Stari Mostar broj 4 (01.-15.11.1995): Memoari sloma Jugoslavije, Warren Zimmerman (ekskluzivni feljton)

 Ekskluzivni feljton "Starog Mostara"

 

MEMOARI SLOMA JUGOSLAVIJE

 

Zadnji ambasador SAD u Beogradu - Warren Zimmerman (3)

 

Albanski nacionalizam je bio, kao i hrvatski nacionalizam, do nekog stepena reakcija na Miloševićevu agresivnu taktiku. Kako su Srbi pritiskali, Albanci su se učvršćivali. Bojkotovali su srbijanske izbore, uprkos američkom savjetu da bi kao određena parlamentarna manjina mogli imati više političkog uticaja. Miloševićev pristup "čvrste ruke" gurnuo je Albance na put bez povratka, ka potpunoj nezavisnosti od Srba. Decembra 1990. godine, bilo je nekoliko kosovskih Albanaca koji nisu insistirali niti na nezavisnosti Kosova, niti na povezivanju sa Albanijom. Psihološki pad je bio kompletan. Bilo kakva provokacija lansirana od bilo koje strane, imala je potencijala da rascijepi pokrajinu.

U ovim prevrtljivim okolnostima nagovarao sam Miloševića da se sastane sa disciplinovanim i impresivnim albanskim liderom, Ibrahimom Rugovom, koji je zagovarao politiku mirnog otpora. Rugova se složio. Milošević je odbio, govoreći o lideru nekih dva miliona Albanaca podvrgnutih Srbiji: "Koga on predstavlja?" Najinteresantnija opozicijska ličnost u Srbiji bio je Vuk Drašković, plahovit i talentovan romanopisac koji je izbačen na političku scenu kao prosrpski ekstremist, kompletan sa bradom Starog Zavjeta, rasističkim idejama i licem srpskog seljaka. Jednom se već naučio kretati po palubi uzburkanog političkog mora, međutim, Drašković se pretvorio u nepokolebljivog branitelja otvorenog političkog sistema i slobode štampe. Dana 9. marta 1991. godine, iskoristio je svoj talent za motivisanje ljudi da bi priredio masovni skup protiv Miloševićeve kontrole medija u Beogradu. Nespretno ponašanje sa policijom i vojskom rezultiralo je sa dva smrtna slučaja - jedan demonstrant i jedan policajac - a Drašković je uhapšen i zatvoren na kratko. Mnogi posmatrači su osjećali da je ovaj skup, koji je pokazao srbijanski folklor, skoro stigao do svrgavanja Miloševića. Dok je ovo diskutabilno, hrabrost od blizu 100.000 spontanih demonstranata je bila poletna nagrada demokratskim vibracijama mnogih Srba.

Mnoge nove opozicione ličnosti u okviru bivše Jugoslavije zauzele su jasan stav prema nacionalizmu. Prema otvorenim iskazima, platili su cijenu u uredima za ispitivanje, prijetnjama smrću, batinanjem i hapšenjima. Uz moju jaku podršku, zapadne grupe za ljudska prava su pomogle opozicionim organizacijama i publikacijama da prežive. Investiranje ma koliko dugoročno, isplatiće se jednog dana. Ljudima se pomagalo i oni koji su uspjeli, dio su jedne "druge Srbije" i "druge Hrvatske" - jezgro demokratskog oporavka mora na vrijeme zamijeniti tadašnju nacionalnu histeriju. Niti Milošević, a ni Tuđman nisu mogli shvatiti zašto se mi toliko brinemo o ljudima koji su ubijeni, mučeni, zlostavljani ili stalno napadani. Milošević bi slušao strpljivo, a zatim bi upitao:"Zašto gubite vrijeme na ovim pojedincima, koji su svakako kriminalci, kada su Srbi kao narod bili zlostavljani godinama?" Tuđman bi često buknuo kao furija kad bih imao smjelosti izložiti da ni hrvatske vlasti nisu baš uvijek primjerene demokrate. Kada bi se došlo do rezultata, Milošević ih gotovo nikad nije dostavljao, a Tuđman ponekad jeste.

