utorak, 7. srpnja 2020.

'Nijedan narod u BiH ne upravlja tom zemljom. U zračnoj luci u Sarajevu dočekao me agent CIA-e', (Hassan Haidar Diab, 5.3.2019.)

https://www.vecernji.hr/premium/ni-jedan-narod-u-bih-ne-upravlja-tom-zemljom-u-zracnoj-luci-u-sarajevu-docekao-me-agent-cia-e-1304576


'Nijedan narod u BiH ne upravlja tom zemljom. U zračnoj luci u Sarajevu dočekao me agent CIA-e'

Šeik Ahmad Salek Kashani jedan je od najbližih suradnika iranskog ajatolaha Homeinija
 05. OŽUJKA 2019. U 16:28  34 KOMENTARA  9371 PRIKAZA 


Šeik Ahmad Salek Kashani i naš novinar Hassan Haidar Diab

Foto: Privatni album
POGLEDAJTE GALERIJU 1/2
Kad sam stigao u Sarajevo a u zračnoj luci dočekao me tajni agent CIA-e sa psom ovčarom i pitao po što sam došao u Sarajevo, potekle su mi suze. Pomislio sam, Bože moj, taj je narod toliko patio i dao tolike žrtve pa da na kraju bude američka kolonija... – počeo je razgovor za Večernji list 73-godišnji šeik Ahmad Salek Kashani, najmoćniji, najutjecajniji i najdugovječniji zastupnik u iranskom parlamentu, kojem su prije puta u Sarajevo savjetovali da ne putuje u svećeničkom odijelu, ali on ga je baš iz inata odjenuo kako bi vidio reakciju na svoj dolazak.
EKSKLUZIVNO IZ IRANAJedan nepromišljeni potez Irana, Izraela ili SAD-a zapalit će Bliski istok i šire
– Ako sam za vrijeme rata mogao tako putovati kroz Hrvatsku u BiH, zašto ne bih mogao sada u miru – rekao je i nastavio:
– U BiH došao sam za vrijeme rata. Više nije tajna da je Iran pomogao braći muslimanima u BiH. Dali smo im oružje, poslali im instruktore... Čak i naš najveći neprijatelj SAD priznaje da je naše oružje promijenilo vojnu ravnotežu u BiH. Sastao sam se tada s Alijom Izetbegovićem i u lice mu rekao: “Predsjedniče mi zauzvrat ništa ne tražimo niti želimo. Naše je moralno načelo pomoći braći muslimanima.” To je bio slogan i osnivača Islamske Republike ajatolaha Ruhollaha Homeinija koji je uvijek govorio da trebamo pomagati svim muslimanima, ali i nemuslimanima u nevolji te potlačenima. Kako sam obećao predsjedniku Izetbegoviću, tako je i bilo. Mi smo došli na njihov poziv i otišli kad su nam rekli da nas više ne trebaju.
Potom je šeik Kashani povišenim tonom nastavio govoriti da smjer kojim ide BiH nije dobar jer ni jedan narod u toj zemlji ne upravlja svojom državom, već se njome upravlja izvana.
Fateh, projektil (1)DEZFOULIran predstavio novi balistički projektil dometa 1000 km
– Kakva je to država kad Amerikanac odlučuje o svemu? Nažalost, Amerikanci nikada nisu bili prijatelji ni Bošnjacima ni drugim narodima u BiH. BiH može opstati samo ako njezin narod počne odlučivati o svojoj sudbini – uvjerava nas šeik Ahmad Salek Kashani koji je bio blizak prijatelj i suradnik osnivača Islamske Republike ajatolaha Ruhollaha Homeinija kao i jedan od osnivača najmoćnije i najelitnije vojne snage na Bliskom istoku, iranske Revolucionarne garde te njezina pričuvnog sastava Basij.
Sa šeikom Kashanijem razgovarali smo u njegovu stanu u Isfahanu, za koji kažu da je “pola svijeta”. Isfahan je čaroban grad, pun palača i karavansaraja, džamija i starih crkava koje posjetitelje ostavljaju bez daha, stoga nije čudo da ga godišnje posjeti više od pet milijuna stranih turista. Šeik Kashani živi skromno, u stanu u kakvom živi prosječan Iranac i ni po čemu se posebno ne ističe. Ono što ipak odaje da u tom stanu živi važna osoba stroge su sigurnosne mjere i tjelohranitelji koji su stalno uz njega. Koliki je autoritet šeik Kashani dokazuje i to da je jedan od razloga otkazivanja posjeta Iranu francuskom predsjedniku Emmanuelu Macronu bilo protivljenje upravo šeika Kashanija koji je kazao da Macron nije dobrodošao jer je, kako tvrdi, stao na stranu tlačitelja – SAD-a i Donalda Trumpa.
