https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1057610X.2019.1678878
(full article available for purchase from the link)
Abstract
One of the most important legacies of the “Troubles” in Northern Ireland and the ensuing 20 years post-peace-process era, heralded by the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, is the rise of complex and diverse Republican and Loyalist paramilitary groups engaging in acts of terrorism and a wide range of organized criminal and cross-border activities. Yet, little scholarship has been dedicated for examining the nexus between terrorism and organized crime in Northern Ireland or for accurately understanding the role that paramilitaries play in organized crime and their dynamic interactions with organized criminal groups. Informed by empirical evidence and qualitative interviews with government agencies in Northern Ireland, it is this important gap in scholarship that this article aims to fill. It does so by developing a new terrorism-organized crime model which reveals a range of different types of crime-terror interactions in Northern Ireland. The article concludes that national terrorism-organized crime models, and the Northern Ireland model in particular, albeit with variations to its constituent components to accommodate local situations, are most appropriate for capturing intricate and dynamic interactions between these two phenomena across diverse environments rather than existing models designed for universal application.
Additional information
Notes
1 The Troubles refers to a violent thirty-year armed conflict in Northern Ireland involving on one side terrorist paramilitary groups fighting for the unification of Ireland (Republican) and on the other side those fighting for Northern Ireland to remain part of the United Kingdom (Loyalist).
2 Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of Ireland, 10 April 1998. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-belfast-agreement (accessed 6 March 2019).
3 Interview. See also House of Commons Northern Ireland Affairs Committee, The Financing of Terrorism in Northern Ireland, Fourth Report of Session 2001-02, HC 978-1 (2002), paras. 3–4; Independent Monitoring Commission, Third Report of the Independent Monitoring Commission (HC 1218, London, The Stationery Office, November 4, 2004), paras. 5, 13.
4 Home Office, Proscribed Terrorist Organizations, 1 March 2019. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/783067/proscribed-terrorist-organizations.pdf (accessed 6 March 2019).
5 Interview. According to government agencies within Northern Ireland, the designation of these fourteen groups as terrorist organizations is due to historical and political reasons. Legally, some remain designated as terrorist organizations but politically they are not treated as terrorist organizations as they have decommissioned and are committed to the peace process. However, these organizations are essentially the same in their organizational structure, modi operandi, and capacity to commit terrorist violence as many of the other paramilitary groups that have not been designated as terrorist organizations. In the present article, terrorist and paramilitary groups are used interchangeably.
6 Peter Neumann, Old and New Terrorism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009); Bruce Hoffmann, “Rethinking Terrorism and Counterterrorism Since 9/11,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 25, no. 5 (2002): 303–16. doi:10.1080/105761002901223; Paul Wilkinson, “International Terrorism: The Changing Threat and the EU’s Response” (Chaillot Paper No. 84, Institute for Security Studies, European Union, Paris, October 2005).
7 Rohan Gunaratna and Aviv Oreg, “Al Qaeda’s Organizational Structure and its Evolution,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 33, no. 12 (2010): 1043–78, doi:10.1080/1057610X.2010.523860; Johnathon Stevenson, “Al-Qaeda’s Evolution Since 9/11,” Strategic Comments 23, no. 8 (2017): vii–viii, doi:10.1080/13567888.2017.1385982
8 Interview.
9 The military defeat of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (Da’esh) in 2017 has forced the group to evolve and transform from a hierarchically organized group, concentrating on conquering and holding territory, to a covert, networked group with a flat hierarchy and cells and affiliates increasingly acting autonomously. Despite many Islamic State fighters and commanders being killed, members of the group have fled to neighboring States seeking refuge, while 20,000–30,000 members are hiding out in sympathetic communities in Iraq and Syria. Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) members have established themselves in Libya, Algeria, and Morocco, as well as Asia, including Bangladesh and the Philippines. It is therefore likely that an Islamic State group core will survive for the foreseeable future. Letter dated 17 January 2018 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011), and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2018/14/Rev.1, February 27, 2018; Letter dated 16 July 2018 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2018/705, July 27, 2018; Phill Hynes, “As ISIS Winds Down In Syria and Iraq, a New Hotbed of Terror Is Created—In Asia,” Frontera, 2 August 2016.
10 Until its military defeat, Da’esh had an Islamist caliphate in the heart of the Middle East and exerted control over an estimated 90,000 square kilometers of territory and a taxable population of seven to eight million people, as well as oilfields and refineries, vast grain stores, lucrative smuggling routes, and vast stockpiles of arms and ammunition, making it the strongest, best resourced, and most ideologically potent terrorist quasi-State of the post–11 September 2001 era. At the same time, Da’esh was transnational in nature by attracting tens of thousands of foreign fighters from over 100 countries and creating the necessary infrastructure to carry out significant external terrorist attacks. Jason Burke, “Rise and Fall of Isis: Its Dream of a Caliphate is Over, so What Now?,” The Guardian, 21 October 2017.
11 The UVF, UDA, and INLA are reported to still be recruiting new members. Paramilitary Groups in Northern Ireland, “An Assessment Commissioned by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland on the Structure, Role and Purpose of Paramilitary Groups Focusing on those which Declared Ceasefires in Order to Support and Facilitate the Political Process,” 19 October 2015, para. 2. House of Commons Northern Ireland Affairs Committee, The Financing of Terrorism in Northern Ireland, Fourth Report of Session 2001-02, HC 978-1 (2002), para. 68.
12 Since the signing of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998, the Republican paramilitary dominance of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) has been replaced by the violent dissident Republicans violent dissident Republicans, a set of groups whose aim is to maintain the paramilitary conflict in the pursuit of a united Ireland. They reject the legitimacy of the peace process and believe that Sinn Fein and the PIRA have sold out the Republican community through their engagement in the politics of normalization. See John Horgan and John Morrison, “Here to Stay? The Rising Threat of Violent Dissident Republicanism in Northern Ireland,” Terrorism and Political Violence 23, no. 4 (2011), 642–69. doi:10.1080/09546553.2011.594924.
13 PSNI Statistics Branch, “Police Recorded Security Situation Statistics 1 September 2017 to 31 August 2018,” 7 September 2018. See also Lord Alderdice, John McBurney, and Monica McWilliams, “The Fresh Start Panel Report on the Disbandment of Paramilitary Groups in Northern Ireland” (Northern Ireland Executive, 7 June 2016), para. 2.7; Rachel Monaghan and Peter Shirlow, “Forward to the Past? Loyalist Paramilitarism in Northern Ireland Since 1994,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 34, no. 8 (2011), pp. 649–65. doi:10.1080/1057610X.2011.583205; John Morrison and John Horgan, “Reloading the Armalite? Victims and Targets of Violent Dissident Irish Republicanism 2007–2015,” Terrorism and Political Violence 28, no. 3 (2016), pp. 576–97. doi:10.1080/09546553.2016.1155940. According to “Paramilitary Groups in Northern Ireland, An Assessment Commissioned by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland on the Structure, Role and Purpose of Paramilitary Groups,” para. 2, there were between fifteen and forty attacks annually between 2000 to 2015 inclusive primarily directed at PSNI officers.
