Okvirni plan prevencije za suzbijanje nasilja po osnovu spola na području Grada Mostara za period 2012. – 2013. godine (Službeni glasnik Grada Mostara, 2/2012)

Tužilaštva predugo istražuju stečajne afere (Centar za istraživačko novinarstvo za magazin DANI, 18/11/2011)

Tužilaštva u Bosni i Hercegovini i po pet godina istražuju prijave radnika o namjernom dovođenju državnih firmi do bankrota i kriminalu u stečajnim postupcima. Dok traju istrage, imovina preduzeća prelazi u ruke novih vlasnika, a radnici ostaju bez posla, zarađenih plaća i penzija.

Studije slučaja: Mlinpek iz Prnjavora; Građevinsko preduzeća Integra-inžinjering iz Tuzle i  Trgovačko preduzeće Promet iz Prnjavora

THE CURRENT DIGITAL ARENA AND ITS RISKS TO SERVING MILITARY PERSONNEL Sebastian Bay, Nora Biteniece (Riga, January 2019 NATO STRATCOM COE)

THE CURRENT DIGITAL ARENA AND ITS RISKS TO SERVING MILITARY PERSONNEL Sebastian Bay, Nora Biteniece 

This article is published as a part of a study "Responding to Cognitive Security Challenges". Full report is also available online: www.stratcomcoe.org ISBN: 978-9934-564-39-0 Authors: Sebastian Bay, Giorgio Bertolin, Nora Biteniece, Edward H. Christie, Anton Dek, Rolf E. Fredheim, John D. Gallacher, Kateryna Kononova, Tetiana Marchenko Project manager: Giorgio Bertolin Text editor: Anna Reynolds, Mike Collier Design: Kārlis Ulmanis Riga, January 2019 NATO STRATCOM COE 11b Kalciema Iela Riga LV1048, Latvia www.stratcomcoe.org Facebook/stratcomcoe Twitter: @stratcomcoe This publication does not represent the opinions or policies of NATO. © All rights reserved by the NATO StratCom COE. Reports may not be copied, reproduced, distributed or publicly displayed without reference to the NATO StratCom COE. The views expressed here are solely those of the author in his private capacity and do not in any way represent the views of NATO StratCom COE. NATO StratCom COE does not take responsibility for the views of authors expressed in their articles.

"Cambridge Analytica allegedly analysed thousands of data points on hundreds of millions of Americans to generate effective microtargeting and behaviour-prediction algorithms during the 2016 US presidential election campaign. In light of these events, it is imperative that we increase our understanding of the possibilities for malicious use of data.  Much of the data used by Cambridge Analytica was collected using the Facebook app ‘This is Your Digital Life’. Roughly 270,000 people used this app and unwittingly shared their personal data, and that of their friends, with Cambridge Analytica. It has been estimated that the personal information of roughly 50  million Americans was harvested this way.  And Cambridge Analytica is not the only company collecting data on private citizens. Data has become an important component of our digital existence because people now expect customised search results and an online experience tailored to their personal needs, wants, and desires. This kind of customisation is not possible without extensive data collection."

Spear Phishing A Law Enforcement and Cross-Industry Perspective (EUROPOL, EC3 report, November, 2019)

This report is the result of the joint Advisory Group Meeting from March 26 – 27 2019, gathering over 70 representatives from private industry at Europol to discuss the threat of spear phishing. It contains the meeting’s main conclusions and recommendations for organisations on how to combat this threat effectively on a technical, educational, as well as operational level. It concludes that spear phishing is still the main attack vector for cybercriminals to target their victims and shows that there are a number of readily available solutions that can help minimise the risk of a successful attack. At the same time, this report highlights some of the challenges related to information sharing and the investigation of spear phishing attacks, as well as what can be done collectively to improve the situation.

"Phishing can be the vector for fraud, extortion, espionage or other malicious cyberattacks. It is an attack with a variety of sophistication and purpose used by malicious actors ranging from script kiddies and fraudsters to serious organised criminal groups and nation states."

It is often trivial to gather extensive knowledge about an organisation’s staff. LinkedIn, for instance, is an online professional networking platform and counts over 610 million users in over 200 countries worldwide11. Websites such as these (in addition to other, country-specific equivalents) provide large amounts of information about individuals and organisations of interest to potential attackers. Through connections to other members, role descriptions and publicly available CVs, it is possible to gain a detailed understanding not only about an organisation’s staff structure, but also identify potential interests of staff employees, which may subsequently be exploited. LinkedIn, in combination with tools such as hunter.io, additionally provides a significant resource for identifying corporate email addresses, which can then be targeted by spear phishing emails. Finally, data leaks of email addresses and passwords which are offered in batches on the dark web can provide an easy access for the criminal if basic cybersecurity hygiene practices are not followed. As will be shown in the following section, getting the target to trust the sender of the email is key to carrying out a successful spear phishing attack. And what sender is more trustworthy for employees than their own company’s CEO? 