Imam Homeini ostat će zapamćen i među onima koji su ga voljeli i među svojim neprijateljima kao jedna od najkarizmatičnijih i najistaknutijih osoba u povijesti čovječanstva, ističe šeik Khasani | Autor : Privatni album//STRINGER/REUTERS/PIXSELLFoto: Privatni album//STRINGER/REUTERS/PIXSELLImam Homeini ostat će zapamćen i među onima koji su ga voljeli i među svojim neprijateljima kao jedna od najkarizmatičnijih i najistaknutijih osoba u povijesti čovječanstva, ističe šeik Khasani
– Ne može netko osuditi iransko testiranje balističkih raketa srednjeg dometa i smatrati to kršenjem međunarodnog sporazuma o iranskom nuklearnom programu te uputiti prijetnju Iranu i nakon toga doći u Iran tražiti posao za svoje kompanije. Bio sam jasan i rekao da Macron u Iranu nije dobrodošao i to je za mene završena priča. Iran ima pravo na testiranje raketa i na naoružanje. Zašto nas svi kritiziraju i napadaju zbog naoružanja, a mi nikome ništa ne činimo? Istodobno, nitko ništa takva ne govori Izraelu koji tlači i svakodnevno ubija palestinski narod, žene, djecu, naočigled svijeta i ne birajući sredstva? Umjesto osude, oni mu daju potporu i naoružanje. Kako sam vam rekao na početku, mi ćemo uvijek braniti potlačene diljem svijeta, bez obzira na vjeroispovijest, i u tome nas nitko ne može sprečavati – odlučan je šeik Kashani. Glavnu ulogu odigrao je i u dizanju pobune 1979. godine protiv šaha Reze Pahlavija.
IranBLISKI ISTOKIranski razvoj projektila zabrinjava čelnike Europske unije
Osuđen na doživotni zatvor
– Da šah nije svrgnut, danas bih ja još sjedio u zatvoru – govori šeik Kashani pijući čaj i ne obazirući se na mobitel koji mu nije prestao zvoniti otkad smo počeli razgovarati.
– Šah me osudio na doživotni zatvor jer sam, uz mnoge svećenike, pokrenuo pobunu protiv njega koju je izvana organizirao i vodio ajatolah Ruhollah Homeini. Dok sam bio u zatvoru u Shirazu, 18 časnika SAVAK-a izvršavalo je nada mnom svakodnevno 17 vrsta mučenja od devet ujutro do ponoći – prisjeća se i pokazuje nam tragove mučenja i ožiljke koji su mu ostali za cijeli život.
– SAVAK je, uz vojsku, žandarmeriju i policiju, bila najznačajnija poluga šahova sigurnosnog aparata koji je osnovan 1957. i stavljen pod zapovjednišvo njegova bliskog suradnika generala Nematollaha Nasserija. Cilj SAVAK-a bio je spriječiti svaku destabilizaciju i pokušaj rušenja režima, posebno od strane ljevičarskih skupina. Stoga je razvio razgranatu špijunsku mrežu te provodio masovna uhićenja protivnika režima, od kojih su mnogi potom nestali. Ja sam jedan od rijetkih koji je uspio preživjeti. U to vrijeme, podučavao sam filozofiju na fakultetu i imao 25 učenika. Mnogi profesori i zaposlenici u školi bili su tajni agenti SAVAK-a. Tako su pratili i osluškivali svako moje predavanje i nakon što su zaključili da govorim protiv šaha, uhitili su me, odveli na ispitivanje i brzinom munje osudili na doživotnu kaznu – svjedoči šeik Kashani i kaže da je jedva čekao rušenje šaha Reze Pahlavija jer su s njim svi resursi i bogatstvo Irana bili u rukama SAD-a i Izraela.