14 Lord Bourne of Aberystwyth, Hansard Parliamentary Debates, Official Report, 18 July 2017, 1590.
15 Northern Ireland Terrorism Legislation: Annual Statistics 2016/17, Northern Ireland Office, 7 November 2017, 7–12; Northern Ireland Terrorism Legislation: Annual Statistics 2017/18, Northern Ireland Office, 7 November 2018, 7–12.
16 Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, Annual Report 2016–2017, HC 655 (December 2017), 27.
17 Alex P. Schmid, “Revisiting the Relationship between International Terrorism and Transnational Organised Crime 22 Years Later” (Research Paper, The International Center for Counter-Terrorism, The Hague (2018): 1–40, doi:10.19165/2018.1.06
18 Ben Saul, “Terrorism as a Legal Concept,” in Routledge Handbook of Law and Terrorism, ed. Genevieve Lennon and Clive Walker (London, Routledge, 2015), 19–38.
19 Neil Boister, “The UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime 2000,” in International Law and Transnational Organized Crime, ed. Pierre Hauck and Sven Peterke (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2016), 126–49.
20 Department of Justice, “Organised Crime Task Force Annual Report and Threat Assessment 2017–18: Organised Crime in Northern Ireland” (2018). https://www.justice-ni.gov.uk/sites/default/files/publications/justice/octf-2017-18-annual-report.pdf (accessed 7 March 2019), 6. See also Department of Justice, “The Northern Ireland Organised Crime Strategy” (Organized Crime Task Force) (2016). https://www.octf.gov.uk/OCTF/media/OCTF/documents/publications/N.I.%20Organised%20Crime%20Strategy/The-NI-Organized-Crime-Strategy-April-2016.pdf?ext=.pdf (accessed 7 March 2019). The definition in Northern Ireland is slightly different to that provided by the United Kingdom’s National Crime Agency: “Organized crime can be defined as serious crime planned, coordinated and conducted by people working together on a continuing basis. Their motivation is often, but not always, financial gain. Organized criminals working together for a particular criminal activity or activities are called an organized crime group.” National Crime Agency, “Organized Crime Groups.” http://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/crime-threats/organized-crime-groups (accessed 7 March 2019).
21 The definition of terrorism is contained in section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2000. The current definition refers to the use or threat of action involving serious violence against a person, serious damage to property, the endangerment of a person’s life, the creation of a serious risk to the health and safety of the public or a section of the public, or serious interference with or seriously disrupting an electronic system where the use of threat is designed to influence the government or an international governmental organization or to intimidate the public or a section of it. See further R v Gul (Appellant) [2013] UKSC 64.
22 See, for example, Erik Alda and Joseph L Sala, “Links Between Terrorism, Organized Crime and Crime: The Case of the Sahel Region,” Stability: International Journal of Security & Development 3, no. 1 (2014): 1–9. doi:10.5334/sta.ea; Rajan Basra, Peter R. Neumann, and Claudia Brunner, “Criminal Pasts, Terrorist Futures: European Jihadists and the New Crime-Terror Nexus” (London: International Center for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence, 2016); Sergei Boeke, “Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Terrorism, Insurgency, or Organized Crime?,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 27, no. 5 (2016): 914–36. doi:10.1080/09592318.2016.1208280; Chris Dishman, “The Leaderless Nexus: When Crime and Terror Converge,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 28, no. 3 (2005): 237–52. doi:10.1080/10576100590928124; Michael Fredholm, Transnational Organized Crime and Jihadist Terrorism: Russian-Speaking Networks in Western Europe (New York: Routledge, 2017); Annette Hübschle, “From Theory to Practice: Exploring the Organized Crime-Terror Nexus in Sub-Saharan Africa,” Perspectives on Terrorism 5, no. 3–4 (2011): 81–95; Leslie Holmes, ed., Terrorism, Organized Crime and Corruption: Networks and Linkages (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2007); Tamara Makarenko, “The Crime-Terror Nexus: Do Threat Perceptions Align with Reality?,” in Defining and Defying Organized Crime: Discourse, Perceptions and Reality, ed. Felicia Allum, Francesca Lono, Daniela Irrera, and Panos A Kostakos (London, Routledge, 2010), 180–92; Tamara Makarenko and Michael Mesquita, “Categorising the Crime–Terror Nexus in the European Union,” Global Crime 15, no. 3–4 (2014): 259–74. doi:10.1080/17440572.2014.931227; John T Picarelli, “Osama bin Corleone? Vito the Jackal? Framing Threat Convergence Through an Examination of Transnational Organized Crime and International Terrorism,” Terrorism and Political Violence 24, no. 2 (2012): 180–98. doi:10.1080/09546553.2011.648349; Tuesday Reitano, Colin Clarke, and Laura Adal, “Examining the Nexus between Organized Crime and Terrorism and its Implications for EU Programming” (Counter-Terrorism Monitoring, Reporting and Support Mechanism, European Union, 2017); James Windle, John Morrison, Aaron Winter, and Andrew Silke, eds., Historical Perspectives on Organized Crime and Terrorism (London: Routledge, 2017).
23 For example, Phil Williams, “Terrorism and Organized Crime: Convergence, Nexus or Transformation?” in FOA Report on Terrorism, ed. Gunnar Jervas (Swedish Defense Research Establishment (1998), 69–92; Tamara Makarenko, “The Crime-Terror Continuum: Tracing the Interplay between Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism Global Crime 6, no. 1 (2004), 129–45; Louise I. Shelley et al., “Methods and Motives: Exploring Links between Transnational Organized Crime & International Terrorism,” US Department of Justice (2005); Steven Hutchinson and Pat O’Malley, “A Crime–Terror Nexus? Thinking on Some of the Links between Terrorism and Criminality,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 30, no. 12 (2007): 1095–1107; Santiago Ballina, “The Crime-Terror Continuum Revisited: A Model for the Study of Hybrid Criminal Organizations,” Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism 6, no. 2 (2011): 121–36; Tamara Makarenko, “Europe's Crime-Terror Nexus: Links between Terrorist and Organized Crime Groups in the European Union,” Directorate General for Internal Policies—Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs (2012); Marinko Bobic, “Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism: Nexus Needing a Human Security Framework” Global Crime 15, no. 3–4 (2014), 241–58.
24 For example, John F. Morrison, “Origins and Rise of Dissident Irish Republicanism: The Role and Impact of Organizational Splits” (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2014); John F. Morrison, “Fighting Talk: The Statements of the IRA/New IRA,” Terrorism and Political Violence 28, no. 3 (2016a), pp. 598–619; John F. Morrison and John Horgan, “Reloading the Armalite? Victims and Targets of Violent Dissident Irish Republicanism 2007–2015,” Terrorism and Political Violence 28, no. 3 (2016); John F. Morrison, “Copying to be Different: Violent Dissident Irish Republican Learning,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 40, no. 7 (2017), pp. 586–602.
