rights Violations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Chances for Repatriation and Integration of Bosnian Refugees," conducted by the Vienna-based Ludwig Boltzmann Institute for Human Rights.  It was encouraged by the UN Commission of Experts, which was established on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 780 (1992) "to collect evidence for serious violations of the Geneva Red Cross Conventions and for other violations of international human rights legislation in the area of the former Yugoslavia". The report ("Report on ethnic cleansing operations in the northeast-Bosnian city of Zvornik from April through June 1992") was handed over to the UN Experts Commission on April 6. In its final report (UN Doc. S/1994/674) presented May 27, 1994, the Commission cited this report as an exemplary study on "ethnic cleansing operations," and published it as an annex (UN Doc. S/1994/674/add.2 (vol.I) December 1994). The present report is an extended and revised version of the report for the Commission of Experts; it has been complemented by a legal analysis regarding relevant international law and human rights legislation.
We would like to thank all interviewers, translators, and interlocutors for their commitment and their valuable contributions.  Without them we would have been unable to compile this report in its present form.
We extend our special thanks to Professor Cherif M. Bassiouni, chairman of the above-mentioned UN Commission of Experts, who encouraged us to develop this report further and who provided us with valuable information for this work.
We are extremely grateful, however, to all those expelled Bosnian nationals who told us in interviews how they suffered and what they witnessed.  We would like to assure them that we will use the information provided by them to further justice.
Finally, we would like to extend our special thanks to the Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Austria, Dr. Alois Mock, and to the director of the human rights office of this Federal Ministry, Ambassador Dr. Franz Cede, for supporting this project and for the financial resources provided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Vienna, October 30, 1994                The Authors
 Note: Please understand that printing constraints did not allow us to include special graphic symbols used with proper names or topographical information.
1. INTRODUCTION
This report sets out to reconstruct the genesis and pattern of the process leading to the irrevocable expulsion ("ethnic cleansing") of the non-Serbian population of the town of Zvornik.  It was our objective to evaluate events in exact chronological order.  At the same time the investigation focused primarily on the identification of those responsible for the military operations, for the war crimes, and for committing serious human rights violations. The study furthermore seeks to identify a likely structure or even a distinct system of operations which characterized events from the time of the attack (on the city) to the expulsion of the Muslim population.
The present analysis relies on information obtained by the Ludwig Boltzmann Institute for Human Rights (BIM) in the course of an inquiry of 887 expellees  from the Zvornik area.  It was conducted as part of the research project "War Crimes and Human Rights Violations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Chances for Repatriation and Integration of Bosnian Refugees " (called "BIM-Study" hereafter).
Intensive, preparatory interviews and 31 in-depth interviews with expellees from Zvornik were conducted for the purpose of this study.  The interviewed individuals have detailed knowledge of the respective events.  Some of them held key positions in the social and political life of the city.  Their names are known to the Institute.  For the in-depth interviews, the Institute devised a complex questionnaire, including open and closed question techniques, and a "check-list," which is accessible to the interviewer alone.  This list was designed to double-check pertinent events or events already known, as well as to answer any questions which remain still open.
In one part of the questionnaire the interviees were asked to identify those groups and individuals who participated in the military attacks and in the subsequent expulsion -- in particular units and commanders of the former Yugoslav National Army (JNA) and para-military units.  In addition, they were asked to localize the positions the individual units held during the military operations, and to evaluate any likely cooperation between the individual units.
Another part of the questionnaire attempts to reconstruct events in chronological order.  For this purpose, the following break-down of phases was developed:
 Phase I:  The time prior to the attack.
Phase II: The attack from April 8 until April 10, 1992.
Phase III:The time up to the fall of Kulagrad on April 26, 1992.
Phase IV: From the fall of Kulagrad until May 15, 1992.
Phase V:  The time after May 15, 1992.
In the course of the interview, the expellees were asked to describe without constraints how they had experienced the various phases.  At the same time they were encouraged to give special consideration to the behavior of those units of the JNA which had been present in the city, as well as to the para-military units (the so-called "territorial defense" and partisan units), to the members of the militia, and to the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS).
Each phase was initiated with the following question: "please describe in as much detail as possible how you experienced this phase".  In addition, the above-mentioned check-list could be used with each phase in order to clarify, if necessary, certain events or individual questions which had not been addressed at all or which had only partially been addressed by the expellees because of the open interviewing techniques.  Moreover, interviewers prepared clearly structured questions regarding important events which had taken place during the attack, as well as questions pertaining to the time of the occupation (ultimatums, calls for return after the first wave of refugees, forced registration, forced transferral of property, deportation, imprisonment in war camps, war crimes, human rights violations).
Interviewers confronted the respondents with two maps of the city -- one of the city of Zvornik and one showing the Karakaj industrial zone situated somewhat outside the city.  They served to help pinpoint the exact location of the units participating in the attack, to identify the starting and the final points, to review the development of the military operations, as well as to localize the "concentration camps" -- especially those in Karakaj.
The interviews were conducted in the Austrian provinces of Vienna, Lower Austria, and Styria, as well as in one refugee camp near Gabcikovo/Slovakia, and in one refugee camp in Dortmund/Germany, from March 10 to March 28, 1994 by experienced, bilingual interviewers who had been specially trained for these specific purposes.  The interviewers themselves translated the records obtained in the Bosnian or Croatian languages into German.
2. SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC DATA
According to the 1991 census, the district of Zvornik had a population of 81,111.  Of them, 48,208 were ethnic Bosnians (Muslims 59.4%), 30,839 were Serb nationals (38.0%).  A total of 14,660 people lived in the city of Zvornik, 8,942 (61,0%) of them were Bosnian, 4,281 or 29.2% Serbian nationals, 74 (0.5%) were Croatians, and 1,363 (9.3%) were defined as "others" (mostly Roma).
The following additional municipalities are relevant to the study:
The municipality of Jardan north of Zvornik, which includes the towns of Jardan and Lipovac, had a population of 2,503, with a 53.1% share of ethnic Serbs, and a 46% share of Bosnians.  These towns are located close to the industrial area of Karakaj, where JNA units had been stationed already prior to the attack.  Later, the "headquarters" of both the "Serbian militia" and of the JNA units were moved there, and several camps were established.  The municipality of Celopek (pop. 1,894) is situated north of Jardan; its population consisted of 93.1% ethnic Serbs and 6.3% Bosnians. Well before the attack, units of the former JNA were stationed in Celopek.
In 1981, a total of 27,695 (38.5%) people held jobs, 9,487 of them in the farming and forestry sectors, 18,208 in non-agrarian occupations.  The total number of self-employed was 2,202.   The "Birac" company in the Karakaj industrial zone was the biggest and most important local employer. It manufactured precursor material for the production of aluminum.
3. STRATEGIC SITUATION OF ZVORNIK
Being a border town situated directly at the Bosnian-Serb border river Drina, Zvornik's location was strategically important.  This is where Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia are linked not only via a car bridge in the city itself and in the Karakaj industrial zone north of Zvornik, but also via a railroad bridge between Karakaj and the town of Celopek.  This fact lent the city particular strategic importance.  After all, Zvornik represented an important link on the Belgrade-Sarajevo line, as well as on the Belgrade-Tuzla line.
Having control of Zvornik meant that any future movements of troops or logistic material from Serbian territory toward Tuzla or Sarajevo could be accomplished without any obstacles.  The early deployment of units of the former JNA clearly indicated the objective to secure control over the two corridors of Belgrade-Tuzla and Belgrade-Sarajevo by taking control of Zvornik.  For the Bosnian side, Zvornik was strategically important only in a defensive sense, i.e. in as much as the above-mentioned supply lines could be interrupted.  Moreover, because of its geographic situation, Zvornik was not relevant to the armed conflicts and military movements within Bosnia-Herzegovina.  The "Kula" hill and the fortress bearing the same name as well as the predominantly Muslim settlement of "Kulagrad" were important only from a local strategic point of view.  It was from this hill that large parts of the city of Zvornik (as well as the Divic hydroelectric power plant south of Zvornik) could be controlled.
4. MILITARY SITUATION
4.1. Yugoslav national army (JNA)
There was no official garrison of the former JNA in the district of Zvornik.  The Zvornik region was under the command of the 17th Corps Tuzla.  Up to the fall of 1991, the 17th Corps consisted of three brigades and one partisan brigade.  It belonged to the 1st Military District of Belgrade.  After the reorganization of the JNA in spring 1992, it was formally incorporated into the 2nd Military District of Sarajevo.  However, it apparently remained under the command of the 1st Military District of Belgrade.
At the turn of the year 1991/92, the first tank units (apparently from the abandoned Jastrebarsko garrison in Croatia) were stationed near Zvornik (i.e. on the Bosnian side of the Drina river).  In February/March 1992 (at the time of the referendum for independence), additional troops of the former JNA -- tank, artillery and anti-aircraft units -- were stationed there. Initially, the tanks still carried the emblems of the JNA.  It was only later that they sported the Serbian flag and badges showing the coat-of-arms.  At the same time, the members of the units --officers and soldiers alike -- had been wearing Serb badges on their uniforms from the very beginning.