Case of Qasem Soleimani - Croatian journalist who met with killed Iranian general: A terrorist for some, a martyr for the others...(09.01.2020, danas.hr)

https://net.hr/danas/svijet/hrvatski-novinar-koji-je-upoznao-likvidiranog-iranskog-generala-za-jedne-terorist-za-druge-mucenik-ali-jednu-stvar-o-njemu-moramo-znati/?fbclid=IwAR3-XGFXB9dF7l6EqmvSP0Bz8cDKtYsaOVcm71bwJOIFvR3umO5oI2h6OSI

Case of Qasem Soleimani - Croatian journalist who met murdered Iranian general: A terrorist for some, a martyr for the others, but there is one thing that we have to know about him 

(based on the interview with Hassan Haidar Diab for RTL)

“However, the leader of Iran, Khamenei, was clear, that is only the first slap, but not the final revenge. Americans located in Iraq or Lebanon, are the targets of all Shia paramilitary formations calling themselves "the axis of resistance". When Soleimani was killed, it was emphasized that he was not only the martyr of Iran, but of the entire "axis of resistance". We may expect that Americans will be the targets of attack of these paramilitary attacks. Just remember when in the 80s, over 300 Americans were killed in Lebanon by Hizbullah, but also when the US Embassy was attacked", Hassan Haidar Diab says. In the Iranian attack on two American military bases in Iraq, there were no victims, and some analysts claim that obviously they did not plan to kill anybody. "Of course, the U.S. will claim that they did not plan to kill anybody, but it is clear that, after general Soleimani was liquidated and the threats we had witnessed, Americans are at the highest level of alert and that is why they have practically emptied the military bases" ... "However, it is incredible to me, that Donald Trump said that the damages were not significant. That does not make sense - 10 missiles hit the bases, that is not insignificant damage", Diab (Vecernji List journalist) says. 


    


SLUČAJ KASIMA SULEJMANIJA

HRVATSKI NOVINAR KOJI JE UPOZNAO UBIJENOG IRANSKOG GENERALA: ‘Za jedne terorist, za druge mučenik, ali jednu stvar o njemu moramo znati…’

“Međutim, vođa Irana Hamnei je bio jasan, to je prva pljuska, no ne i konačna osveta. Amerikanci koji se nalaze u Iraku ili Libanonu, mete su svih paravojnim šijitskih formacija koje se nazivaju ‘osovinama otpora’. Kad je ubijen Sulejmani, rečeno je da nije mučenik samo Irana već cijele ‘osovine otpora’. Možemo očekivati da će Amerikanci biti mete napada tih paravojnih napada. Sjećamo se kako je osamdesetih Hezbolah ubio u Libanonu više od 300 Amerikanaca, ali i kad je napadnuto američko veleposlanstvo”, naglašava Hassan Haidar Diab. U napadu Iranaca na dvije američke vojne baze u Iraku žrtava nije bilo, a neki analitičari tvrde da očito nikoga nisu ni planirali ubiti. “Naravno, SAD će tvrditi da nikoga nisu željeli ubiti, ali evidentno je da nakon likvidacije generala Sulejmanija i prijetnji kojima smo svjedočili, Amerikanci su na najvišem nivou stanja pripravnosti i zato su praktički ispraznili baze"... "Ipak, meni je nevjerojatno da je Donald Trump rekao da šteta nije značajna. To nema smisla, deset projektila pogodilo je baze, to nije mala stvar”, govori novinar Večernjeg lista.


Jesu li željeli nekoga ubiti?