25 To date, a number of studies have noted links between organized crime and terrorist financing in Northern Ireland. For example, Andrew Silke, “In Defense of the Realm: Financing Loyalist Terrorism in Northern Ireland—Part One: Extortion and Blackmail,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 21, no. 4 (1998): 331–61; John Horgan and Max Taylor, “Playing the Green Card—Financing the Provisional IRA: Part 1, Terrorism and Political Violence 11, no. 2 (1999), pp. 1–38; Andrew Silke, “Drink, Drugs and Rock ‘n’ Roll: Financing Loyalist Terrorism in Northern Ireland— Part Two, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 23, no. 2 (2000), pp. 107–27; Richard Evans, “Organized Crime and Terrorism Financing in Northern Ireland,” Intelligence Review 14, no. 9 (2002), pp. 26–29; John Horgan and Max Taylor, “Playing the Green Card—Financing the Provisional IRA: Part 2,” Terrorism and Political Violence 15, no. 2 (2003), pp. 1–60; Jon Moran, “Paramilitaries, ‘Ordinary Decent Criminals’ and the Development of Organized Crime Following the Belfast Agreement,” International Journal of the Sociology of Law 32 (2004), pp. 263–278; Ryan Clarke and Stuart Lee, “The PIRA, D-Company, and the Crime-Terror Nexus,” Terrorism and Political Violence 20, no. 3 (2008): 376–95; Niahm Hourigan, John Morrison, James Windle, and Andrew Silke, “Crime in Ireland North and South: Feuding Gangs and Profiteering Paramilitaries,” Trends in Organized Crime 21, no. 2 (2018), pp. 126–46; Peng Wang, “The Crime-Terror Nexus: Transformation, Allegiance, Convergence,” Asian Social Science 6, no. 6 (2010): 11–20, at 15. doi:10.5539/ass.v6n6p11
26 In 2005 the Independent Monitoring Commision reported that “because of […] paramilitary involvement, organized crime is the biggest long-term threat to the rule of law in Northern Ireland.”
27 Hourigan et al., “Crime in Ireland North and South,” 137.
28 Interview. House of Commons Northern Ireland Affairs Committee, The Financing of Terrorism in Northern Ireland, Fourth Report of Session 2001-02, HC 978-1 (2002), para. 32.
29 Interview.
30 The identities of these experts remain anonymous for security reasons. We refer to them in generic terms as “government experts” to protect their anonymity as disclosure of their roles in their organizations may reveal their identity. It is important to note, at the outset, that the nature and extent of the crime–terror nexus does not always correlate with criminal prosecutions, as this may not always be deemed the most efficient or effective means of disrupting criminal activity and there may also be issues of obtaining evidence to the requisite standard of proof and potentially revealing sensitive sources of intelligence; as such, the nexus also has to be established and mapped by intelligence gathered from investigations by various government agencies. Additionally, there are always issues of accuracy when relying on reports of newspapers, media accounts, and scholarship. In an effort to counterbalance this, we have had our findings verified and corroborated by government agencies.
31 Additionally, this article is informed by the present authors’ experience and insight in leading, in 2018, a project on the links between terrorism and crime from a global perspective on behalf of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime.
32 “The Hague Good Practices on the Nexus Between Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism,” Global Counterterrorism Forum. https://www.thegctf.org/Portals/1/Documents/Framework%20Documents/C/GCTF-Good-Practices-on-the-Nexus_ENG.pdf?ver=2018-09-21-122246-363 (accessed 6 March 2019), 4.
33 “Concept Note, Open Briefing of the Counter-Terrorism Committee on the Nexus between International Terrorism and Transnational Organized Crime,” Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED), 8 October 2018, 2.
34 It also has to be borne in mind that, in applying the Northern Ireland model to other jurisdictions, states define the concepts of “organized crime” and “terrorism” differently, often in radically different ways, and sometimes not at all.
35 HM Government, “Local to Global: Reducing the Risk from Organized Crime,” (2011), para. 44. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97823/organized-crime-strategy.pdf (accessed 6 March 2019).
36 Home Office, “Future Directions for Organized Crime Research” (2011). ://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/116653/future-organized-crime-res-2011.pdf (accessed 6 March 2019).
37 S/RES/2195, 19 December 2014. See also Report of the Secretary-General on the threat of terrorists benefiting from transnational organized crime, UN Doc. S/2015/366, 21 May 2015.
38 UNICRI and Thailand Institute of Justice, “Breaking the Organized Crime and Counter-Terrorism Nexus: Identifying Programmatic Approaches,” Meeting Report (2016).
39 UNODC, “Countering Illicit Arms Trafficking and its Links to Terrorism and Other Serious Crime” (2017). Stepping Up International Efforts to Address the Nexus between terrorism and transnational crime: What More Can be Done? Organized by the Government of the Netherlands, Interpol and the UNODC Terrorism Prevention Branch (2017). https://www.unodc.org/documents/commissions/CND_CCPCJ_joint/Side_Events/2017/17-02842_CCPCJ_program_ebook.pdf. United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) and Thailand Institute of Justice (2016), “Breaking the Organized Crime and Counter-Terrorism Nexus: Identifying Programmatic Approaches,” Meeting Report. http://unicri.it/in_focus/files/NEXUS_REPORT_UNICRI.pdf.
40 Tamara Makarenko, “Europe's Crime-Terror Nexus: Links between Terrorist and Organized Crime Groups in the European Union,” Directorate General for Internal Policies—Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs (2012); Tamara Makarenko, “Address to the European Parliament’s Special Committee on Organized Crime, Corruption and Money Laundering“ (2013). http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201302/20130221ATT61506/20130221ATT61506EN.pdf; Reitano et al., “Examining the Nexus.” See also European Police Office (Europol), “Changes in Modus Operandi of Islamic State (IS) Revisited” (The Hague: Europol, 2016); European Police Force, “European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report” (The Hague: Europol, 2017). Interpol, “INTERPOL Launches Project to Counter Terrorism in South and Southeast Asia,” 30 August 2017, https://www.interpol.int/News-and-media/News/2017/N2017-110.
41 Council of Europe, 2nd Conference on Terrorism and Organized Crime, September 2017. https://www.coe.int/en/web/counter-terrorism/terrorism-and-organized-crime-2017, 21–22.
42 The UNICRI initiative resulted in the development of The Hague Good Practices on the Nexus between Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism, endorsed at the Ninth Global Counter-Terrorism Forum Ministerial Plenary Meeting in New York in September 2018. See “The Hague Good Practices.”
43 7351st mtg., 19 December 2014.