JEDANAESTOSATNI MANEVRI

 Posljednja godina postojanja Jugoslavije suočila se sa razvijanjem unilateralnih i konfliktnih nacionalističkih strategija. Slovenija, gdje je decembarski referendum 1990. godine iskazao strahovitu podršku nezavisnosti, objavila je odluku o secesiji u junu 1991. godine, ako rješenje o labavoj konfederaciji ne bude prihvaćeno. Svjesno praveći svoju državu taocem slovenske politike, Tuđman je rekao da Hrvatska treba činiti ono što je Slovenija uradila. Milošević je uzvratio da će raspad Jugoslavije voditi ka srbijanskom inkorporiranju svih Srba u jednu državu. Bosanski lider Alija Izetbegović obrazlagao je da je opstanak Jugoslavije u bilo kom obliku esecijalan za očuvanje mira i sprečavanje tragedije u Bosni. Izetbegović je bio blage naravi, popustljiv i neprekidno zabrinut. Nosio je plašt vođstva sa velikom nelagodom. Pobožan Musliman, ali ne i ekstremist, dosljedno je zagovarao očuvanje multinacionalne Bosne. Milošević i Tuđman nisu dijelili njegovo mišljenje i položili su filozofsku kartu za odvajanje muslimanskog entiteta. Bosna je imala izražen multinacionalni karakter i najveći procenat miješanih brakova od bilo koje druge republike. Dok njihova historija do XV vijeka nije bila krvavija od historije Engleske ili Francuske, Bosna je bila balkanska zemlja u kojoj se najviše ubijalo za vrijeme II svjetskog rata. Izetbegović je bio kratak sa mnom: "Ukoliko Hrvatska postane nezavisna, Bosna će biti razorena."

SRAMNA ULOGA JNA

Za tog razdoblja, Jugoslovenska narodna armija izlazi na vidjelo kao glavni politički igrač, vrlo neobična uloga za jednu komunističku vojsku. Regularno sam se sastao sa ministrom odbrane Veljkom Kadijevićem, oficirom obuzetim mračnim mislima i bez smisa za šalu, koji je govorio sa antipatijom o Slovencima i Hrvatima, a paranoično o Njemačkoj, u kojoj je vidio sklonost ka inkorporaciji Balkana u IV Rajh. JNA je uživala tradiciju vrijednu ponosa, njeni korijeni su u Titovim partizanskim odredima, koji su stali nasuprot Nijemaca u II svjetskom ratu. Po veličini peta armija Evrope, dobro opskrbljena od strane Sovjetskog Saveza i enormne domaće industrije oružja, smatrana je najznačajnijom institucijom jedinstva u Jugoslaviji. Njen oficirski kadar, međutim, bio je većinom srpski, pošto su ih događaji natjerali da biraju po Miloševiću. 

Obje, i Hrvatska i Slovenija, pokušavale su kreirati sopstvene snage pozivajući svoje mladiće da dezertiraju iz JNA i slabeći kontrolu JNA nad snagama Teritorijalne odbrane (jedna vrsta narodne garde). JNA je podivljavala od ovog brzog i obilatog stvaranja vojski. "Koliko vojski imaju Sjedinjene Države?", zagrmio je na mene Kadijević. Početkom 1991. godine, JNA je pokušala prisiliti jugoslovensko Predsjedništvo - komično slab kolektiv od osam vođa države - da proglasi vanredno stanje u zemlji i ovlasti Armiju da razoruža slovensku i hrvatsku vojsku. Ovo naređenje, koje je naraslo skoro do vojnog udara, politički je sprečavano iod demokratski nastrojenih članova Predsjedništva iz Makedonije i Slovenije - Vasila Turpukovskog i Janeza Drnovšeka. Poraz je ponukao Miloševića da iskoristi četiri glasa koja je kontrolisao u osmočlanom Predsjedništvu da bi potkopao dogovorenu rotaciju njegovog "predsjednika" od Srbina na Hrvata. (nastavlja se)  