U napadu Iranaca na dvije američke vojne baze u Iraku žrtava nije bilo, a neki analitičari tvrde da očito nikoga nisu ni planirali ubiti. “Naravno, SAD će tvrditi da nikoga nisu željeli ubiti, ali evidentno je da nakon likvidacije generala Sulejmanija i prijetnji kojima smo svjedočili, Amerikanci su na najvišem nivou stanja pripravnosti i zato su praktički ispraznili baze.
Amerikanci mete paravojnih napada
Rohani je najavio odmazdu, no Haidar Diab misli da je to sve što se tiče Irana kao države. “Međutim, vođa Irana Hamnei je bio jasan, to je prva pljuska, no ne i konačna osveta. Amerikanci koji se nalaze u Iraku ili Libanonu, mete su svih paravojnim šijitskih formacija koje se nazivaju ‘osovinama otpora’. Kad je ubijen Sulejmani, rečeno je da nije mučenik samo Irana već cijele ‘osovine otpora’. Možemo očekivati da će Amerikanci biti mete napada tih paravojnih napada. Sjećamo se kako je osamdesetih Hezbolah ubio u Libanonu više od 300 Amerikanaca, ali i kad je napadnuto američko veleposlanstvo”, naglašava Hassan Haidar Diab.
Međutim, ne vjeruje da će doći do rata. “Odmah sam rekao da je to sve previše naglašeno, nitko nema interesa za rat. Donald Trump je odmah nakon ubojstva generala Sulejmanija rekao da ima ciljane mete ako ih Iran napadne, a danas je u izjavama povukao ručnu.”

Susret sa Sulejmanijem

Haidar Diab dvaput je sreo generala Kasima Sulejmanija. “Za neke je mučenik, za neke  terorist. Za Izrael, Saudijsku Arabiju i SAD je terorist, ali mi moramo znati jednu stvar… Najveće zasluge za poraz ISIL-a ima Sulejmani. To znaju i Amerikanci pa mi je bilo nevjerojatno slušati Trumpa kako hvali svoju vojsku, a govori da je Sulejmani terorist. On uvijek misli da ljudi ne znaju, a svi znaju kolike zasluge imaju Iran, Rusija i sirijski režim, pa i šijitska paravojna organizacija. Bili su mu saveznici”, kazao je Haidar Diab.
Prisjetio se i susreta sa Sulejmanijem 2016. i 2017. godine.
“Sreo sam ga 2016. i 2017. pa smo pričali jer fenomenalno govori arapski. Zvali su ga živim mučenikom jer mu je najveća želja bila umrijeti mučeničkom smrću. Na odlasku bih mu rekao kako se molim za njega, a on bi mi odgovorio neka se molim da pogine kao mučenik. A sad… Što je mučenik? Ne želim biti sudac. Ako je već porazio najveće zločince i najveće ubojice, je li mučenik ili terorist? Svi znaju da zahvaljujući njemu mi u Europi možemo odahnuti jer je likvidirao desetke tisuće džihadista”, zaključio je novinar Večernjeg lista za RTL.

nedjelja, 5. srpnja 2020.

Igor Bavčar: S prevzemom ministrstva sem prišel v središčno točko partijskega režima (Novice, 1. 6. 2016)

https://siol.net/novice/slovenija/igor-bavcar-s-prevzemom-ministrstva-sem-prisel-v-srediscno-tocko-partijskega-rezima-418716?fbclid=IwAR27nGel5qbbFxe0NA7k_07VOXKIWCHqrhD5o4bWT9MsDMvacug3j12pIM0

Naš protielitizem nasprotuje tudi tistemu pozitivnemu smislu elite, ki jo za uspe­šen razvoj potrebuje vsaka družba, o vzpostavljanju nove gospodarske elite v času osamosvajanja pravi takratni notranji minister Igor Bavčar.
Štiri tedne pred dnevom državnosti 25. junija dnevno objavljamo izseke intervjujev z osebnostmi, ki so pomembno vplivale na slovensko osamosvojitev. Pogovori so zbrani v knjigi Boštjana Furlana, Ožbeja Peterleta in Marka Balažica Slovenija in pika!, ki bo pri Cankarjevi založbi izšla 15. junija.

Danes objavljamo dele pogovora z republiškim sekretarjem za notranje zadeve v Demosovi vladi Igorjem Bavčarjem.