Since the beginning of that year, various tank positions could be identified on the Serbian side of the Drina river bank as well. Later, artillery positions and anti-aircraft weaponry were added.
4.1.1. Units participating in the attack
According to witness accounts, former JNA troops from the following garrisons participated in the course of the attack:
• Tuzla (Bosnia-Herzegovina): some of the tanks used in Zvornik formed part of the units which were transferred from Jastrebarsko/Croatia to Tuzla.
• Bijeljina (Bosnia-Herzegovina): the infantry divisions of the former JNA were reserve units of the Bijeljina mobilization base, the Bijeljina garrison belonged to the 17th Corps Tuzla.
Already prior to the attack, the units from Tuzla were stationed near Zvornik -- particularly on the Bosnian side of the Drina river bank.  In the town of Celopek, in the "Dom Kulture" (Cultural Center), there were small barracks housing roughly  100 infantry soldiers.  In the "Novi Standard" shoe factory in Karakaj, there were barracks, too, which reportedly accommodated more soldiers than those in Celopek.  According to statements by some witnesses, the soldiers accommodated in both towns were reportedly from Tuzla.   There is, however, evidence that the infantry units in "Novi Standard" were part of a newly formed so-called "territorial defense" ; the infantry unit in the "Dom Culture" in Celopek was a reserve unit from Bijeljina.  A high-rise apartment building in Meterize -- a distinct part of the city of Zvornik -- served as an additional place of accommodation for soldiers.  These soldiers stayed in apartments owned by the "Birac" company, while the Muslim residents were expelled.
The planes and helicopters participating in the attack are also believed to have been from Tuzla.
• Novi Sad (Serbia): Up to the reorganization of the former JNA, the headquarters of the 12th Corps Novi Sad commanded as "Sector Command North" so-called "operative groups" which were directly controlled by the General Command, including at least three brigades and additional forces.
• Sabac (Serbia)
• Sremska Mitrovica (Serbia): The units from Sabac and Sremska Mitrovica remained permanently under the command of the 12th Corps Novi Sad.
• Valjevo (Serbia): the unit in Valjevo was permanently under the command of the 1st Corps of Belgrade.  The units from Sabac, Sremska Mitrovica and Valjevo, all of which belonged to the 1st Military District, were all organized as readily deployable troops up until the fall of 1991.
Prior to the attack, these units were partly stationed on the Serbian and partly on the Bosnian side of the Drina river bank. They also participated in the attack on Zvornik, operating from Serbian territory.  One unit from Sabac is said to have been put up in the "Dom Kulture" in Mali Zvornik.  "Small barracks" reportedly existed in Rakalj north of Mali Zvornik.
• Nis (Serbia): Up until the reorganization of the former JNA, the 21st Corps stationed in Nis was under the authority of the 3rd Military District of Skopje. Later a separate 3rd Military District was established.
There is some indication that a specialized unit originating in Nis participated in the attack on Zvornik and, later, on Kulagrad.  It was reportedly composed of the 63rd airborne brigade Nis" of the "Corps for Special Tasks Belgrade".  It was especially trained to handle matters of internal security.
Infantry divisions which had been withdrawn from the Croatian (Vukovar) war theater and which had participated in the attack on Zvornik could not be identified in more detail.
4.1.2. Commander
General Jankovic was garrison commander in Tuzla and is said to have repeatedly visited the troops from Tuzla stationed in and around Zvornik prior to the attack.  In the course of the restructuring of the JNA in May 1992 -- when "pro-Yugoslav" officers were replaced by "pro-Serb" officers -- he was forced to retire.
General Milutin Kukanjac was commander of the 2nd Military District of Sarajevo.  After the reorganization of the JNA, he was responsible for the Zvornik area during the time of the attack.  In a TV interview following the attack on Zvornik, Kukanjac reportedly said:  "If the people of Zvornik return their weapons, the army will protect them.  This should serve as an example for other towns."
Lieutenant Colonel Pejic  was the commander of the troops participating in the attack on Zvornik and commander-in-chief until April 26.  During the Croatian War Pejic was head of the operations division at the 32nd Corps Varazdin.  In the course of the reorganization of the JNA he was moved to Sarajevo.  It is, therefore, believed that his responsibilities in Zvornik also included the preparation and execution of the attack -- a task which was indeed attributed to him by many of the respondents.
Colonel Marko Pavlovic  belonged to a unit in Croatia until December 1991; he was commander of the 622nd motorized brigade Petrinja, which belonged to the 10th Corps Zagreb.  Later, he was detached to the 2nd Military District of Sarajevo.  Following Pejic, Pavlovic is said to have taken over the command of the troops after the fall of Kulagrad on April 26.  According to witness accounts, he is believed to have been responsible for the ethnic cleansing operations.  After the fall of Zvornik he apparently assumed administrative tasks.  Formally, however, -- at least by mid-June or by the end of June -- he no longer acted as a member of the JNA, but as "commander of the Zvornik territorial defense," which is the title attributed to him in a newspaper interview with the Serbian publication "Borba".
Lieutenant Radovan Ticic reportedly commanded the tank-unit from Tuzla.
4.1.3. Armaments
Using photographic evidence, the following armaments could be identified in the course of the research by the Institute:
Infantry
Automatic rifles/carabines and M 52, M 59, M65, M66, M70A, M70B, M72 and "Kalashnikov" machine guns, bajonettes, hand grenades, "Soja" anti-tank grenade launchers, portable grenade launchers.
Tanks
Battle tanks T 344, T 54, T 55, T 72 and T 84; "Marda(er)" armored personnel carriers with machine canons; "Samohodka" wheeled tanks.
Artillery
Howitzers as well as 122mm and 130mm canons;  60mm, 80 mm, and 120 mm mortars; anti-aircraft artillery.
Air force
MIG 21 and MIG 29 fighter bombers; "Jastrep" training and ground fighter planes with machine guns and missiles; "Galeb" training and ground fighter planes; "Eagle" reconnaissance planes; MI 8, MI 9 and "Gazella"  helicopters.
4.2. Paramilitary Units
4.2.1. General Remarks
During the entire period studied the supreme military command was held by the JNA officers Pejic and Pavlovic.  Except for the "Arkanovci," the para-military groups accepted the command of the JNA when conducting military operations.
From the time after the attack until the final "ethnic expulsion," a considerable number of para-military groups stayed in the city. They included "organized" partisan groups as well as so-called "week-end Cetniks,"  especially from Serbia.  Almost all groups exerted some form of terror over the city population.  They are being held responsible for murders, rapes, lootings and tortures in the camps.  They seemed to be under nobody's command or control.
The most important "organized" para-military units were the "Arkanovci,"  the so-called "territorial defense" (TO), the "Seseljevci," and the "Beli Orlovi."
It proved impossible to distinguish the last three units mentioned above explicitly from each other, nor was it possible to identify them as separate from the infantry units of the former JNA.
There is considerable evidence that infantry units not only included regular members of the former JNA and reserve soldiers called to arms, but of "volunteers" as well.  This can partly be concluded from observations made by several citizens.  According to these accounts, it was already prior to the attack, i.e. as early as March 1992, that the soldiers -- and, as some of those interviewed said, officers as well -- no longer wore the badges of the former JNA, but already had Serb cockades on their uniforms. On the other hand, the old Yugoslav identification symbols could still be seen on military vehicles and on various military equipment.  Moreover, many soldiers wearing old JNA uniforms had a white ribbon on the upper arm or wore other identification symbols.
These were identification marks which only made sense if one wanted to distinguish oneself from soldiers who were similarly dressed.  This distinction became necessary only with regard to JNA units or units in JNA uniform, as there was no organized military enemy on the Muslim side.  The fact that soldiers wore long beards served as another means of identification.  This would have been impossible for a regular member of the former JNA.  Moreover, some of the physical descriptions of these units and their localization correspond to the descriptions and the localization of the "territorial defense," the Seseljevci, or of the Beli Orlovi, which were provided by other interviewees.  Members of these units reportedly used to participate within combined fighting units in the attack.  A major part of the para-military groups had no distinct identification features at all and was, therefore, attributed to the JNA infantry by the respondents.  But they are likely to have been part of the "territorial defense," which, according to reports, had been newly founded for the area of Zvornik prior to the attack on the city.
Some reserve officers of the infantry came from the region of Zvornik and were at the same time well-known SDS activists.  For example, Momir Vasiljevic reportedly was the commander in Zvornik. He was "captain of the reserve, first class" and was originally from Celopek.  Prior to the war, he worked in the hospital of Zvornik.  One of the officers was Zoran Jovanovic, who had been employed with the "Birac" company; later, he became one of the most important figures of the so-called "Serb district of Zvornik."
Another reason for the difficulty in keeping the various para-military groups clearly apart was the fact that respondents identified the same persons from the surrounding villages in Serbia and Bosnia at one time as being part of the Seseljevci, at another time as members of the Beli Orlovi, then again as members of the "volunteer units."  It can be assumed that partisan units identified themselves as members of well-known units (e.g. Arkanovci, Seseljevci, Beli Orlovi, Draganovci), even though they were never actually a part of them.
It is further believed that the so-called "territorial defense" was incorporated into the reserve units of the JNA shortly after the attack.