 

 

 

  

Interview: Morton Abramowitz On The 'End Of Bosnia' (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 13 August, 2011)

Interview: Morton Abramowitz On The 'End Of Bosnia'  (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 13 August, 2011)

https://www.rferl.org/a/interview_abramowitz_end_of_bosnia/24295787.html

 

Morton Abramowitz is a senior fellow at The Century Foundation and former president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He has served as ambassador to Turkey and Thailand and as assistant secretary of state for intelligence and research. The author of many books, he recently co-wrote an article in "The National Interest" titled "The Death of the Bosnian State." RFE/RL's Balkan Service director Gordana Knezevic asked him what he meant by this.

RFE/RL: The recent article you co-authored in "The National Interest" is kind of alarming. Do you think Bosnia-Herzegovina can really fall apart?

Morton Abramowitz: To be frank, the title was put out by the editor; it was not our title. It's a rather alarming title. We had a much more subdued one.

On the other hand, I think there is a serious situation. The ethnic rivalry is hardening and it's like a frozen conflict in a sense. Leaving it that way is very dangerous, or potentially very dangerous. So we wanted to point out that one, this is a very uncertain and unsatisfactory situation and it had to be dealt with, and not a can to be kicked down the road. For example, the European Union approach to this seems to be that we will, over time, by providing aid assistance, make some progress in reducing tensions. This will culminate in some sort of better and more satisfactory relationship between the parties.

Clearly, I don't think it can work. There has to be a much more vigorous effort to deal with the situation. The center of the problem in my view -- a lot of people disagree with this -- both in Kosovo and in Bosnia is Serb domestic politics. And until that problem is resolved, I'm not optimistic we will see much progress made. That was the gist of the piece.

There was a relationship also between Kosovo and Bosnia in that as long as the Kosovo problem remained unresolved, the problem of north Kosovo, the problem of Bosnia, was likely to remain unresolved. And if for some reason north Kosovo was somehow partitioned, that would open a new channel for the exit of Republika Srpska (the Bosnian Serb entity) from Bosnia. It's a problem mainly of Serb domestic politics.

Now, the EU basically seeks to find some way to continue both in Bosnia and Kosovo ways that will indicate some progress in the Kosovo negotiations or through a new EU mission in Bosnia. This will lead to a situation that will enable Serbia to get the ability to win accession [to the EU] and permit [Serbian President Boris] Tadic to win [reelection] in Belgrade because they see him as the major source of progress on these Balkan issues. I think that's a very, very difficult row to hoe with very uncertain results.

RFE/RL: This is an amazing analysis.

 Abramowitz: The problem is one of how you produce constructive change in two very difficult situations in which there is a potential for sliding backward and even for some violence. We've seen a little violence occur in Kosovo and that should be a wake-up call to the West and Kosovo, to realize progress is simply not going to be made by the parties getting together in Brussels and producing advances in useful but small issues.

The issue is more fundamental than that and it's the issue of north Kosovo. It's easier to proceed in hopes that over time, attitudes will change and there will be a little more forthcoming relationships between the Serbs and the Kosovars, but I don't believe that is a productive way for resolving this problem. I feel you have to attack the main problem, which is the future of north Kosovo. I may be too pessimistic, but I don't believe this problem in Kosovo can be resolved without some resolution of the north Kosovo situation and that problem lies in Belgrade.

A European Future

RFE/RL: Do you have any explanation for why the European Union isn't applying pressure on Belgrade?

Abramowitz: The European Union largely doesn't believe in pressure. The European Union basically believes in trying to find ways that are so-called constructive and enlist the parties in cooperation and over time produce a significant change in the situation. They also believe the promise of European accession will encourage the parties to compromise and find ways to get along better and produce an effective Bosnian government, etc. I would hope that to be the case, but I'm very skeptical.