Kaj za vas pomeni krilatica "sestop z oblasti"?
Odločitev za volitve je padla ob pričakovanju, da jim bo skozi formo svobodne politične volje uspelo podaljšati obstanek na oblasti. Z volilnim rezultatom koalicije Demos se jim ta račun ni izšel. A naša nesposobnost in napačna ocena, do kam smo pri prehodu v nov sistem prišli, sta omogočili, da je bil ta sestop z oblasti v resnici navidezen. Neizvedene reforme so omogočile, da je velik del partijske nomenklature preživel, tako v državni administraciji kot v pravosodju, tudi v medijih. Ostala je naklonjenost državnemu lastništvu, ki se enostavno ne more posloviti.
naslovnica
Danes poslušam očitke, da nismo izvedli lustracije. Takrat sem admini­strativno upokojil nekaj sto uslužbencev SDV-ja, tudi takšne s štiridesetimi leti. Demos na tej točki ni mogel priti do soglasja. Fokusiranje na lustracijo pred osamosvojitvijo bi pripeljalo do nevarnega razdora.
Prav tako je treba upoštevati, da smo prišli tako rekoč z ulice. Lojze Peterle je bil raziskovalec na nekem inštitutu, Janša in jaz sva bila mala podjetnika, potem so bili tu v glavnem profesorji, pisatelji, kulturniki. Nekateri smo imeli vsaj nekaj šole z ZSMS-ja, kar se je poznalo pri operacionalizaciji osamosva­janja. Nismo imeli Tomáša Masaryka, ki je naredil češko zgodbo s propadom K.u.K. imperija (Kaiserliche und Königliche Monarchie, Cesarska in kraljeva monarhija, op. a.). Stvari smo dobesedno delali sproti.
"Zelo težko je bilo premakniti ovire v glavah. Med drugim sem vodil projektno skupino za meje. Ko sem svojim ljudem povedal, da potrebujemo koncept za vzpostavitev južne meje, so me debelo gledali." (foto: Tone Stojko, hrani: Muzej novejše zgodovine Slovenije)"Zelo težko je bilo premakniti ovire v glavah. Med drugim sem vodil projektno skupino za meje. Ko sem svojim ljudem povedal, da potrebujemo koncept za vzpostavitev južne meje, so me debelo gledali." (foto: Tone Stojko, hrani: Muzej novejše zgodovine Slovenije) Foto: Tone Stojko
Učenje ob delu?
Tako je. Dan pred dogovorjenim formalnim prevzemom funkcije sva šla z Janšo v ministrske kabinete, ker smo popoldne izvedeli za odvzem orožja. Ko sem prišel, je vratarja skoraj kap. V moji bodoči pisarni ni bilo nikogar. V odprtem sefu je bila samo študija Analiza Ministarstva unutranjih poslova o delovanju Gestapa. V blagajni mi je predhodnik Tomaž Ertl pustil eno "reichsmarko" s Hitlerjevo podobo. Tam je bil kup telefonov. Poklical sem stalno službo in se je vendarle nekdo prikazal (smeh). Po prevzemu skoraj pol leta nisem mogel dobiti načelnika SDV-ja. Med desetimi kandidati ni bilo junaka, ki bi prevzel to nalogo. Končno sem našel Miho Brejca.
Večinoma smo imeli zelo naivne predstave o teh državnih zadevah. Zelo težko je bilo premakniti ovire v glavah. Med drugim sem vodil projektno skupino za meje. Ko sem svojim ljudem povedal, da potrebujemo koncept za vzpostavitev južne meje, so me debelo gledali. Ko sem to povedal hrvaškemu ministru Josipu Boljkovcu, pa je rekel: "Pa kakva granica. Ste vi ludi? Pa šta vam je? Pa daj. Ma nemoj sada to. To će biti sami problemi." (Kakšna meja! Ste nori? Kaj vam pa je? Dajte, nehajte! Same težave bodo s tem.) (smeh)