Despite these facts, the following chapters seek to identify distinct features characterizing each of these groups.  And, as regards the units of the former JNA, it is assumed that several infantry units did, in fact, exist.
4.2.2. "Territorial Defense" (TO)
Shortly after the dissolution of the regular territorial defense in Bosnia-Herzegovina in fall 1991, SDS leaders in Zvornik began recruiting, equipping and obviously also training a new "Serbian territorial defense."  Many of them came from predominantly Serb-populated towns such as Celopek or Scemlija near Zvornik, or from various districts of Zvornik (Lisisnjak).
Their headquarters were located in the Karakaj industrial zone, while the major part of the troops stayed in the "Novi Standard" factory.  Many of the interviewees also stated that their headquarters are believed to have been in the Lisisnjak part of the city.  However, only the apartments of Branko Grujic, who later became "President of the Serb municipality of Zvornik," and of Bosko Ceranic, another SDS activist, are believed to have been in this part of the city.
Branko Grujic is said to have been the leader of this unit.  Other leading members included Ljupko Ilic (he later reportedly became "President of the Martial Court"), Drago Krstanovic (prior to the war he worked in the hospital), and "Marko," a crane operator. Like all other para-military units, the territorial defense, too, cooperated with the JNA and operated under its command.
Being from the area themselves, its members are said to have been under special orders to act as informants for the military; later, they reportedly identified many wealthy and prominent Muslims who were subsequently robbed and arrested (many of them handed over to the "Arkanovci" as prisoners).  During the attack, they came into the city in a second wave directly in the wake of the "Arkanovci".
4.2.3. Arkanovci, ("Srpska Dobrovoljacke Garda"/ "Serb Volunteer Guard")
The Arkanovci as well as "Arkan"  himself are unanimously being described as the decisive personalities of the attack.  During the attack proper, Arkan's responsibilities as leader not only went beyond those of the commanders of the former JNA, they also surpassed those of the leading personalities of the local SDS.
During the attack, Arkan himself held the supreme command over the Arkanovci.  Other important figures besides him were:  "Rambo" (he was reportedly Arkan's brother-in-law, who was killed in the course of the battle of Kulagrad); "Zuco," who is held responsible for several serious war crimes and human rights violations; his companion "Topola;" the Jovic brothers from Mali Zvornik (Dragan "Jole" Jovic and his brother Pero Jovic commanded a special unit with red berets with Serb National badges;  they, too, wore the "Tiger" badge and the slogan "Arkanove delije" on their shoulders; others said the two brothers were part of different groups); a certain "Vuk" or "Vuco;" and a woman by the name of "Lela," who was made responsible for tortures and killings in camps.  The headquarters were in Mali Zvornik in the "Jezero" hotel, Arkan himself stayed in Radaljska Banja.
The members of the Arkanovci had short hair and wore (dark) olive overalls,  black gloves cut off at mid-finger, and black woollen caps which could be used as masks.  Their army boots were fixed to their uniforms with "Velcro" stripes.  On their left arms they had a badge showing four cyrillic letters "S" and the words "Serb volunteer guard" stitched around the outer circle of this emblem. According to other witness accounts, they wore camouflage uniforms with red arrows as badges, the Serb national colors on the right arm, and a badge with the words "Arkanove delije" on the shoulders.
One of their characteristic traits was their adherence to a strict disciplinary code.  They were described as very brutal and "meticulous" regarding "cleansing operations."  The respondents portrayed them as "cold-blooded killers."  Expressions such as "fighter machines" or "Rambos" were also used by the interviewees. The fact that the Arkanovci were never drunk made them also stand out among the other units.  However, they are said to have resorted to other forms of drugs.
There is evidence that they had name lists of rich Muslims whose gold and money they robbed.  Local Serbs are said to have been responsible for compiling these lists.  Reportedly, it was the Arkanovci in particular who, accompanied by local Serbs, were systematically involved in house searches, killings, rapes, and lootings.  The "right to be the first to loot," which they apparently enjoyed, was obviously part of their "remuneration."
Arkan himself is said to have arrived in Zvornik on April 7. There is some contradiction as to whether he only participated in "negotiations" on Zvornik's future that day, or whether he actually dominated those talks.   Arkan himself issued an ultimatum for the surrender of the city and the turn-over of all weapons by the morning of April 9.  Some days later, Arkan is said to have returned to Zvornik.  He kidnapped hospital patients to press for the release of "Rambo's" dead body.  Members of the Arkanovci wearing civil clothes are said to have been present in the city since the end of March.
Their participation in the fighting began on April 8 with mortar fire and attacks by snipers located in Mali Zvornik.  They conquered the city and assumed control of it on April 9, having taken control of the most important facilities (hospital, radio station) as well as of strategic points.  The Arkanovci were supported all along by JNA artillery and logistics.  Apparently, strategic planning and command structures had been uniform.
Later other groups (Seseljevci, Beli Orlovi, the "territorial defense," and "volunteers" from neighboring towns in Serbia assumed the task of securing the city (militarily).  After the occupation of the city (April 10/11), the core troops apparently left Zvornik.
The Arkanovci were highly mobile and had many vehicles from private owners.  Apart from their "military tasks," the Arkanovci were responsible for many of the atrocities and lootings.  Arkan himself purportedly ordered Muslims and hospital patients to the execution sites.  His people murdered several men in the house of Salim Donjic and committed massacres in the city districts Zamlas and Hrid.  In the morning of April 9 they are said to have committed another massacre in Vidakove Nijeve at the access road to Zvornik.  In the cafe "Klempic," too, they are said to have committed another massacre in the morning hours of April 9.  But since the cafe is situated in the direction of Vidakove Nijeve, the massacre mentioned earlier could be identical with that in Vidakove Nijeve.
Their arms included:  automatic rifles M 70A, M 70B and U.S. rifles, "Skorpion" rifles, hand grenades, anti-tank grenades and launching grenades; ropes for choking people, long "Rambo-style" knives, clubs; they wore bullet-proof jackets for their own security.
4.2.4.  Seseljevci
The Seseljevci were described as "bearded" men.  They wore Serbian military berets with the Serbian flag or a skull on the front side, or black fur hats ("Sapka") with Serbian cockade.  The cross-shaped ammunition belts worn across the breast and the handgrenades on the belt were another identification mark.
Their leaders are said to have been Nikola Jovanovic, a taxi driver from Loznica; a certain "Nislija"; a man named "Hladni", a man called "Dragan Toro," who wore a major's badge, and "Vojvoda Seselj".
According to witness accounts they were frequently drunk; they repeatedly recruited criminals and "weekend fighters."  They are said to have been particularly active as regards acts of violence against civilians -- including violence in internment camps.  The Seseljevci are blamed for the desecration of at least one mosque, playing "Cetnik songs" over the loudspeakers and raising a flag with a skull.
Their headquarters were hard to localize.  According to witnesses, they were in the "Standard" factory in Karakaj, in the "Inzinjering" company building on the "Alhos" premises, or the "Vezionica" in Karakaj, in the "Drina" hotel, and in the radio station's pre-school.
Prior to the attack, members of the Selseljevci were already present as civilians.   They participated in the attack as early as April 9 and stayed involved throughout the entire period of the occupation until the conquest of Kulagrad.
They assumed control of various parts of the city and were responsible for lootings wherever they went. They always cooperated with the JNA, both with regard to strategy and command structure.
Their weapons included: automatic rifles M 59, M 66, M 70A, M 70B, long, curved knives, hand grenades.
4.2.5. Beli Orlovi (White Eagles)
They were reportedly sloppily dressed, wearing all sorts of uniforms from various JNA stock, or civilian clothes.  They wore a badge on the cap and the upper arm depicting a white, two-headed eagle.  They came for the most part from near-by towns in Serbia (Loynica, Valjevo, etc.).  Their leaders were, alternately, Mirko Jovic, Dragoslav Bokan, and Vojislav Seselj.   Moreover, it was difficult to identify their headquarters.  According to witnesses, they were believed to have been on the "Alhos" premises (together with the Arkanovci) and in the "Jezero" hotel in Mali Zvornik.
Like the Seseljevci, they, too, participated only in the second wave of the attack.  Their "task" was to assist in the fighting and to secure strategic positions.  They participated in the shelling, siege, and occupation of the city, as well as in the attack on Kulagrad.
Their prime responsibility appears to have been the military securement of the deportations; they patrolled intersections and streets (frequently in a drunk and provocative manner), routinely arrested "suspects," and customarily looted.  White eagles were painted on homes and warehouses.  It was forbidden for the locals to remove them.  They operated under the command of the JNA.
Their weapons included light armaments (no detailed information was available).
4.2.6. Draganovci
Another important unit was that of the Draganovci of "Kapetan Dragan" (Vasijkovic Dragan).  While they did not participate in the attack, they did take part in the occupation of Zvornik.  Its members wore red berets and camouflage uniforms.   Kapetan Dragan himself reportedly wore civilian clothes only.  The Draganovci did not arrive in Zvornik until mid-May.  Their headquarters were set up in the Vidikovac hotel in Divic.  They were only tasked with administrative matters.  But they, too, reportedly participated in the organized expulsion of the Muslim population.