44 The Fresh Start Panel Report on the Disbandment of Paramilitary Groups in Northern Ireland (2016), paras. 2.7–2.23. https://www.northernireland.gov.uk/sites/default/files/publications/newnigov/The%20Fresh%20Start%20Panel%20report%20on%20the%20disbandment%20of%20paramilitary%20groups.pdf (accessed 6 March 2019).
45 Ibid.
46 A Fresh Start. The Stormont Agreement and Implementation Plan (2015). https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/479116/A_Fresh_Start_-_The_Stormont_Agreement_and_Implementation_Plan_-_Final_Version_20_Nov_2015_for_PDF.pdf (accessed 6 March 2019).
47 Fresh Start Panel Report.
48 See also “Organized Crime Task Force, 2017–18 Annual Report and Threat Assessment, Organized Crime in Northern Ireland,” Appendix 2 (2018).
49 The Task Force was established in September 2017 as part of the commitment to tackle paramilitary activity in Northern Ireland set out in the Fresh Start Agreement. It was to include forty PSNI officers, twenty-two NCA personnel, and ten customs officers and to receive £25million over five years; see Vincent Kearney, “New Taskforce to Tackle Paramilitaries,” BBC, 27 September 2017. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-41407322; interview.
50 Interview.
51 Fresh Start Panel Report, 11.
52 The term “Brexit” refers to Britain’s decision to exit from the European Union following a referendum held on 23 June 2016. See Mark Daly, Pat Dolan, and Mark Brennan, “Northern Ireland Returning to Violence as a Result of a Hard Border due to Brexit or a Rushed Border Poll: Risks to Youth,” UNESCO, February 2019. https://senatormarkdaly.files.wordpress.com/2019/02/unesco-chairs-report-brexit-return-to-violence.pdf (accessed 6 March 2019). See also Police Remuneration Review Body, “Fourth Report on Northern Ireland 2018” (25 May 2018), 7–9.
53 We do not include corruption in this model due to a lack of empirical evidence but note that in jurisdictions impacted by the nexus between terrorism and organized crime in Northern Ireland corruption may be an additional component of interaction.
54 It is important to note that these constituent elements are not necessarily self-contained and there may in some cases be overlap between activity assimilation and alliances.
55 Home Office, “List of Proscribed Terrorist Groups or Organizations.” https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/proscribed-terror-groups-or-organizations–2 (accessed 7 March 2019), 21.
56 Paramilitary groups in Northern Ireland, An Assessment Commissioned by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland on the Structure, Role and Purpose of Paramilitary Groups Focusing on Those which Declared Ceasefires in Order to Support and Facilitate the Political Process, 19 October 2015, para. 2; Fresh Start Panel report, para. 2.7. For example, NIRA are alleged to have been responsible for the bomb attack in Derry on 19 January 2019. See Rory Carroll, “Derry Bomb Attack: Northern Ireland Police Arrest Four Men,” Guardian 20 January 2019.
57 Williams, “Terrorism and Organized Crime,” 70; Makarenko, “The Crime–Terror Continuum,” 131; Makarenko, “Categorising,” 260; Shelley et al., “Methods and Motives,” 37. Williams and Shelley et al. refer to this type of linkage as a “nexus.”
58 Chris Dishman, “Terrorism, Crime and Transformation,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 24, no. 1 (2001): 43–58; see also Peng Wang, “The Crime-Terror Nexus,” 15.
59 Europol, “EU Drug Markets Report. In-Depth Analysis,” 2016. http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/system/files/publications/2373/TD0216072ENN.PDF (accessed 7 March 2019), 18.
60 House of Commons Northern Ireland Affairs Committee, “The Financing of Terrorism in Northern Ireland,” Fourth Report of Session 2001-02, HC 978-1 (2002), para. 22.
61 The need for expanding tactical expertise led the PIRA, and other republican groups, to seek direct training from international allies to complement their own internal training. In the 1970s it is widely believed that both the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) and the PIRA received training in Palestine from the Palestine Liberation Organization. See John F. Morrison and Paul Gill, “100 Years of Irish Republican Violence,” Terrorism and Political Violence 28, no. 3 (2016), pp. 409, 411; Morrison, “Copying to be Different,” 589.
62 These three men—Niall Connolly, Martin McCauley, and James Monaghan—indicted in Columbia in 2002 for training FARC militants in the use of explosives, including homemade mortars, and, in 2004, were sentenced to seventeen years in prison. It is important to keep in mind that this is not the first time that FARC and PIRA have allegedly exchanged knowledge and information. PIRA purportedly initiated contact with FARC in 1997 through the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, with which PIRA has a long-standing relationship and has exchanged knowledge and technical know-how, particularly in bomb making. According to an April 2002 U.S. Department of State report, one of the three PIRA men, Connolly, Sinn Fein’s representative in Cuba, initiated the contact with FARC in 1997; and, from 1998 to 2001, at least fifteen PIRA militants traveled to Colombia, along with Iranian, Cuban, and Basque terrorists, to train FARC. One expert alleged that senior PIRA leaders would have sanctioned this kind of an exchange of technology with another militant group, even though they are publicly adhering to a cease-fire. Notably, PIRA has a long-standing policy prohibiting “freelancing” by its members; as such, the Colombia Three did not likely act alone, despite vehement denials from Sinn Fein, which does not want to be seen as violating the cease-fire. U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, responding to the information that this relationship developed after the 1997 peace process began in Northern Ireland, said on a trip to Bogotá in December 2002 that the groups were “sharing experiences and knowledge.” For a case study examining the exchange of technology and knowledge between the PIRA and the FARC, see Kim Cragin, Peter Chalk, Sara A. Daly, and Brian A. Jackson, “Sharing the Dragon's Teeth: Terrorist Groups and the Exchange of New Technologies” (Santa Monica, USA: RAND Corporation, 2007), ch. 5. See also House of Commons Northern Ireland Affairs Committee, The Financing of Terrorism in Northern Ireland, Fourth Report of Session 2001-02, HC 978-1 (2002), para. 5; Hearing before the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, “International Global Terrorism. It’s Links with Illicit Drugs as Illustrated by the IRA and other Groups in Colombia” (April 2002). http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa78947.000/hfa78947_0f.htm (accessed 7 March 2019).
63 David Bamber, “The IRA ‘is Teaching Palestinians How to Blow Up Israeli Soldiers’ in West Bank,” The Telegraph 28 April 2002; Jim Cusack, “Taliban Using IRA Bomb Techniques in Terror War,” Irish Independent 3 June 2007.
64 Andrew Alderson, David Bamber, and Francis Elliott, “IRA’s Involvement in International Terrorism,” The Daily Telegraph 28 April 2002.
65 Shelley et al., “Methods and Motives,” 36.
66 Dishman, “Terrorism,” 48–49.
67 Williams, “Terrorism and Organized Crime,” 70.
68 Shelley et al., “Methods and Motives,” 53
69 Makarenko and Mesquita, “Categorising,” 260.
70 The importance of conflicts that occur between terrorist groups and organized criminal groups has recently been highlighted by Hourigan et al., “Crime in Ireland North and South.”