RFE/RL: I'd like to ask you about the international community's Office of the High Representative (OHR) in Bosnia. It's seen by many as an obstacle to Bosnia's European future, but at the same time, it's an obstacle to the disintegration of Bosnia. At the very least, the office can declare null and void any unilateral proclamation of independence as it would be against the terms of the Dayton peace agreement.

Abramowitz: That's been a view of many in the United States. The U.S. has always been the principal champion of the continuation of the OHR position.

The fact is the OHR is a skeleton of what it once was. Its ability to fashion its will is very difficult. Look at the way the OHR was undermined by the EU in its dealings on the proposed referendum in Serbia. They undermined OHR, gave them a kick in the ass. So I have always felt OHR was a useful institution, but right now, in the way it's operating, I don't think those powers are very effective.

RFE/RL: Do you think that Bosnia should join NATO and do you think it would provide some sense of security to all ethnic groups?

Abramowitz: I think it would be useful if Bosnia could join NATO, as I believe it useful if the Greeks would stop preventing Macedonia from joining NATO. I think it would be a step forward, but I'm not quite sure that all parties in Bosnia would agree to it and I don't think it resolves the fundamental issue of how to reduce the ethnic abrasions and move forward. There are some people who are more optimistic about the impact of that; I'm not. But I'm obviously not opposed to it.

Healing Ethnic Divisions

RFE/RL: The fact that Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats, and Bosnian Muslims are cooperating and standing shoulder-to-shoulder in NATO missions in Afghanistan and Iraq is sending us a clear message within the right framework and in a truly professional environment...

Abramowitz: It doesn't deal with Bosnia's domestic politics. Maybe it will encourage change, I would hope that might be the case, but I'm not optimistic. Bosnian politicians are wedded to different things that are often inconsistent with what many people would want. I think there are a lot of people in Bosnia and in all quarters who want to see much more focus on the economy, much more growth, much more robust activity, but that doesn't seem to happen.

 

 Rather we have [President Milorad] Dodik in [Republika] Srpska and other politicians there who always go back to ethnic issues. And the ethnic parties tend to vote in an ethnic way. The Bosniaks vote for Bosniaks, Serbs vote for Serbs, and it doesn't break this down.

Now, how this is to be done I frankly don't know. I think the biggest problem is Republika Srpska and to change the climate that has been produced by Mr. Dodik and all his statements.

RFE/RL: The division of the country along ethnic lines was actually legitimized by the Dayton agreement...

Abramowitz: Yes, of course, that's what they did; it consolidated the status quo and did nothing more. It did not provide adequately for the growth of a different country.

RFE/RL: And Dayton is now seen as a holy script for some....

Abramowitz: Well, it's a holy script because no one knows how to replace it. No one's going to get together and produce another Dayton agreement that integrates the country. If they wanted to do that, the parties themselves could, but they're not.

Unless the West were to impose a totally new agreement, which they're certainly not prepared to do, I don't know how a new Dayton conference will achieve anything. If it were possible to achieve something by a new Dayton conference, which would change the way the country operates, obviously I would support it, but I don't see that happening.

Look, over the past year there have been all sorts of meetings, high-level officials came back and forth. Nothing's changed.

Papering Over The Cracks

RFE/RL: I think what we're seeing now in Kosovo is the bad politics and hypocrisy of the international community exploding. When Kosovo simply decided to guard its own border, we had a new crisis.

Abramowitz: For whatever reason, [Kosovo Prime Minister Hashim] Thaci got mad and he decided to move ahead. Whether he talked to the Americans or not, I don't know; there's a lot of back-and-forth on this issue. Kosovars rarely do anything without American approval; Americans are their best friends.

But nevertheless he went and did it and I believe the status quo has been somewhat changed. I don't know where the negotiations are now. They may well go back to Brussels and try to restore the status quo. Further talks may solve the customs problem, but I don't think it's going to contribute to any long-term solution in the north.

Now, they may hope that over time good things will occur because they're cooperating more, but I don't think they're going to cooperate more.