Remarkably, many of the interviewees noted that the Draganovci appeared "disciplined" and "orderly", even "correct" and "friendly".  Members of the Draganovci reportedly even saved Muslim prisoners from being murdered by other partisans.  In fact, the study by the Boltzmann Institute for Human Rights, too, rarely found charges of human rights violations against them.
On the other hand, members of the Draganovci are accused of having trained local Serbs in the soccer stadium of Divic in military skills.  Moreover, they are said to have resorted to looting and forced labor to "solicit" financial contributions for the "Kapetan Dragan Foundations."
Their armaments reportedly included light weapons only (no detailed information given.)
4.2.7.  Other Formations
During the various phases of the attack, a sizable number of other formations stayed at Zvornik.  Respondents said they had seen many partisans joining various units at different times.  These included:
• Zute Ose (Yellow Wasps):
 Their commander was Vojin ("Zuca") Vuckovic.  However, the unit's best-known member was Vojin's brother, Dusan ("Repic") Vuckovic.   He was accused, among other things, of having committed a massacre among the citizens of Divic in Celopek.  He faces a trial for this crime in Sabac (Serbia).
• Anticevci
• Special units of the local Serbs
• Serb volunteers from Loznica, Sabac, Valjevo
• Pusula`s group
• Group from Padinska Skela
• Vukovarci
• Dusan Silni (Dusan the Mighty)
5. CHRONOLOGY
In order to illustrate the chronology of the events, the following division was chosen: After a brief delineation of the time prior to the attack, there follows a description of the time of the attack itself.  This phase is broken down into two chronological lines: The first line illuminates the military events, i.e. the (military) attack on Zvornik and the decisive attack on Kulagrad less than two weeks later.  The second line of events illustrates the civilian development in the city itself.  Thus emerged a clearly discernible division into individual phases which were clearly linked to the military developments.
5.1. The time prior to the attack
As pointed out in the study by the "BIM", the climate of co-existence of the various ethnic groups progressively deteriorated in the course of the months preceding the attack.  While the relationship between the various ethnic groups prior to the war in Croatia could be characterized as good -- after all, only 4 percent of the Muslim persons interviewed said they had no friends among the Serbs -- this situation apparently deteriorated already with the escalation of the war in Croatia in the summer of 1991.   Tensions emerged at the workplace, in schools, and in the neighborhood.  The individual ethnic groups increasingly began to isolate themselves.  This was paralleled by a growing militarization of the society.  According to the persons interviewed, the Serbian side was well informed about all imminent actions.
There is considerable evidence that the attack and the expulsion of the Muslim population was pre-planned:
Around the turn of the year 1991/1992, troops of the JNA were for the first time assembled in the region of Zvornik.
About 2-3 months prior to the attack, military training exercises lasting up to 2 weeks were conducted in Osmaci near Kalesija (about 30 kilometers north of Zvornik) and in other places.  They were organized by the JNA and only Serbs were invited, under the pretext that the territorial defense was being trained.  Already during the weeks prior to the attack, members of all ethnic groups procured arms.  According to the interviewees, the Serb population of Zvornik received their weapons largely through the SDS or the JNA, while the Muslim population arranged for its weapons supply through "private" channels -- a fact which is also supported by the BIM study.
According to statements by 31 interviewees, many Serb citizens of Zvornik left the town during the month of March prior to the attack for a weekend, but returned to work the following Monday.  These observations have once again been confirmed by the results of the BIM study.  It is hard to ascertain whether this was an SDS-organized trial evacuation in the event of an attack on Zvornik --as claimed by one of the respondents.  Nevertheless, there is evidence that this was an organized action since it was, after all, the overwhelming part of Serb families that had left the city for the weekend.  At the time of the attack, women and children of Serb nationality had left the city already.  Some of the interviewees recounted that in the days prior to the attack they had been advised by Serb friends or colleagues to leave the town soon.  This serves as evidence in support of the statements by many of the respondents, according to which the Serb population of Zvornik had at least been informed shortly before the attack about the attack.
During the weekend prior to the attack (April 4/5), Serbs erected a barricade at the Meterize part of the city using trucks of the "Boksit" company (a bauxite mine in Milici, 20 km south of Zvornik).  This separated the town from the industrial area of Karakaj.  On the following Monday, April 6, Muslims were barred from going to work.  School children from the Technical School Center in Karakaj, too, were told to turn back at the barricades.
The developments during the last few days and fear of a military confrontation prompted many Muslim families to leave the city via the "Old Bridge" in the city center.  In reaction to the Serb barricade, the Muslims, too, put up barricades with trucks at the same site which was guarded by the "Muslim" police and by armed volunteers.  Initially, only some verbal exchanges took place at the barricades.  On April 6/7, the barricades became the site of demonstrations for a peaceful coexistence, and members of all ethnic groups participated.
Also on April 6th, the local police units were separated.   The headquarters of the police in Zvornik were vacated by Serb police; weapons, equipment and cars were moved to the Karakaj industrial zone north of Zvornik.   During the weeks prior to the attack, patrols in the city and on the bridges had still been conducted by ethnically mixed police forces in order to demonstrate the unity of all ethnic groups.
On April 7, a large part of the Muslim population fled from Lipovac and Karakaj to Zvornik.  On the evening of April 7, one day prior to the attack, Belgrade TV justified the heavy presence of JNA units by claiming that an attack by "Muslim extremists" hiding in Kulagrad was imminent.
On April 8, negotiations took place in Mali Zvornik which were attended by representatives of the SDS from Zvornik, delegates of the Party of the Democratic Action (SDA) from Zvornik, and by Arkan.  The talks were reportedly aimed at a "peaceful surrender of the city", i.e. at a "capitulation by the Muslim population." Moreover, the two representatives from Zvornik apparently reached an "agreement" which aimed at dividing the city.  The center of the city of Zvornik was to remain "Muslim," while the northern parts, including the Karakaj industrial zone, were to be "awarded" to the Serbs.  According to one respondent who had briefly talked to the chief negotiator of the SDA shortly after the meeting, the SDS and the SDA had agreed to this scenario; However, the SDA representative reportedly still feared an attack, since Arkan was said to have been dissatisfied with this meeting and reportedly announced that he would "take charge of things from now on". According to similar reports, Arkan even attacked the two other individuals.  In the morning of April 9, another round of negotiations took place -- albeit without results.
5.2. The attack on Zvornik
The military attack on Zvornik lasted from April 8 through April 10/11, 1992.  Thereafter, only sporadic military operations were carried out, involving units of the former JNA which cooperated with para-military troops.  These operations focused primarily on the medieval fortress of Kulagrad, which is situated to the north of Zvornik, because some resistance fighters (about 100 to 300 persons) were holding out there.  Still, the fortress was conquered in a concerted attack by former JNA troops and para-military units relying on air support on April 26, 1992.
Immediately after the fall of Kulagrad, the town of Divic, situated south of Zvornik, was attacked.  Divic, a predominantly Muslim settlement, is located near the hydro-electric power plant serving the city.  Since Divic could also be controlled from Kulagrad, the aggressors believed a decisive attack on Divic was not possible until after the conquest of Kulagrad.  Moreover, Divic was considered a "Muslim stronghold" from which strong resistance was to be expected.  It was also assumed that the plant's dam had been mined.
The attack was carried out both from the Serbian side and from Bosnian territory, using tanks, artillery, and infantry units with portable mortars.  JNA units and para-military units worked hand in hand.  The  "Arkanovci" operated from front-line positions, conquering the city.  Their core troops left the city after the successful attack in order to prepare a raid on the next town (Bratunac.)
Following sporadic rifle fire, the actual attack on the city began in the late morning hours of April 8.  The Bukovik and Meterize city districts as well as the Muslim-held defense positions on the Debelo Brdo hill were attacked by mortar fire from artillery positions in Karakaj, from the Bosnian river bank before Meterize, and from Mali Zvornik (Serbia).  This attack was mainly carried out by JNA units using heavy artillery and tanks.  Reports further mention Arkanovci snipers firing from Mali Zvornik on the opposite Bosnian river bank, as well as snipers shooting from high-rise buildings within Zvornik on the citizens.  The Muslim position on Debelo Brdo was conquered on the same day and occupied by the aggressors.
During the following night the city was heavily bombed.  The following morning, negotiations were conducted once again.  They resulted in an ultimatum according to which the weapons were to be handed over and the city was to be surrendered by 8 p.m. of that day.  In reaction, the Bosnians sent desperate messages to the crisis committee of the Bosnian Government in Tuzla, to Radio Tuzla, Radio Zenica, and to Sarajevo TV and Radio.  The call for help was aired by all media, but had no effect.
At 8 a.m. mortar fire resumed.  Thereafter, the conquest of the city by infantry units began.  The Arkanovci assumed the leading role in the conquest of the city, coming from the north via the Bukovik and Meterize city districts to take control of the city center, facing hardly any resistance.  By noon, the Arkanovci had occupied the hospital, and, by the afternoon, the radio station. In addition, infantry units of the JNA cooperated with "Serb volunteers" (Seseljevci, Beli Orlovi, "Territorial Defense") in the conquest of the city.  They approached the city in a second wave primarily from the west, from Scemlije and Lisisnjak.  Massacres, killings, deportations and rapes reportedly happened in the camps  already during the first weeks, but continued throughout the weeks that followed.  Units of the Arkanovci, Seseljevci, Beli Orlovi, and the "territorial defense" participated in those atrocities.  On April 10/11, Zvornik was fully conquered.  The Kulagrad fortress north of Zvornik and the town of Divic bordering on Zvornik to the south had not yet been occupied.