71 Shelley et al., “Methods and Motives,” 54; Makarenko and Mesquita, “Categorising,” 260.
72 Ibid.
73 We are concerned with this relationship in this analysis rather than the additional possibility of organized criminal groups adopting terrorist tactics as we find no evidence of this development in Northern Ireland. This is not to adopt Shelley et al.’s definition of a hybrid, which normally envisaged a convergence of separate terrorist and organized crime groups.
74 Interview.
75 Interview. See also House of Commons Select Committee on Northern Ireland Affairs, Third Report, 28 June 2006, paras. 11–12. https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmselect/cmniaf/886/88605.htm#n44; House of Commons Northern Ireland Affairs Committee, The Financing of Terrorism in Northern Ireland, para. 18.
76 For debates on the dichotomy, see, for example, Alison Jamieson, “The Use of Terrorism and Organized Crime,” in Root Causes of Terrorism. Proceedings from an International Expert Meeting, ed. Tore Bjørgo, Conference Report, The Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (Oslo, 9–11 June 2003), 169. See also Louise I. Shelley, Dirty Entanglements: Corruption, Crime and Terrorism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 113.
77 Dishman, “Terrorism,” 47-50.
78 Williams, “Terrorism and Organized Crime,” 71.
79 Shelley et al., “Methods and Motives,” 36.
80 Makarenko, “The Crime–Terror Continuum,” 135; Makarenko and Mesquita, “Categorising,” 261.
81 Rosie Cowan, “Loyalists Recruit the Next Generation,” The Guardian, 2 April 2001.
82 Paramilitary groups in Northern Ireland, An Assessment Commissioned by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland on the Structure, Role and Purpose of Paramilitary Groups Focusing on Those which Declared Ceasefires in Order to Support and Facilitate the Political Process.
83 Ibid., para. 18. Interview.
84 Ibid., para. 2.
85 Ibid.
86 IMC, First Report 20 April 2004, 25.
87 “Paramilitary Groups in Northern Ireland,” para. 2.
88 For example, Makarenko and Mesquita, “Categorising,” 261.
89 See earlier, referenced in the introductory text.
90 For example, Clarke and Lee observed that “the continuum proposed by Makarenko cannot sufficiently account for the blurred distinction between categories of criminal or terrorist, nor can it realistically represent the dynamic complexity of the PIRA’s former day-to-day operations as a terror group, punishment squad, criminal group for fundraising, and alleged collaborator with both state and non-state actors.” Clarke and Lee, “The PIRA, D-Company, and the Crime-Terror Nexus,” 392.
91 For example, see Schmid, “Revisiting the Relationship between International Terrorism and Transnational Organised Crime 22 Years Later,” 13.
92 For example see Wang, “The Crime-Terror Nexus.”
93 Dishman noted different degrees of transformation from one type of group—terrorist or criminal—to another but not those outlined in this article.
94 Although the model is Northern Ireland–focused, it does take into account terrorist groups located in Northern Ireland that engage in organized crime and have interactions with organized criminal groups transnationally.
95 Silke, “In Defense of the Realm,” 335–336; HC Committee Northern Ireland Affairs. Northern Ireland Affairs Committee, Financing of Terrorism, Fourth Report, 2001–02.
96 One report estimated the combined budget for UDA and the UVF to be £3 million per annum: see Darwin Templeton, “Terror Bosses Feel the Pinch,” Sunday Life, 21 April 1996, 12; the PIRA’s annual budget was in the region of £15 million: see Silke, “In Defense of the Realm,” 333. In 2002 the PSNI estimated that PIRA raised £5–8 million annually, while RIRA raised £5 million, UDA raised £1 million, and UVF raised £1.5 million: see House of Commons Northern Ireland Affairs Committee, “The Financing of Terrorism in Northern Ireland, Fourth Report of Session 2001–02,” HC 978-1 (2002), para. 33.
97 Interview. See also Silke, “Drink, Drugs and Rock ‘n’ Roll”; House of Commons, “The Financing of Terrorism,” paras. 11–12.
98 Interview. House of Commons, “The Financing of Terrorism,” para. 13.
99 Interview.
100 Hourigan et al., “Crime in Ireland North and South.”
101 Ibid., 142.
102 House of Commons, “The Financing of Terrorism”; Organized Crime Task Force, “The Threat Assessment 2002: Serious and Organized Crime in Northern Ireland.” (Belfast: Northern Ireland Office, 2002).
103 Ibid.
104 Interview. Terrorist–organized crime alliances are frequently referred to by intelligence and law enforcement officials across Europe as a “marriage of convenience.” See Makarenko, “Europe’s Crime-Terror Nexus.”
105 Dishman, “Terrorism”; Silke, “In Defense of the Realm”; Evans, “Organized Crime and Terrorism Financing in Northern Ireland”; Chris Ryder, “Organized Crime and Racketeering in Northern Ireland,” in Combatting Terrorism in Northern Ireland, ed. James Dingley (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009).
106 Interview. James Bone and Tom Farmery, “Italian Police Arrest 20 People in €450 Million IRA Money Laundering Plot,” The Times, 6 March 2013.
107 Makarenko, “Europe’s Crime-Terror Nexus,” 23–24.
108 European Monitoring Center for Drugs and Drug Addiction, “EU Drug Markets Report: In-Depth Analysis” (EMCDDA–Europol Joint Publications, Luxembourg, 2016), 33.
109 Italian investigators ultimately were unable to identify the source of the money.
110 Leandro Di Natala, “Anti-Money Laundering Operation Proves Links between Italian ‘Ndrangheta and IRA” (European Strategic Intelligence and Security Center, 2013). http://www.esisc.org/contact-us.
111 See also Main & Ors v (Giambrone & Law) & Ors [2017] EWCA Civ 1193.
112 Hourigan et al., “Crime in Ireland North and South,” 138; Clarke and Lee, “The PIRA, D-Company, and the Crime-Terror Nexus.”
113 Fitzsimons was extradited to Italy in 2013, having fled to Senegal, but was eventually released due to insufficient evidence, Mark Rainey, “Ex-IRA Man Henry ‘Harry’ Fitzsimons Beats Mafia Fraud Extradition,” News Letter, 30 April 2016.
114 Interview.
115 Interview.
116 Interview. Tom Clonan, “This Dublin Gun Violence Bears all the Hallmarks of Paramilitary Involvement,” The Guardian, 10 February 2016; Paul Williams, “Deadly Kinahan-Hutch Feud is Linked to €7.6 m Tiger Kidnaping,” Irish Independent, 28 January 2018; Henry McDonald, “Dublin’s Dead Men Walking: 29 on Death List in Brutal Gangland War,” The Guardian, 19 February 2018.