/…/
"Administrativno sem upokojil čez 300 ljudi. Najbolj moteče pa je bilo, ko sem jih razorožil in jim vzel policijska pooblastila.""Administrativno sem upokojil čez 300 ljudi. Najbolj moteče pa je bilo, ko sem jih razorožil in jim vzel policijska pooblastila." Foto: Matjaž Rušt
Ertl je aprila 1988 na sestanku v Beogradu poročal, da so v preteklem letu slovenskemu političnemu vodstvu poslali 127 informacij o »meščanski desnici«. Kako ste se lotili preobrazbe politične policije, namenjene pregonu slo­venskih državljanov, v obveščevalno službo, namenjeno zaščiti slovenskih državljanov?
Lotil sem se prijemov, ki niso bili epohalni, bili pa so zelo učinkoviti. Prepovedal sem uporabo vmesnih delilnikov. To so posebne sobe, ki še vedno obstajajo na vseh slovenskih poštah. Tja so speljani vsi kabli za telefonsko ko­munikacijo. Prepovedal sem uporabo Siemensove centrale pod Cankarjevim domom in "uherjev". To so bile vrhunske naprave za prisluškovanje in snemanje pogovorov. "Uher" so bile takrat sanje vsakega novinarja. Udba jih je imela 400.
Vodja oddelka za prisluškovanje je bil Srečko Brišar. Spominjam se, kako mi je polepšal dan, ko ni mogel priti na razgovor zaradi vnetega ušesa. Šef prisluškovanja na SDV-ju ima vnetje ušesa! Zdelo se mi je neznansko zabavno. Mislil sem si, Bog je!
Administrativno sem upokojil čez 300 ljudi. Najbolj moteče pa je bilo, ko sem jih razorožil in jim vzel policijska pooblastila. Potem sem počasi začel iskati nove ljudi, kar je potekalo res počasi.
/…/
Ali je obstajala želja po zamenjavi starih ekonomskih elit?
T. i. obračun s starimi gospodarskimi elitami je bil načrtovan, a bi zame­njavo gospodarskih elit težko izvedli tudi zato, ker je slovensko gospodarstvo relativno uspešno zamenjalo trge. Ne pozabimo, da smo imeli takrat enako število brezposelnih, kot jih imamo danes, a smo zadeve hitro sanirali. Ta ekonomija namreč ni bila tako centralno vodena, kot se nam je mogoče zdelo, ampak je imela neko določeno svobodo že takrat.
"Spominjam se, da sem v kampanji predlagal, da bi zagovarjali predajo upravljanja KAD-a in SOD-a tujim družbam. Saj so me skoraj odslovili!""Spominjam se, da sem v kampanji predlagal, da bi zagovarjali predajo upravljanja KAD-a in SOD-a tujim družbam. Saj so me skoraj odslovili!" Foto: Matej Leskovšek
Tukaj ni čarobne paličice. Govorimo o procesu, ki je praktično enak večstoletni prvotni akumulaciji, iz katere je nastal kapitalistični sistem. Pogovarjamo se o 25 oziroma 10 letih, ko bi se to moralo zgoditi. Kaj takega se ne more zgoditi brez radikalnih družbenih konfliktov. Zato je tudi današnje dogajanje, z vsemi očitki v zvezi s privatizacijo, povsem logično.