5.3. The attack on Kulagrad and Divic
Kulagrad is a settlement in the vicinity of a medieval fortress on the Kula hill, located on the southern outskirts of Zvornik. In view of the geographical location of Zvornik and the strategic position of the attacking units, there were only two escape routes open to the population after the beginning of the artillery fire: either towards the east across the "Old Bridge" to Serbia in the direction of Mali Zvornik or Loznica  or in a south-western direction via Kulagrad and Liplje  to Tuzla. Kulagrad and Liplje were each only used as short stopovers and, during the period after the attack, had to accommodate highly fluctuating numbers of refugees.
On April 9, an artillery assault on Kulagrad started since the attacking units were expecting major Muslim resistence forces. Already before the attack, the Serbian media reported that "several thousand Muslim extremists" were hiding in Kulagrad. In fact, there were probably no more than 30 to 100 armed Muslims under the command of Kapetan Almir, a former JNA officer, who had spontaneously started to organize a resistance movement with light equipment (small arms) (30).
From April 11 onward, there were almost daily attempts by small combat groups composed of various paramilitary units to capture the fortress. These attempts failed, however, despite the fact that Kulagrad was constantly under fire from mortars, anti-aircraft guns and tanks. The reason for this failure might be that there was both an apparent lack of coordination of the attacks and deficiencies in the training of the involved infantry units.
On April 25, Colonel Pavlovic presented an ultimatum to the inhabitants of Divic to turn in their arms. The defenders of Kulagrad were given a number of ultimatums since the beginning of the attack on April 11, the last one on April 26, the day of the decisive attack on Kulagrad.
In the morning of April 26, the villages around Kulagrad were the first to fall in the wake of a concerted attack. At the same time, Kulagrad and Divic were attacked by heavy artillery fire from the Serbian bank of the Drina river. This enabled the attackers, who this time had coordinated their actions, to capture Kulagrad. For one, because the units were able to approach the fortress from all directions, including the power station in the south. For another, because the attack was conducted more effectively. Some respondents stated that members of the 63rd Nis parachute brigade  were involved in the decisive attack and the seizure of Kulagrad.
The Muslims remaining in Kulagrad left the town at approx. 10:30 a.m. together with the rest of the inhabitants and the refugees accommodated in Kulagrad (approx. 100 persons) via Liplje in the direction of Tuzla. In Liplje, they were only able to stay very briefly as later that afternoon this village was also taken by the Serbs without any resistance. On the same afternoon, paramilitary units marched into Divic, and pillages were reported. Some time later, Divic was also occupied by the JNA.
6. CIVIL DEVELOPMENT IN ZVORNIK AFTER THE ATTACK
6.1. From the aftermath of the attack on Zvornik until the fall of Kulagrad
Control over the "civil administration" was first in the hands of the so-called "crisis committee" which above all included members of the local SDS and the militia. Some of these persons were also integrated into the so-called "territorial defense" . On the basis of one document  it is clear that the "crisis committee" did not come into existence until April 8 but had by that time already taken a "decision to introduce a general obligation to work" in the so-called "Serbian Community of Zvornik" . However, already in the early days of the aggression (around April 10) a "Provisional Government" of the "Serbian Community of Zvornik" was founded. Its most important members were Branko Grujic (baker and president of the "Serbian Community"), Radosav Peric (elementary school teacher) and Stevo Radic (jurist, municipal secretary). Other important members of the SDS and the "Serbian Community" were: Sveto Popovic (postal employee), Zoran Jovanovic, Bosko Ceranic, Dragan Spasojevic and Zoran Pazin.
Already shortly after the occupation (approx. April 10/11) a proclamation was broadcast by Radio Zvornik, appealing to the refugees to return to their workplaces. This appeal was however hardly complied with, as there were still numerous paramilitary troops in town who were looting and terrorizing the locals. Therefore, the appeal was broadcast once more a few days later (approx. April 15/16). However, the overall response to these appeals was rather poor. And the experiences of those who did follow the appeal to return to the workplace showed that the true purpose of this appeal - and of others that followed - was to monitor the male Muslim population.
Also immediately after the occupation of the town, a nocturnal curfew was imposed which remained in force until the "ethnic cleansing" was completed. During the day, men were allowed to move around only with a pass issued by the Zvornik Serbian police department.  Many of the men who went to Karakaj (or later to the police department in Zvornik)  in order to apply for a "pass" were suddenly deported into one of the camps in the industrial district of Karakaj.  There they were subjected to severe torture and murder, in particular by members of the para-military troops whose quarters were partly in the same buildings as those in which the prisoners were detained.  The detainees were entirely at the mercy of their torturers. Many of the men therefore did not dare to pick up their passes themselves and remained in hiding in their houses. But even persons with a pass were not safe from random aggressions by the numerous para-military units in town. It was reported by some witnesses that they had their passes taken away or torn into pieces by members of a para-military group immediately upon leaving the police station. Some of them were even physically attacked and deported into camps.
Everyday life was dominated by the fact that maraudering para-military troops, who were not controlled by any authority, terrorized the Muslim population of Zvornik. While male Muslims were required to carry a day-time pass with them, women were permitted to leave the house for shopping during the day. In order to do so, however, they had to cross the old bridge to Mali Zvornik (Serbia) as the stores in Zvornik had already been looted. At the check-points on the bridge, the women were frequently molested. There were also several reports of rape.
From the onset of the occupation, Muslims were prohibited from working unless they held jobs which were indispensible for the aggressors (e.g. hospital employees, who were not released until May 19).
There are only few established data on the behavior of the local Serb population as the respondents were almost exclusively Muslims, and also because there were only few Serbs left in Zvornik at the time of the attack. When asked why they thought the Serbs had left town during that period, many respondents expressed a suspicion that the Serbs "had been fully informed" and had therefore left town in time before the attack. This suspicion is substantiated by the fact that some of the Muslims were warned by Serbian friends about an impending attack.  Apart from that, local Serbs also took part, as members of para-military groups and units of police and SDS, in numerous acts of violence committed in the town.
Apparently it was disadvantageous for local Serbs to talk to the Muslim inhabitants. However there were also reports of clandestine assistance including food supplies. Serbs who stood up against the atrocities inflicted on the Muslim population also fell victim to the Serbian guerilla. One case which was confirmed by several respondents was that of a young Serbian woman whose throat was cut through by guerilla fighters when she tried to protect her Muslim friends.
6.2. After the fall of Kulagrad
There is agreement that after the fall of Kulagrad on April 26, 1992, the situation in Zvornik was less strained for a while. Many members of the para-military units as well as parts of the troops of the former JNA were reported to have left town by the end of April. Many of the local Serbs who had also fled from Zvornik came back into town. The SDS started to organize a local administration in the new "Serbian Community of Zvornik" with Branko Grujic as its "president".
At the end of April, the "Serbian Community of Zvornik" issued another appeal for the Muslim refugees to return to Zvornik. Relying on a large number of consistent reports, one could summarize the message of the appeal as follows:
The situation in town was now back to normal and everybody would be able to come back unharmed. Any personal property would have to be registered with the Zvornik police by May 15 as all unregistered property would otherwise fall to the "Serbian Community of Zvornik". This appeal to return was broadcast daily for a period of approximately two weeks by Radio Zvornik, Radio Loznica and, most likely, also by the Belgrade TV station in a variety of versions. This appeal was more successful with the refugees than an earlier appeal to return to the workplace.  In addition to the fear of losing their property, the situation in town, which, on the surface, had indeed "returned to normal", seemed to have been the decisive reason for an astonishingly large number of persons to come back.  However, their return had grave consequences for the Muslim inhabitants. For only now was it possible for the aggressors to prepare and actually carry out the "ethnic cleansing" procedure. Therefore, it was not until the fall of Kulagrad that one could actually speak of an organized expulsion of the Muslim population.
Consequently, after a relatively short time, around May 10, the situation for the Muslim inhabitants began to deteriorate again. New para-military units came into town. Attempts to instil terror in the civilian population began to increase and men were more frequently deported in the camps at Karakaj. In particular, former members of the SDA fell victim to such deportations into the camps in Karakaj or Batkovic near Bijeljina. The militia and other local Serbs who were frequently referred to as members of the SDS appear to have been regularly involved in these aggressions. It was hardly possible anymore to leave the town at that point of time due to the fact that check points had been erected on all exit roads. There seems to have been a further exacerbation of the situation around end-May/early June. This is seen by some respondents as being linked to the arrival of the Draganovci in town.