117 Interview. The Hutch gang controls smuggling routes at Dublin port. The Kinahan cartel have always craved control of that network and by defeating the Hutch gang they would take over these routes,
118 James Quinn was convicted for the murder of Gary Hutch in Spain. Reportedly, Hutch was murdered following an attempt by the Hutch group to murder Daniel Kinahan—the son of the Kinahan organized crime group. Gerard Couzens, “James Quinn Jailed for 22 Years in Spain over Gary Hutch Murder,” The Irish Times, 21 June 2018.
119 Interview. In 2008 several police forces across Europe collaborated to investigate the Kinahan crime group. The investigation, codenamed “Operation Shovel,” was led by Spanish authorities but also incorporated specialist police teams in Belgium, the Republic of Ireland, and the United Kingdom. UN Office on Drugs and Crime, “Operation Shovel,” https://www.unodc.org/cld/case-law-doc/drugcrimetype/esp/operation_shovel.html (accessed 4 March 2019).
120 Interview. See also Ewan MacKenna, “Boxing to Daniel Kinahan is What Football was to Pablo Escobar—and It’s Choking the Sport in Ireland,” Irish Independent, 5 March 2018.
121 Vincent Kearney, “Dublin Weigh-In Murder: Continuity IRA Claims Murder of David Byrne,” BBC News, 8 February 2016.
122 According to one source, the weapons used to murder Byrne were obtained from an old PIRA stockpile. Allison Morris, “Suspect in Dublin Gangland Murder Dies,” The Irish News, 11 August 2017.
123 Interview. See also Conor Lally, “Kinahan-Hutch Feud Edges into Northern Ireland: North Increasingly used as Hiding Place for Criminals Involved in Gang Feud,” The Irish Times, 24 July 2017.
124 Paul Holtom, Paul James, and Connor Patmore, “From the IRA to ISIS: Exploring Terrorist Access to the UK’s Illicit Firearms Market,” in Triggering Terror: Illicit Gun Markets and Firearms Acquisition of Terrorist Networks in Europe, ed. Nils Duquet (Brussels: Flemish Peace Institute, 2018). The authors have observed the lacuna in academic research on terrorist acquisition of firearms in the United Kingdom. But see Michael Jonsson and Elliot Brennan, “Drugs, Guns and Rebellion: A Comparative Analysis of the Arms Procurement of Insurgent Groups in Colombia and Myanmar,” European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research 20, no. 3 (2014): 307–21. doi:10.1007/s10610-013-9228-0.
125 Interview. See also Holtom et al., “From the IRA to ISIS,” 409–417; Ciaran Barnes, “Murdered Dissident Republican Michael Barr got Mum to Stash his Haul of Drugs,” Belfast Telegraph, 3 May 2016.
126 Makarenko, “Europe’s Crime-Terror Nexus,” 23.
127 Jana Arsovska, “Introduction: Illicit Firearms Market in Europe and Beyond,” European Journal of Criminal Policy and Research 20, Iss. 3 (2014): 295–305, at 299–300. doi:10.1007/s10610-014-9254-6; Jana Arsovska and Panos Kostakos, “Illicit Arms Trafficking and the Limits of Rational Choice Theory: The Case of the Balkans,” Trends in Organized Crime 11, Iss. 4 (2008): 352–87. doi:10.1007/s12117-008-9052-y; Samantha Bricknell, “Firearm Trafficking and Serious and Organized Crime Gangs” (Research and Public Policy Series No. 116, Australian Institute of Criminology, Canberra, 2012).
128 After thirteen years of hiding, Karadzic was convicted in 2016 by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia for the commission of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity during the Bosnian war in the 1990s. PROSECUTOR v RADOVAN KARADŽIĆ, Case No.: IT-95-5/18-T, 24 March 2016.
129 Giles Tremlett, “Karadzic Family ‘Arming Real IRA,’” The Guardian, 5 April 2001.
130 The reason for Andabak’s questioning was in connection with the murder of a Bosnia Croat official who was blown up by an under-car booby-trap similar to those devised by the PIRA during the Troubles in the 1970s and 1980s.
131 Arsovska, “Introduction: Illicit Firearms,” 299–300; Henry McDonald, “Croat General ‘Armed Real IRA Terrorists,’” The Guardian, 24 September 2000.
132 Ibid.
133 Tremlett, “Karadzic.”
134 Interview.
135 Arsovska, “Introduction: Illicit Firearms,” 297–98.
136 Police Service of Northern Ireland, Police Recorded Security Situation Statistics Annual Report, 1 April 2016–31 March 2017, 17 May 17 2017, 2, 6. However, during 2017–18 the police recorded fifty shooting incidents, eleven fewer than in the previous year: Police Service of Northern Ireland, Police Recorded Security Situation Statistics Annual Report, 1 April 2017–31 March 2018.
137 Ibid. A significant level of terrorist threat remains in Northern Ireland as a result of the security situation, which is evidenced by the number of bombing incidents over the past five years; indeed, during the reporting period 2012–13 to 2016–17, there were 230 bombing incidents. Ibid., 5. In 2017–18, there were eighteen bombing incidents as a result of the security situation, the lowest number per year since 1995–96.
138 Ibid. This compares to sixty-six seized during the previous year. The number of firearms seized each year has fluctuated over the last decade with a peak of 176 firearms seized in 2011/12.
139 Ibid.
140 Ibid. However, during the reporting period 2017–18, PSNI officers seized forty firearms and 5,758 rounds of ammunition, the smallest number found since records began in 1969. Likewise, the 0.43 kg of explosives found during 2017–18 was the smallest quantity found since records began. Police Recorded Security Situation Statistics Annual Report, 1 April 2017–31 March 2018, 17 May 2018, 8.
141 Northern Ireland Terrorism Legislation Annual Statistics 2017/18, Northern Ireland Office, 7 November 2018, 12.
142 Interview.
143 Holtom, “From the IRA to ISIS,” 409–17.
144 Ibid. While automatic firearms are not considered an easily available option for a jihadist in the United Kingdom, the authors observe that “10 terrorist attacks foiled by British security services and police during 2015-16 involved plans to buy guns.” Ibid., 409.
145 Ibid., 410–13.
146 Paramilitary Groups in Northern Ireland, An Assessment Commissioned by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland on the Structure, Role and Purpose of Paramilitary Groups Focusing on Those which Declared Ceasefires in Order to Support and Facilitate the Political Process, 19 October 2015.
147 Holtom, “From the IRA to ISIS,” 411.
148 Ibid., 412–13; interview.
149 Ibid.
150 Interview. See also Bimpre Archer, “Three Quarters of Organized Crime Gangs in Belfast Involved in Drugs, Police Chief Reveals,” The Irish News, 5 March 2019.
151 Interview. See also John Cassidy, “UVF Link to Triad Gang: RUC Probe Attacks on Chinese Immigrants,” Sunday Mirror, 2 July 2000.