The Bosnian Train and Equip Program: A Lesson in Interagency Integration of Hard and Soft Power by Christopher J. Lamb, with Sarah Arkin and Sally Scudder (Strategic Perspectives 15, INSS, 2014)

The Bosnian Train and Equip Program: A Lesson in Interagency Integration of Hard and Soft Power - by Christopher J. Lamb, with Sarah Arkin and Sally Scudder, (Strategic Perspectives 15,  Center for Strategic Research Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University - INSS, 2014)

"During the Presidential campaign of 1992, Bill Clinton promised to commit his administration to resolving the situation in Bosnia by bombing the Serbs if necessary. Shortly after taking office in early 1993, President Clinton commissioned a high level review of the Bosnia policy and then chose a “lift and strike policy”—lifting the arms embargo and employing limited air strikes against Serb targets. Staunch opposition from European allies effectively reversed that decision a month later. Congressional skepticism about military interventions also constrained the administration. In October 1993 President Clinton suffered a major foreign policy reversal as the humanitarian intervention in Somalia degenerated into large-scale fighting with significant American casualties. Shortly thereafter, the United States suffered another embarrassment in Haiti when anti-democratic forces forced a U.S. vessel carrying civic action teams to withdraw from the country. These events reinforced reluctance to intervene in a situation as complex as Bosnia. With congressional support weak and European opposition strong, the United States and NATO settled for targeted, minor airstrikes against Serb positions in November 1994. The Clinton administration also explored diplomatic options for conflict resolution and scored a success by brokering an agreement to end the Muslim-Croat conflict and create a Muslim-Croat Federation. In March 1994 the Washington Agreement formally brought the two warring ethnic factions together as a single political and geographic entity, divided into 10 cantons under the auspices of UNPROFOR. All government posts were to be split evenly between Croats and Bosniaks. A year later, however, President Clinton’s chief negotiator for Bosnia, Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, observed that the Federation “existed only on paper” and that “friction between the Croats and the Muslims was enormous.” The conflict dragged on into the spring of 1995, at which point it had already claimed 100,000 lives and produced more than a million refugees. On both ends of the U.S. political spectrum, concerns about the future of NATO as a strategic alliance and outrage over gross human rights abuses began to soften resistance to intervention. Foreign policy leaders such as Holbrooke believed “America’s post-World War II security role in Europe was at stake,” and news magazines with pictures of emaciated prisoners recalling Nazi concentration camps began to swing public sentiment in favor of some kind of intervention. In March the New York Times reported that a CIA report had concluded that “90 percent of the acts of ethnic cleansing were carried out by Serbs and that leading Serbian politicians almost certainly played a role in the crimes.” Over time U.S. Balkans policy was influenced less by the impression that all sides bore some responsibility and more by the view that Slobodan Milosevic was a “new Hitler” promoting nationalist aggression. He appeared determined to form a greater Serbia by using his superior military forces to annex territory in Bosnia and Croatia where Serbs lived and by “expelling or killing all inhabitants who were not Serbs, most egregiously [Bosniaks].” Increasing numbers of U.S. Government officials, members of Congress, and prominent newspaper editorialists called for action to help the persecuted Bosniak population. Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Richard Holbrooke and an interagency team conducted shuttle diplomacy in the Balkans to find a way forward toward a negotiated settlement, but Serb military advantages diminished incentives for compromises. One event in particular convinced Holbrooke and other Americans that more military force would be required to bring the Serbs to the negotiating table. In May 1995 NATO responded to Serb attacks on UN safe zones with “pinprick” air strikes as it did the previous year. This time, however, the Serbs took 350 UN peacekeepers hostage in response. Holbrooke encouraged the Clinton administration to increase the bombing, but the Europeans, particularly those countries whose soldiers were taken hostage, were opposed to using more airpower. The Clinton administration settled on a policy of containment and humanitarian relief while it worked other options quietly, including ways to shift the military balance among the three warring factions. While formally abiding by the UN arms embargo, which Clinton believed “unfairly and unintentionally penalized the victims in this conflict,” the United States tacitly allowed arms to flow to the Bosnians, mostly from majority-Muslim countries in the Middle East. U.S. diplomats made no effort to stop Croatia from allowing military supplies to reach Bosnia through Croatian territory, including transit of arms from Iran to Bosnian Muslim forces, thus circumventing the UN embargo and making an exception to the U.S. policy of isolating Iran. In addition the United States supported Croatia’s efforts to build up its military forces. The Department of State quietly approved nonlethal assistance to the Croatian Ministry of Defense through U.S. private sector military advisors. The U.S. company, Military Professional Resources, Inc. (MPRI), which was led by such notables as former U.S. Army Chief of Staff Carl Vuono, assisted the Croatian Ministry of Defense. During this period the United States lobbied its European allies for more forceful intervention, arguing that diplomacy would have to be supported by military force. Since Holbrooke’s mission took place against a backdrop of continuing violence, the United States could increasingly emphasize the moral case for intervention. Notorious mass killings of Bosniak civilians, including a mortar attack against the Markale marketplace in August 1995, increased support for intervention. The unquestionable tipping point, however, was the appalling massacre of more than 8,000 Bosniak men sheltered in the UN “safe zone” of Srebrenica in July 1995. Amidst widespread outrage over the horrific event, U.S. policymakers argued that such merciless disregard for human life and contempt for international peacekeeping forces called the continuing relevance of NATO into question and jeopardized transatlantic security relations. With European support for more forceful action growing, two August 1995 military developments finally pushed the Serbs to the negotiating table. First, with acquiescence from the United States and other allies, Croatia launched punishing offensives against the Serbs. The Croatian Army evicted Serb forces from the self-declared Republic of Serbian Krajina, producing a large number of Serb civilian casualties and refugee flows in the process. Then, operating in concert with Bosnian Army units around Bihac, Croatian forces routed the Serbs who were occupying other parts of Croatia and Bosnia. American leaders attempted to constrain Croatia, fearing the Croats, flush with success, would go too far and ignite a larger conflict.33 But both Holbrooke and Clinton would write in their memoirs that Serb military reverses were essential for bringing the Serbs to the negotiating table.34 In addition to the successful Croatian and Bosniak ground initiatives, NATO launched air strikes against the Republika Srpska and Serb targets on August 30 in Operation Deliberate Force. The Serbs stopped their attacks against Sarajevo after 11 days of air strikes."