7. EXPULSION AND DEPORTATION
After the "unorganized" expulsion of the Muslim inhabitants through a reign of terror, the next stage was their expulsion by means of administrative measures. The first step had already been the above-mentioned appeal to return. The registration of property that was mandatory for all inhabitants including the Serbs served above all the purpose of registering the male Muslim population. For this reason, only men were eligible for registration, which had to be done before the "Serbian municipality" or the "Serbian militia", even if a property was registered under the wife's name. These registrations also led to arrests and deportations into camps, apparently on the basis of a pre-established list.
Furthermore, an "agency for the exchange of houses" was set up, to which the Muslim inhabitants were to transfer their houses. In return, the Muslims were promised houses belonging to Bosnian Serbs (e.g. in the Tuzla region) who supposedly had also assigned their homes to the agency. In order to make this "offer to exchange houses" appear more attractive, Serbian radio stations broadcast reports about the successful exchange of houses by prominent Muslim inhabitants, which in many cases however turned out to be false or to only have been brought about under coercion.
Muslims were only allowed to leave the town on the condition that they renounced their property and transferred it to the "Serbian Community of Zvornik". This forced transfer of property was executed by the "Serbian Community of Zvornik" in cooperation with the police and the Draganovci.
It is hard to say what the typical procedure employed by the authorities during the "ethnic cleansing" looked like in the following weeks. The acts of mandatory registration and forced transfer of property which preceded the actual expulsion were characterized by a variety of different approaches. Despite the fact that there was no clear indication as to the method used for expulsion, the following pattern emerges from a large number of consistent cases:
After their return, the refugees were first forced to register. This registration had no immediate consequences for the organized deportations. It was however a prerequisite for the subsequent transfer of property, which also had to be done before the SUP and which in many cases immediately preceded the actual deportation. The forced transfer of property to the "Serbian Community of Zvornik" made the former house-owners eligible for obtaining an official stamp on their ID-card indicating a change of domicile. This stamp was an indispensable prerequisite for being allowed to leave town later on. Some of the deportees, especially men, also had to prove that they had "donated blood".
Documents required in order to be allowed to leave town included:
- an ID card which guaranteed the holder the freedom of movement on the territory of the Serbian Community of Zvornik,
-  a slip certifying the "change of address",
- a personal ID card in which the date of the notice of change of address was entered by the authority.
From the end of May to the beginning of June, there were days on which the Muslim populations of entire municipal districts or neighboring villages were deported.  These organized deportations were reportedly carried out with vehicles provided by the "Drinatrans" company, which brought the deportees to Mali Zvornik, and from there via Loznica to Subotica  or onto the Bosnian territory of Tuzla. The deportees were only permitted to take with them a very limited number of personal belongings. Quite frequently, though, even these were taken away from them at the check-points.
8. ANALYSIS OF EVENTS
8.1. Planning and conduct of military operations
A detailed assessment of the level of involvement of the former JNA in the attack on Zvornik is only possible to a certain degree. What is certain, though, is that former JNA units were involved. Intelligence reports and observations of the troops in combat further showed that there were only rare occasions where a complete brigade was deployed and that "combat groups" were formed instead, as a rule, which consisted of parts of infantry, artillery and tank units.
What is also certain is the deployment of a tank unit (or parts thereof) that had until the winter of 1991 been stationed in Jastrebarsko/Croatia and integrated into the 17th Corps Tuzla following the abandonment of JNA locations in Croatia. The unit was stationed in the village of Celopek north of Zvornik, with a number of tanks located in the industrial district of Karakaj and proceeding towards the Zvornik city limits (to the precinct of Meterize) when the attack began. Considering that tank units are generally less labor-intensive than infantry units but require better training, it can be concluded that this unit was mostly staffed with "regular" JNA members. The artillery and air defense emplacements stationed on the Bosnian side may also be attributed to the former JNA.
As regards the infantry units, which some of the refugees have ascribed to the JNA, however, there is some evidence that they were not composed exclusively of "regular members" of the former JNA and of draftees of the reserve corps, but above all also of "volunteers". This assessment is consistent with the fact that the former JNA was suffering from great personnel losses already during the Croatian war and, above all, at the end of the military actions there (especially with many "non-Serb" recruits refusing to report for active duty and many "non-Serb" soldiers and officers deserting). The labor-intensive infantry units in particular required additional manpower, as the example of the incompletely staffed units deployed in Zvornik shows. The local SDS activists described by some respondents as "infantry officers" may really have been "officers of the JNA reserve" or "officers of the territorial defense".
According to several interviewees, the soldiers - and according to some, the officers as well - had already prior to the attack, i.e. in March 1992, begun to wear Serb badges and cockades instead of badges of the former JNA on  their uniforms and continued to do so during the attack. Vehicles and equipment, however, still carried the old Yugoslav identification signs, which may be an indication that the latter were at least provided by the JNA.
Another fact was that the actual seizure of the town was not carried out by infantry units of the JNA but by a combat patrol of the Arkanovci, while the infantry units attributed to the JNA arrived only after them.
The responsible officers of the former JNA during the attack and occupation periods were lieutenant-colonel Pejic and colonel Marko Pavlovic, respectively, who were the supreme military commanders during the attack on Zvornik. After the fall of Kulagrad and following the final consolidation of "Serbian control" over Zvornik, it was reported by the respondents, that the supreme command was transferred from Pejic to Pavlovic. This observation is consistent with the last known functions of the two officers in the former JNA.
These facts serve to corroborate another assumption, namely that the newly organized units formed the core of the subsequent "Serbian Army in Bosnia-Herzegovina". The  "Serbian Army in Bosnia-Herzegovina", as the members of the former JNA remaining in Bosnia-Herzegovina were called, was not officially established until March 5, 1992. The attack on Zvornik had however already been conducted one month earlier. The enlistment and equipment of this new army must therefore not only have been planned a long time ago - i.e. long before the attack on Bosnia-Herzegovina - but must have taken place no later thatn March 1992. The civil preparations in the city for the impending attack  as well as the local measures for the creation of a Serbian "territorial defense" in Zvornik thus do not only coincide with the establishment of a new "Serbian Army in Bosnia-Herzegovina". This "territorial defense" could have served as the basis for the 36th infantry brigade of the Drina Corps of the "Serbian Army in Bosnia-Herzegovina", which had meanwhile been stationed in Zvornik.
Analyzing these factors, one could conclude that the attack on Zvornik was planned, coordinated and directed by the former JNA. Crucial indications for an involvement of supra-local and supra-regional military and political institutions include the following:
- The assignment of war-experienced commanders to Zvornik already before the attack. The two responsible officers, Pejic and Pavlovic, had already been involved in combat in Croatia.
- The recruitment and stationing of infantry reservists in improvised barracks in the town of Celopek near Zvornik quite some time before the attack.
- The cooperation with trained fighters of the Arkanovci, who carried out a quick and radical seizure of the city.
- The participation of guerilla units from nearby towns in Serbia, the extent of which also required prior preparations.
- The identification of soldiers involved in the attack. According to consistent reports, they already had Serbian badges and flags on their uniforms instead of the old Yugoslav emblems.
- The stationing of JNA units from various corps under the command of the 1st Belgrade military district both on the Bosnian and Serbian sides of the Drina river.
- The resignation of the Supreme Commander of the Tuzla corps, General Jankovic, in May 1992, as well as the fact that both officers and military equipment of the JNA were involved in the attack, could be an indication that the true superiors in Tuzla may have been cut out and that the attack on Zvornik may have been coordinated with the military leadership in Belgrade.
The attack on Zvornik was initiated by barrage fire from artillery and tank units of the former JNA that supported the seizure of the town by units of the Arkanovci. According to several respondents, destruction caused by artillery and tank fire was rather insignificant. The aim was not to destroy the town, but to forestall all potential resistance activities and to frighten and terrorize the inhabitants.
The seizure of the town was carried out by the core unit of the Arkanovci. This assumption is supported by the fact that some Arkanovci who were involved in the capture of the town left again a few days later, whereas others stayed in town and were joined by some more Arkanovci guerilla. The seizure of the town may therefore have been carried out by a specific combat unit which had previously captured Bijeljina and which also occupied the town of Bratunac shortly after Zvornik.
The other para-military units only arrived in town in a second wave. They were led by the Seseljevci along with the Beli Orlovi and the so-called "Serbian territorial defense" of the SDS with "volunteers" from predominantly Serbian-populated villages from the surroundings of Zvornik and from the adjacent regions.
It is difficult to say which groups actually exerted military control over Zvornik at the various stages following the occupation of the town. Supreme command is frequently ascribed to the JNA and - as mentioned above - is associated with the names of Pejic and Pavlovic. The fact that both were former JNA officers may have led many expellees to assume that the supreme command was in the hand of the JNA. But while these two officers did have the supreme control over the town, they may not really have been officers of the JNA anymore, but rather leading officers of a new "territorial defense" which had been established by local leaders and which may later - as mentioned above - have constituted the core of the "Serbian army in Bosnia-Herzegowina" in Zvornik, which was officially declared in May 1992.
It may be assumed, though, that there was a concerted effort to divide responsibilities and, thus, control over the town. At least until the fall of Kulagrad, there appears to have been a sharing of power by the officers of the former JNA (Pejic and Pavlovic) and SDS (Grujic) with the militia.