Slovenci tudi nismo imeli resne gospodarske elite v diaspori, ki bi bila sposobna pomembno poseči na slovenski trg kapitala. Predvojni kapital je bil pretežno nemški, češki, italijanski … Malo je bilo slovenskega, in še tega je komunistična oblast ne le odvzela, ampak je lastnike celo fizično iztrebila. Čeprav je velika večina podpirala odpor, jim to ni kaj dosti pomagalo. Naš protielitizem nasprotuje tudi tistemu pozitivnemu smislu elite, ki jo za uspe­šen razvoj potrebuje vsaka družba. Imeli smo kulturno elito, a to ni dovolj. Mešanica vsega tega je privedla do našega zaostajanja v tranziciji.
Ko smo z LDS-om leta 2000 premočno zmagali, smo nekateri hoteli v radikalne reforme. A posluha ni bilo niti znotraj LDS-a niti pri Drnovšku. Bil je prepričan, da smo zgodba o uspehu. V veliki meri smo v LDS-u sami generirali in spodbujali prepričanje, da ne potrebujemo resnejših reform. Spominjam se, da sem v kampanji predlagal, da bi zagovarjali predajo upravljanja KAD-a in SOD-a tujim družbam. Saj so me skoraj odslovili!
/.../
"Zdaj vidim, da Kučan vleče vzporednice med pobojem domobrancev in izbrisanimi, kar se mi zdi skrajno odurno.""Zdaj vidim, da Kučan vleče vzporednice med pobojem domobrancev in izbrisanimi, kar se mi zdi skrajno odurno." Foto: Bor Slana
Ko ste bili notranji minister, je prišlo do izbrisa. Bi se danes odločili enako?
Sprejemam stališče Ustavnega in Evropskega sodišča. Ne želim se opra­vičevati, vendar bi rad opozoril, da je vlada podprla amandma poslanke Mencinove, a je večina v parlamentu glasovala proti njemu. Po drugi strani so imeli ti ljudje možnost, da bi v nekem obdobju uredili svoj status. Nekateri so se celo javno opredelili proti temu, kar je na drugi strani spodbujalo zelo žolčne reakcije. Veliko je bilo nespretnosti administracije notranjega mini­strstva oziroma upravnih enot, ki so ljudi obravnavale kot po tekočem traku.
Žal mi je, da je do izbrisa prišlo. Ne bom trdil, da zadeva ni bila problematična, vendar bi bila v veliki meri rešljiva zgolj z angažmajem ljudi, ki jih je zadela. Obstaja del ljudi, ki tega niso vedeli. Je pa tudi del ljudi, ki namenoma niso hoteli prevzeti slovenskega državljanstva.
/.../
Bili ste prvi minister za evropske zadeve v Sloveniji. Kako ste vodili procese približevanja EU-ju?
Zdi se mi, da smo zadevo izvedli optimalno. Ves čas sem imel probleme z našim lastnim razmišljanjem, ne z EU-jem. V ta klub smo šele vstopali, pa so hoteli mnogi že na začetku menjati pravila za klub. Seveda pa v tem klubu niso bili zainteresirani za takšne ideje. Takrat sem spoznal celo vrsto procesov, ki mi prej niso bili poznani.
V rubriki 25 let Slovenije predstavljamo zgodbe iz časa slovenskega osamosvajanja in dogodke, ki so na drug način povezani s časom pred 25 leti. Brali boste lahko o dogodkih ob osamosvojitvi in njihovih akterjih, o tem, kakšno je bilo življenje v tistem času, kakšna je bila povprečna plača in kaj je bilo mogoče kupiti zanjo, s kakšnimi vozili smo se prevažali Slovenci, kdo so uspešni posamezniki, rojeni v žlahtnem letu 1991, in druge prispevke, povezane s slovensko petindvajsetico.