International Society for Military Law and the Law of War - NEWSLETTER APRIL/MAY/JUNE 2007 (Iraq, Sudan, Kosovo, Serbia, ICTY. ICTR etc.)

International Society for Military Law and the Law of War - NEWSLETTER APRIL/MAY/JUNE 2007

EDITORIAL Dear Member, The topic of extraterritorial application of human rights obligations to external operations was chosen for the keynote discussion of our last Congress. The May 2007 decision of the European Court of Human Rights in the cases Behrami and Behrami v. France and Saramati v. France, Germany and Norway, constitutes a new and important element in the ongoing discussions, especially in the context of operations under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Both cases concern conduct of personnel of States Parties in the international civil and security presence in Kosovo. The Court held that is was not competent to review the acts of the States in question carried out on behalf of the UN. We are therefore very pleased to offer you in this newsletter inter alia a preliminary analysis of this decision. Ludwig Van Der Veken Secretary-General

Hrvati Bosne i Hercegovine — nositelji europskih vrijednosti? - zbornik radova (dvojeznička publikacija na hrvatskom i engleskom jeziku), mart, 2017

Hrvati Bosne i Hercegovine — nositelji europskih vrijednosti? ZNANSTVENO-STRUČNI SKUP S MEĐUNARODNIM SUDJELOVANJEM
Zbornik radova
Neum, 16. i 17. ožujka 2017

 "Republika Hrvatska je podržala referendum o samostalnosti i nezavisnosti BiH. Prva je uputila veleposlanika u Sarajevo. Bosna i Hercegovina, kao i Republika Hrvatska, bila je žrtva Miloševićeve velikosrpske agresije. Gotovo sva vojna i humanitarna pomoć Bošnjacima i Hrvatima u Bosni i Hercegovini došla je iz Republike Hrvatske ili preko Republike Hrvatske. Republika Hrvatska je, uz Sjedinjene Američke Države, najzaslužnija za zaustavljanje nesretnog hrvatsko-bošnjačkog sukoba, a u skladu sa Splitskom deklaracijom i za oslobođenje preko 20 posto teritorija Bosne i Hercegovine. Tijekom rata Republika Hrvatska je primila gotovo milijun izbjeglica iz Bosne i Hercegovine. Republika Hrvatska je potpisala Washingtonski i Daytonski sporazum te bitno pridonijela zaustavljanju rata i uspostavi mira u Bosni i Hercegovini. " - Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović, predsjednica Republike Hrvatske