However, this assumption is modified by the fact that nearly all of the respondents stated that the various para-military units roaming around the streets of Zvornik had unlimited freedom of action (e.g. to terrorize the civilian population, to perform random executions and arrestations, to engage in looting etc.). With the exception of lootings, the JNA units were reported by the respondents to have participated in war crimes and severe human rights violations only to a very limited degree throughout the entire period. Guards working in camps in which war crimes and human rights violations were committed were partly members of JNA units. It could not be ascertained whether they were part of regular units, conscripted reservists or members of the "territorial defense".
There are many signs that the complete freedom of action on the part of the para-military units amounted to a kind of "tolerated chaos" which was due to the fact that the theoretical authority of the JNA and the local militia was not accepted by the violent para-military units. Especially the Arkanovci acted in complete autonomy and rarely bowed to the authority of the JNA officers or, even less so, to that of the local authorities. Overall, the descriptions given by the respondents create the impression that each of the various para-military units only accepted the authority of their own respective "leaders" and that many of the less strictly organized guerilla groups regarded their complete freedom of action as a kind of "remuneration" for their work. This circumstance may, however, also be seen as an indication that the unclear division of power only served to cover up those persons responsible for war crimes and human rights violations.
At that time, however, the aim of the violent chaos may not yet have been to use the terror exerted by the para-military groups as a means of expelling the Muslim population.
8.2. Preparation of the attack on Zvornik and subsequent civilian control over the town
The attack on Zvornik appears to have been prepared logistically also on the civilian level. In February, for example, a truck was reported to have brought uniforms and arms to Bosko Ceranic, an activist of the SDS, and another respondent said that Vojislav Seselj visited Ceranic on March 25, 1992 and brought arms into the church of Scemlije. The civilian preparations also included an "evacuation exercise" on either the last or next to the last weekend in March 1992. On that weekend, to the surprise of the Muslim inhabitants of Zvornik, the greater part of the Serbian families left town on Friday and did not come back until Monday.
The local SDS representatives, who were reported to also have had contacts with Seselj's "Radical Party" in Serbia, had made provisions for the seizure of power already during the months preceding the attack. As early as the fall of 1991, they had declared Zvornik a part of the "Autonomous Serbian Region of Semberija and Majevica". Shortly before the attack, demands for a separation of the town according to ethnic criteria were raised by representatives of the local SDS.
Preparatory measures for the attack seem to have been coordinated with the regional business leaders. The director of the largest local employer, the "Birac" company, Jefto Subotic, was accused by the press in the fall of 1991 of having provided the SDS with large quantities of fuel. The vehicles that were used for putting up the barricades on the Serbian side near Meterize shortly before the attack came from the "Boksit" company in Milici, some 30 km south of Zvornik. "Boksit" was a major supplier for "Birac" and was like "Birac" a part of "Energo-Invest". It is assumed that the director of the firm, Rajko Dukic, was on the "Birac" company's board of managers. Bosko Milic, the director of the transport enterprise "Drina-Trans", may also have been part of that group. Like Subotic, he is accused of having distributed guns before the attack and he is also said to have participated in the "capitulation talks" in Mali Zvornik. Trucks provided by his firm were used to transport the expellees either to the deportation gathering place or to deport them from Zvornik to Serbia.
Control over the town after the seizure was initially held by the "crisis committee", whose chairman reportedly was Dragan Spasojevic (a member of both the militia and the SDS in Boskovici near Zvornik). Soon thereafter, Branko Grujic was appointed "president of the Serbian district of Zvornik".
Preparations on the civilian level also included the establishment of a new "territorial defense" by leaders of the SDS. This move was however coordinated with the JNA, which was reported to have provided the training for this "territorial defense". The linkage between military and civilian structures may be seen as yet another indication that the attack had indeed been planned.  In any case, the establishment of the "territorial defense" and its cooperation with the JNA contributed substantially to the militarization of society. The existence of a "territorial defense" as a semi-official military organization of the Bosnian Serbs may also have been used to legitimize their participation in subsequent military and violent activities against the civilian population.
The military operations that were conducted against the Kulagrad position held by Muslim defenders after April 11 were mostly carried out by the "territorial defense" and by "volunteers" from Serbia and from neighboring villages. During the decisive attack on Kulagrad, units of the "territorial defense" and the Beli Orlovi were deployed after the advance of the tank unit.
8.3. The systematic approach to expulsion and deportation
As already mentioned, it may well be assumed that, in terms of preparation and execution, the ultimate deportation of the non-Serbian inhabitants of Zvornik was preceded by a certain amount of planning that had only become possible after the establishment of a communal administration by the SDS.
The first step in this context was - paradoxically - an appeal for the escaped Muslim inhabitants to come back to the town. In that appeal, which was broadcast by Radio Zvornik and Radio Loznica as well as by the TV station in Belgrade, the escapees were invited to return again since the situation had calmed down or returned to normal, and also on the ground that the escaped inhabitants were required to return by a certain date (probably May 15) and to have their property registered as they would otherwise lose all property rights. The next step was the registration of property with the primary objective to obtain an updated list of male inhabitants. The increasing terror that was subsequently exerted by paramilitary units was already designed to prepare the ground for the final, forced expulsion of the Muslim population of Zvornik.
Some time later, around end-May/early June 1992, forced deportations preceded by compulsory assignments of property began which were a prerequisite for being permitted to leave town. It was the task of the militia to organize the compulsory transferral of property whereas the subsequent forced deportations were carried out in cooperation with paramilitary units.
There can be no doubt that the measures described above pursued a far-reaching goal: the systematic expulsion of the Muslim population. For it was only after their return and the registration of their property and, as a result, the "gathering" of the Muslim inhabitants not only of the town but of the entire Zvornik region that their total and final expulsion became possible. This enabled the aggressors not only to remove the population affected from the Zvornik region in an organized and comprehensive manner, but also to deport them beyond the boundaries of the former Yugoslavia. Due to the location of Zvornik on the border to Serbia, the Bosnian Serb leaders had no problem transporting the people out of Bosnia-Herzegowina and further on to another country. The mass deportations, which were conducted by means of buses, brought the expellees as far as Subotica on the Serbian-Hungarian border. There, many of them were issued a "Yugoslav passport" by the Serbian Red Cross and subsequently sent off to Austria via Hungary - mostly on corridor trains.
Such a procedure implies not only the need for local planning and preparation, but also a systematic approach which must at least have been coordinated with some supra-regional bodies.
9. THE PENAL LIABILITY OF ETHNIC CLEANSING UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
9.1. Introductory remarks
At present, two tribunals of the United Nations are seized with the task of investigating or prosecuting violations of international humanitarian law on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, and are hence also concerned with the question of the incompatibility of "ethnic cleansing" with international law: The International Court of Justice at The Hague (ICJ) and the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the Former Yugoslavia (the Tribunal). While the decision on a complaint filed by Bosnia concerning the question whether the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has complied with its obligations under the UN Genocide Convention lies with the ICJ,  the statute of the Tribunal  stipulates that it shall prosecute those persons individually who have infringed specific norms of the Geneva Red Cross Convention, the international military law or the Genocide Convention or who have committed other specifically designated crimes against humanity.
In the following, we shall not go into detail on which provisions of international humanitarian law may have been violated by the "ethnic cleansing" investigated within the framework of this study. This task has already been undertaken by the UN Commission of Experts  which was set up pursuant to a resolution by the Security Council for the purpose of establishing evidence of severe violations of the Geneva Red Cross Conventions  and other infringements of international humanitarian law on the territory of the former Yugoslavia.  As the concept of "ethnic cleansing" does not exist in the pertaining international conventions, the question arises whether, and if so, under which offenses specified by international humanitarian law the act of "ethnic cleansing" may as such be subsumed in toto.
9.2. As to the concept of "ethnic cleansing"
In its final report, the UN Commission of Experts referred to the relatively new concept of "ethnic cleansing" as a purposeful policy designed by one ethnic or religious group to remove by violence and terror-inspiring means the civilian population of some other ethnic or religious group from certain geographic areas. The purpose of such a policy is the occupation of territory to the exclusion of the purged group.  The Commission's final report clearly shows that "ethnic cleansing" is not a synonym for "expulsion", e.g. as within the meaning of Art. 49 of the 4th Geneva Red Cross Convention, but goes far beyond that concept. "Ethnic cleansing" includes "mass murder; torture; rape and other forms of sexual assault; severe physical injury to civilians; mistreatment of civilian prisoners and prisoners of war; use of civilians as human shields; destruction of personal, public and cultural property; looting, theft and robbery of personal property; forced expropriation of real property; forceful displacement of civilian population; and attacks on hospitals, medical personnel and locations marked with the Red Cross/Red Crescent emblem".  In the view of the Commission, many of these acts were carried out with extreme brutality and savagery in a manner designed to instil terror in the civilian population.  In its first interim report, the Commission also qualified as expressions of "ethnic cleansing" the following other measures: (individual) murder, arbitrary arrest and detention, extrajudiciary executions, confinement of civilian population in "ghetto areas", forcible removal, displacement and deportation of civilian population and deliberate military attacks or threats of attacks on civilians and civilian areas.