152 Ciaran Barnes, “UDA Drugs Ring Exposed—Terror Group’s Racket Involved Triad Gang and Ex-Mercenary,” 29 July 2018. See also BBC News, “‘Triad Gang Link’ to Belfast £1 m Cannabis Haul,” 10 January 2019.
153 Ibid.
154 Interview.
155 House of Commons Select Committee on Northern Ireland Affairs, Third Report, paras. 40–43.
156 Financial Action Task Force Report, “Illicit Tobacco Trade” (June 2012), 32.
157 Organized Crime Task Force, “The Northern Ireland Organized Crime Strategy” (April 2016), 4; Organized Crime Task Force, “Annual Report and Threat Assessment Organized Crime in Northern Ireland” (2017).
158 House of Commons Home Affairs Committee for the Tobacco Smuggling Inquiry, Written Evidence from Border Force, HM Revenue and Customs and the National Crime Agency, 6 May 2014. See also House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, Tobacco Smuggling, First Report of Session 2014–15, HC 200, 14 June 2014.
159 Interview.
160 Interview.
161 Interview.
162 Interview.
163 Hayley Halpin, “€4.5 Million Worth of Cigarettes Found at Dublin Port in Container Marked ‘Tyres,’” TheJournal.ie, 25 October 2017.
164 “Russia Gangs ‘Help Cigarette Scams,’” Belfast Telegraph, 22 June 2011.
165 Itai Zehorai, “The Richest Terror Organizations in the World,” Forbes International, 24 January 2018.
166 Laura K. Donohue, The Cost of Counterterrorism: Power, Politics and Liberty (Cambridge University Press, 2008), 127; James Adams, The Financing of Terror: How the Groups that are Terrorizing the World Get the Money to Do It (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986); Silke, “In Defense of the Realm,” 336; Dishman, “Terrorism,” 48–49.
167 Moran, “Paramilitaries,” 268. According to Moran, organizations on the opposite sides of the political divide will cooperate with each other in the allocation of targets situated on the boundaries of the areas they control.
168 Silke, “In Defense of the Realm,” 336-355.
169 Helen Shaw, “Mawhinney ‘Declares War’ on Paramilitary Rackets,” Irish Times 21 August 1987.
170 Phelim McAleer, “UVF Threat Delivered as Minister was Due,” Irish News, 10 November 1994.
171 “Paramilitary Groups in Northern Ireland,” 19 October 2015. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/469548/Paramilitary_Groups_in_Northern_Ireland_-_20_Oct_2015.pdf (accessed 1 March 2019).
172 IMC, First Report 20 April 2004, 30.
173 Moran, “Paramilitaries,” 267.
174 “Report Highlights Level of Extortion in the North,” The Irish Times, 5 April 2006.
175 Alan O’Day, Terrorism’s Laboratory: The Case of Northern Ireland (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1995).
176 Jack Holland and Henry McDonald, I.N.L.A.: Deadly Divisions (Dublin: Torc, 1994), 26–27 and 73.
177 Moran, “Paramilitaries,” 266.
178 IMC, Fourth Report, 10 February 2005, 6.
179 Ibid., 5.
180 Hourigan et al., “Crime in Ireland North and South,” 141.
181 Silke, “Drink, Drugs and Rock ‘n’ Roll,” 107–27.
182 Hourigan et al., “Crime in Ireland North and South,” 141.
183 For example, see Organized Crime Task Force Annual Report and Threat Assessment (2016). https://www.octf.gov.uk/OCTF/files/12/12306e6f-0ad0-408a-b50d-558b2955932b.pdf (accessed 4 April 2019).
184 IMC, 26th Report, 4 July 2011, 56.
185 “Written Evidence from the Police Service of Northern Ireland,” Select Committee on Northern Ireland Affairs. https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmselect/cmniaf/886/886we06.htm (accessed 28 February 2019).
186 See the section “Hybrids and Transformation.”
187 Interview. See also Hourigan et al., “Crime in Ireland North and South,” 137–42.
188 IMC, 20th Report, 10 November 2008, 5; IMC, 21st Report, 7 May 2009, 9.
189 Ibid.; IMC, 25th Report, 4 November 2010, 17.
190 Stephen Wright, “IRA’s Cigarette-Smuggling Millionaires: Former Terrorists Flooding the UK with Potentially Lethal Fakes, Cheating Taxpayers of Billions,” Daily Mail 6 June 2013.
191 Hourigan et al., “Crime in Ireland North and South,” 138.
192 Ciaran Barnes, “Thomas ‘Slab’ Murphy Takes a £10 Million Hit—Busted Armagh Plants ‘Linked to IRA Leader’s Gang,’” Belfast Telegraph, 29 February 2016.
193 House of Commons, “The Financing of Terrorism,” para. 5.
194 Ibid., paras. 68–81.
195 David Cracknell and Alan Murray, “Three Men Held in Slovakia over IRA Gunrunning,” The Telegraph, 8 July 2001.
196 Henry McDonald, “UK Accused of Failing Victims of IRA Killed by Libya-Supplied Weapons,” The Guardian, 2 May 2017.
197 Gordon Rayner, “Real IRA Commander Caught in MI5 Arms Dealing Sting,” The Telegraph, 30 June 2010.
198 Conor Spackman, “How an MI5 ‘Weapons Dealer’ Tricked a Real IRA Leader,” BBC, 2 July 2010.
199 Henry McDonald, “Men Arrested of Real IRA Links in Portugal,” The Guardian, 10 July 2011.
200 “Real IRA’s Michael Campbell Found Guilty after MI5 Sting,” BBC, 21 October 2011. In 2013 a Lithuanian Appeals Court overturned Campbell’s conviction due to lack of evidence. http://www.thejournal.ie/michael-campbell-released-1111352-Oct2013/ (accessed 7 March 2019).
201 Interview.
202 The Hutch–Kinahan conflict, discussed above, has no apparent geographical limitations and is taking place across Northern Ireland, the Republic of Ireland, Spain, and beyond. The Garda operation to tackle the feud has resulted in the seizure of 456 firearms, €2.2 million cash, and illicit drugs valued at €64 million. However, despite the establishment of 22,428 check points across Dublin city in 2016 and 2017 to police the feud, efforts to stem the violence have had mixed success, partly because the leaders of the two feuding entities are based overseas. See also Hourigan et al., “Crime in Ireland North and South.”
203 For discussion of the contract killing of David Byrne and the Kinahan criminal network, see the alliances section above.
204 Cormac O’Keeffe, “Kinahan Boss Issued with Threat to His Life,” Irish Examiner, 11 January 2017; Emma McMenamy, “Dissident Republicans Planning Massive Kinahan Retaliation Attack on Behalf of the Hutch Gang, Gardai Fear,” DublinLive, 12 January 2017.
205 Garreth MacNamee and Garreth MacNamee, “Gardai Probe ‘New IRA’ Group’s Bomb Trade with Hutch Gang,” TheJournal.ie, 8 June 2017.