The investigations conducted by the BIM showed that from April to June 1992 the following measures and practices were undertaken against the resident Muslim civilian population in the Zvornik region: mass and single murders, arbitrary mass and individual executions, tortures, physical and psychological mistreatment, rape, kidnapping, arbitrary arrest and detention, acts of terror in the form of threats, military attacks on the civilian population and civilian objects, looting, wanton destruction of property, forcible expropriation, forceful transfer of real property, as well as mass deportations and mass expulsions.
The totality of these measures and practices as well as the systematic and consequent manner in which the deportations and expulsions were carried out  indicate that their purpose was to prevent the Muslim population from returning.  The (subsequent) destruction of Muslim cultural property demonstrates that the aggressors apparently also wanted to extinguish all memories of the cultural existence of the purged ethnic group.
In view of these aims, the authors regard "ethnic cleansing" as having a separate, legally relevant quality that goes beyond the individual measures and practices. It is questionable whether, and if so, which legal consequences will be linked to this new quality.  As mentioned before, "ethnic cleansing" operations do not constitute a separate, explicit offense under international humanitarian law. Nevertheless, there may still be two ways of categorizing the practice of "ethnic cleansing" as an offense under international criminal law without splitting it up into individual criminal offenses.
9.3. Does "ethnic cleansing" qualify as an offense under the Genocide Convention?
Pursuant to Article II of the Genocide Convention, the concept of "genocide" includes, inter alia, "acts by which conditions of life are deliberately imposed on the ethnic group that may eventually lead to its complete or partial physical destruction"; provided that such acts are committed with an intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, as such. It is not relevant in this context whether the incriminated acts are committed in the course of an international or internal conflict.
In view of the results of the present investigation, there can be no doubt that the policy of "ethnic cleansing" has pursued the aim of inflicting on the Muslim population "conditions of life" which were "likely to lead to their physical destruction either in part or in whole". In the view of the authors of the study, the criterion of a criminal offense under the Genocide Convention is fulfilled in the present case. What remains open, however, is an answer to the difficult question whether the "ethnic cleansing" activities were actually conducted "with an intent to destroy, in whole or in part, the Muslim population as an ethnic group enjoying protection under the Genocide Convention.  This means that the personal motives of the presumed offenders, which are hard to substantiate, become the decisive criterion in the quest for a judgment. However, in cases where evidence of a voluntary participation in systematically planned und conducted "ethnic cleansing" operations can be established, it may be rightly assumed that the persons involved did act with intent.  In imposing preliminary measures under the Genocide Convention in the proceedings on the action brought by Bosnia-Herzegovina against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) , the ICJ has regarded it as possible that the crimes committed in Bosnia-Herzegovina in fact amounted to genocide.  The UN Commission of Experts holds the view that the military and political leaders responsible for the "ethnic cleansing" may also be suspected of having committed genocide.
Even if the view is not shared that "ethnic cleansing" in itself meets the criteria contained in Article II para. (c) of the Genocide Convention, the definition of genocide within the meaning of paras. (a) and (b) of Article II of the Convention may still apply - according to the interviewees - in view of the fact that members of the Muslim ethnic group were killed and serious physical and emotional harm was inflicted on them.
9.4. Does "ethnic cleansing" constitute a "crime against humanity"?
The second question is whether "ethnic cleansing" measures per se might not also be viewed as "crimes against humanity" within the meaning of Article 5 of the statute of the International Tribunal. On the basis of a demonstrative enumeration, these measures include murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape, persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds and - as a sort of "general clause"  - "other inhumane acts" if they are committed against a civil population in the course of an armed international or internal conflict.  The prosecution of such crimes is derived from the Nuremberg Military Tribunal and relates to accepted principles of international customary law applied erga omnes.  In contrast to genocide, the commission of  crimes against humanity is not subject to intent.  However, the above-mentioned acts must be carried out in a systematic or organized manner in order to be qualified as "crimes against humanity" , a criterion which, in the case of Zvornik, must be regarded as fulfilled on the basis of the present investigations. As in connection with genocide, the military and political leaders must be suspected, in the view of the Commission, of also having committed crimes against humanity.  It is still subject to discussion whether governments need to be involved in such offenses in order for these to be classified as "crimes against humanity".
It would be possible to view "ethnic cleansing" as "persecution on political, racial or religious grounds" within the meaning of Article 5, para. (h) of the statute of the Tribunal. It is true that "ethnic cleansing" is basically composed of those crimes which meet the definition contained in paras. (a) - (g) of Article 5 of the statute. In this regard, a separate interpretation of the offense of "ethnic cleansing"  in the context of para. (h) would not be necessary. It could even be objected from a critical point of view that linking the above accusation exclusively with such a subsumption is less important than taking together all relevant offenses enumerated in paras. (a) - (g). The advantage of such an approach, however, would be that those other offenses which are not covered by paras. (a) - (h), but which are nevertheless elements of a policy of "ethnic cleansing", may also be punished as crimes against humanity, just like such other acts as military attacks against civilian populations and civilian objects, the exertion of terror against the civilian population, the infliction of physical and emotional pain, devastation and looting etc. that do not come under the heading of "torture". If this view should not be shared, it would still be possible, in addition to the prosecution of crimes under Art. 5 paras. (a) - (g) of the statute of the Tribunal, to treat any other form of "ethnic cleansing" as a persecution measure pursuant to para. (h), which means that ultimately the total scenario of ethnic cleansing would be covered by international criminal law.
10. SUMMARY OF ANALYSES
On the basis of the available data it can be concluded that the attack on the northeastern Bosnian city of Zvornik had been prepared according to military rules quite some time ahead and was executed with the massive participation of JNA units and paramilitary combat and terror units. The dimensions and systematic conduct of the operation suggest that these units were under the command of a superior military and political authority. Many circumstances also substantiate the assumption that the expulsion of the Muslim inhabitants was not only desired, prepared and carried out by the local Serb authorities, but that this "ethnic cleansing" procedure was at least conducted with the understanding and permission of these superior instances.
Judging from the reports submitted by our respondents, genocide has been committed against the Muslim population in the city of Zvornik in that members of this ethnic group were killed and subjected to physical and mental harm. Such acts as the arbitrary detention of numerous members of this group in camps where they were tortured, or the deportation of the majority of the Muslim inhabitants of Zvornik, also appear to have inflicted on the group conditions of life calculated within the meaning of the Genocide Convention "to lead to their physical destruction in whole or in part".
The occurrences established on the basis of the questionnaire, including murder, deportation, arbitrary arrestation, torture and rape, can also be rated as crimes against humanity within the meaning of international humanitarian law.
We therefore recommend to interpret the "ethnic cleansing" operations per se in such a way as to qualify them as acts of genocide and as crimes against humanity within the meaning of international humanitarian law.
REGISTER OF TOWNS
Bijeljina  Town in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Located approx. 40 km    north of Zvornik. Attacked one week or so before     Zvornik and seized by the Arkanovci.
Bratunac  Town in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Located approx. 30 km    south of Zvornik. Seized by the Arkanovci shortly after    Zvornik.
Bukovik  District of Zvornik.
Celopek  Community with predominantly Serbian population    located north of Karakaj industrial zone.
Debelo Brdo  Hill in the northwest of Zvornik.
Divic   Small town with predominantly Muslim population    south of Zvornik. Hydropower station and dam situated    nearby.
Hrid   District of Zvornik.
Jardan  Community located between Zvornik and Karakaj,     consisting of two parts, Jardan and Lipovac, with     narrow Serb majority.
Karakaj  Industrial zone situated north of Zvornik.
Kulagrad  Settlement in the south of Zvornik with medieval     fortress of the same name located on Kula hill.
Liplje  Small town in the southwest of Zvornik.
Lisisnjak  District of Zvornik (mostly populated by Serbs).
Loznica  Town in Serbia.
Scemlije  Small town with predominantly Serbian population    in the northwest of Zvornik.
Srpska Varos District of Zvornik (mostly populated by Serbs).
Subotica  Town in Serbia, on the border to Hungary.
Tuzla   Town in Bosnia-Herzegovina, some 50 km west of      Zvornik.
Valjevo  Town in Serbia.
Vidakova Njiva District of Zvornik.
Zamlaz  District of Zvornik
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
AJIL  American Journal of International Law
BIM  Ludwig Boltzmann Institut für Menschenrechte
ICJ  International Court of Justice
ILM  International Law Materials
JNA  Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija (Yugoslav National    Army)
JZ  Juristenzeitung
SDA  Stranka Demokratske Akcije (Party of Democratic Action);   represents mostly Bosnian Muslims living in Bosnia-   Herzegovina.
SDS  Stranka Demokratske Akcije (Party of Democratic Action);   represents mostly Bosnian Serbs living in Bosnia-
Herzegovina.
SUP  Sekreteriat za Unutrasnje Poslove (Secretariat for Internal    Affairs)

TO  Territoralna Obrana (Territorial Defense). Part of "Yugoslav   armed forces" together with JNA in the former Yugoslavia.   Was organized and directed separately by each Republic. With   the exception of commanding officers, it was mainly
composed of reservists. In the Zvornik region, a so-called
"TO" was "reestablished" by members of the SDS shortly
before the attack on the town.