206 Allison Morris, “Suspect in Dublin Gangland Murder Dies,” Irish News, 11 August 2017.
207 Lauren Fruen, “IRA ‘Revenge’. Now the IRA Declares War on Dublin Gangs: Security Forces on High Alert After Paramilitary Group ‘Sanctions Spectacular Revenge Attack’ for Shootings,” The Sun, 27 April 2016; Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, “Murder Hit Plots Unraveled in Irish Gang Wars,” 6 November 2018.
208 Emma McMenamy, “Fears New IRA Could Recruit Deadly Criminal Gangs from Europe to Assassinate Enemies,” Mirror, 29 April 2016.
209 Ryan had previously been convicted for possession of a firearm and receiving training in the use of firearms. “Six Given Jail for Taking Part in Real IRA Training Camp,” Drogheda Independent, 30 March 2001.
210 Cathal McMahon, “Promising GAA Player ‘The Beast’ Led Real IRA in a Bloody War on Drugs Gangs,” Indepebndent.ie, 7 December 2016; “The Truth About Alan Ryan and His Funeral,” Independent.ie, 16 September 2012. The “taxation” of criminal groups involved in the traffic and supply of drugs has been used by other Republican paramilitary groups in Northern Ireland, including the INLA and AAD, and terrorist organizations in other parts of the world. For example, in southern Colombia both the FARC guerrilla group and the paramilitary organizations fighting them imposed “taxes” on all the actors involved in the cocaine chain, including the cartels operating cocaine labs in the regions under their control. Likewise, in Afghanistan, the Taliban taxed the actors of the heroin chain, including the criminal organizations operating heroin laboratories. See Ryan Smith, “Revealed: The PSNI’s Four Main Targets in Organized Crime Crackdown,” BelfastLive, 12 January 2018; Vanda Felbab-Brown, Shooting Up: Counterinsurgency and the War on Drugs (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2010).
211 Interview.
212 “Missing Kinahan Hitman Stalked by New IRA Murder Squad,” Herald, 9 June 2016.
213 Ibid.
214 Hourigan et al., “Crime in Ireland North and South,” 141; Ciaran Barnes, “Inside the UVF: Money, Murders and Mayhem—The Loyalist Gang’s Secrets Unveiled,” Belfast Telegraph, 13 October 2014.
215 Silke, “Drink, Drugs and Rock ‘n’ Roll.”
216 IMC, Sixth Report, September 2005, 4–6.
217 Hourigan et al., “Crime in Ireland North and South,” 141–42.
218 Ibid., 138.
219 “Paramilitary Groups in Northern Ireland,” 2.
220 Interview.
221 IMC, 22nd Report, 4 November 2009, 19.
222 IMC, 24th Report, 15 September 2010, 3.
223 IMC, 1st Report, 20 April 2004, 16–17; and IMC 12th Report, 4 October 2006, 15–17.
224 IMC, 1st Report, 20 April 2004, 17.
225 IMC, 24th Report, 15 September 2010, 1–6.
226 “Paramilitary Groups in Northern Ireland,” 2.
227 Interview.
228 “Paramilitary Groups in Northern Ireland,” 2.
229 Interview.
230 Silke, “Drink, Drugs and Rock ‘n’ Roll.”
231 Peter Taylor, Loyalists (London: Bloomsbury, 2000).
232 Steve Bruce, The Red Hand. Protestant Paramilitaries in Northern Ireland (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).
233 “Paramilitary Groups in Northern Ireland,” 3.
234 IMC, 1st Report, 20 April 2004, 16–17, at 22.
235 IMC, 21st Report, 7 May 2009, 14.
236 IMC, 1st Report, 20 April 2004, 30; IMC, 21st Report, 13–14.
237 “Paramilitary Groups in Northern Ireland,” 3.
238 Ibid., 4.
239 Dishman, “Terrorism,” 48–49.
240 IMC, 1st Report, 20 April 2004, 13.
241 The statement of 28 July 2005, stated, “volunteers must not engage in any other activities whatsoever.” See IMC, 7th Report, 19 October 2005, 9.
242 “Paramilitary Groups in Northern Ireland,” 4.
243 “Report Highlights Level of Extortion in the North,” The Irish Times, 5 April 2006.
244 Interview.
245 IMC, 1st Report, 20 April 2004, 12.
246 IMC, 22nd Report, 4 November 2009, 19.
247 IMC, 20th Report, 10 November 2008, 9.
248 “Paramilitary Groups in Northern Ireland,” 1.
249 Ibid.
250 RIRA has been involved in drug dealing, kidnaping, robbery, extortion, and smuggling: see IMC, 21st Report, 7 May 2009, 11–12; ONH members have engaged in robbery, tobacco smuggling, and drug dealing: see IMC, 20th Report, 10 November 2008, 5; CIRA was noted as involved in serious criminal activities, including two armed robberies in 2009: see IMC, 21st Report, 9.
251 Both Loyalist and Republican groups have profited from transnational criminal operations, as outlined in Part II. See also Donohue, “The Cost of Counterterrorism.” Donohue notes that Republican arms have come from the Balkans and Loyalist paramilitaries have obtained weapons from South Africa (128).
252 Jeremy McDermott, “IRA Training Haunts Colombia’s Guerilla War,” The Telegraph, 3 August 2007. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1559348/IRA-training-haunts-Colombias-guerrilla-war.html (accessed 5 June 2019). Within the PIRA’s broader structure, there were numerous independent brigades, each of which were made up of an indeterminate number of active service units. The South Armagh Brigade had a particularly high level of independence and was really “under the control of local chieftains … rather than part of a structured centrally directed organization.” Brendan O'Brien, The Long War: The IRA and Sinn Féin (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1999).
253 In 2014 the Home Office Border Force, HMRC, and National Crime Agency highlighted that, in Northern Ireland, there is “clear evidence” that organized criminal groups with presumed loyalist and nationalist affiliations are prepared actively to trade contraband cigarettes with each other, with one group smuggling, and then selling to the other for onward distribution; “this further blurs any clear delineation of criminal activity according to particular factions/groups.” https://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-committees/home-affairs/Tobacco-written-evidence.pdf (accessed 3 June 2019). Also, interview 24 August 2018.
254 John Horgan and Max Taylor, “The Provisional Irish Republican Army: Command and Functional Structure,” Terrorism and Political Violence, 9, no. 3 (1997), pp. 1–32.
255 Interview.
256 See also https://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-committees/home-affairs/Tobacco-written-evidence.pdf
257 Interview.
258 Fresh Start Agreement. https://www.northernireland.gov.uk/sites/default/files/publications/nigov/a-fresh-start-stormont-agreement_0.pdf
259 Vincent Kearney, “Loyalist Paramilitary Groups ‘to Support Rule of Law,” BBC News, 9 April 2018 https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-43698164 (accessed 11 June 2019).
260 Interview.
261 Moran, “Paramilitaries,” pp. 269–70.
262 UNICRI, “The Hague Good Practices.”