subota, 4. srpnja 2020.

President Clinton's Remarks at Portrait Unveiling of Former Secretary of State Warren Christopher (March, 1999)

https://clintonwhitehouse4.archives.gov/WH/New/html/19990330-1371.html

THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate ReleaseMarch 30, 1999



REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT
AT PORTRAIT UNVEILING OF SECRETARY WARREN CHRISTOPHER

The State Department

1:47 P.M. EST
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you very much. Secretary Albright, Chris, Marie, other members of the Cabinet who are here -- Secretary Rubin, Secretary Shalala. We thank very much Tunky Riley and Hattie Babbitt for being here. And were glad that Tom and Oya are here, and past and present officials of the State Department, other distinguished guests.
I would like to begin by saying that it is ironic, but perhaps appropriate, that we are unveiling the portrait of this truly wonderful, distinguished American who did so much to bring peace to Bosnia, at a time when we are engaged in a struggle for peace in Kosovo. I hope you'll just let me say a word about that.
The NATO military operation is continuing today against an expanded range of targets, including Serbian forces on the ground in Kosovo. The allies are united in our outrage over President Milosevic's atrocities against innocent people. We are determined to stay with our policy. As President Chirac said yesterday, what is happening today must strengthen our resolution.
Countries from throughout the Balkans, from Greece to Turkey to Romania to Bulgaria, are helping us to meet the mounting humanitarian crisis. We are all dealing today with the same horrible pattern of conduct we saw in Bosnia. We saw that conduct resume in 1998 in Kosovo, when a quarter of a million innocent people were driven from their homes. We saw it escalate in January and February of this year, as Serbian forces, in violation of the agreement the President had made last October, moved from village to village and atrocity to atrocity, while their leaders pretended to negotiate for peace in France.
Now it is clear that as the Kosovar leaders were saying yes to peace, Mr. Milosevic was planning a new campaign of expulsions and executions in Kosovo. He started carrying out that plan as the talks ended, increasing our sense of urgency that the air strikes NATO had threatened for some time must begin.
Now, lamentably, we have credible reports that his troops are singling out for murder the moderate Kosovar leaders who supported a peaceful solution. Refugees are streaming out, clearly shaken by what they have seen. Altogether, since the conflict started last year, more than half a million people have been forced from their homes.
If there was ever any doubt about what is at stake in Kosovo, Mr. Milosevic is certainly erasing it by his actions. They are the culmination of more than a decade of using ethnic and religious hatred as a justification for uprooting and murdering completely innocent, peaceful civilians to pave Mr. Milosevic's path to absolute power.
The NATO air campaign is designed to raise the price of that policy. Today, he faces the mounting cost of his continued aggression. For a sustained period, he will see that his military will be seriously diminished, key military infrastructure destroyed, the prospect of international support for Serbia's claim to Kosovo increasingly jeopardized.
We must remain steady and determined, with the will to see this through.
I can't think of anyone whose life and career and personality those words -- "steady, determined, the will to see this through" -- I can't think of anyone those words apply better to than Warren Christopher. No worked harder than he did to bring an end to the bloody war in Bosnia. No one worked harder than he did to galvanize the unity in our NATO Alliance that has allowed us to act with resolve today, and gave us the vision to take on new members and new members in the aftermath of the Cold War.
It took time to forge a just peace in Bosnia, because Chris and his team were persistent and prevailed. We must be as persistent today as we were then in pursuit of peace.
He was our first post-Cold War Secretary of State, our first chief diplomat in over 50 years who faced, as Madeleine recently said, the challenge of defining our foreign policy in a world without a single, overriding threat to our security. But he saw that, as did I, as a great opportunity. He was determined to make sure that we maintained our leadership in the world, consistent with our values, our interests and our tradition, and that we remained alive to the new possibilities for peace and prosperity and security that this new world brings.
From the first days of 1993, he was a whirlwind of activity. I like to say -- I used to kid him that he really weighed 250 pounds when he became Secretary of State and he just worked it off. But that's not true. He got up every morning and went running to wake up and get his exercise, and he never stopped running.
He advanced the peace process in the Middle East, from the unforgettable signing on the South Lawn in 1993 to the peace between Israel and Jordan in the Wadi Araba, to the countless days and nights of hard work to keep the process alive through hope and despair after the death of our friend, Prime Minister Rabin.
He led our efforts to secure the agreed framework with North Korea to achieve a secure peace on the Korean Peninsula, to make the Dayton Agreement first a reality. He shepherded our alliances in Europe and Asia into a new historical era.
He tried to bring new unity to our diplomacy, between our diplomatic, our military and our economic strategies, aggressively supporting NAFTA and GATT. He helped us to reach out to the rest of the world in new and innovative ways, through the Asian Pacific Economic Leaders meeting, the Summit of the Americas, the first White House Conference on Africa.
He understood how important it was for us to maintain and intensify our partnership with Russia, and we did a lot of good things together in those four years. More than any other previous Secretary of State, he understood that protecting the environment would become an increasingly important area of international security, requiring greater international cooperation. He put the environment where it belongs in the 21st century -- in the mainstream of our diplomacy.
Like his successor, Chris also fought tenaciously for the resources the State Department needs to do the job you do so well.
Now, Chris had about the lowest ratio of ego to accomplishment of any public servant I've ever worked with. And we can all say these noble things about him. It's true, he never thought you had to hit below the belt to get above the fold in the morning newspaper. He was always willing to go the extra mile for peace, and is now the most-traveled Secretary of State in our history -- though Madeleine seems determined to overtake him. (Laughter.)
All that is true. But just remember one thing: People ask me all the time, how did you ever decide to make Warren Christopher your first Secretary of State? And I said, you know, I don't know, it just sort of came to me in the transition process -- which Warren Christopher ran. (Laughter.) It is a great mistake to underestimate this man. (Laughter.)
Near the end of his book, "In the Stream of History," Chris reveals that he is not fond of emotional good-byes. I have tried with some difficulty to honor his preference. But I'd like to just mention a couple of things from the book because they particularly touched me. He confesses his admiration in the book for George Marshall and Dean Acheson -- two World War II generation public servants who defeated formidable foes, but had the foresight to commit America to continued leadership in a new world.
In his farewell address to the State Department, he summoned their memory. I suspect that his admiration stems from the fact that they were Americans who put the needs of their country above their own; who are modest when they could be, but forceful when they had to be; who possessed the stamina and the steel to accomplish things that were truly extraordinary. He has all those qualities.
And I can tell you, every day I remain grateful that somehow, some way, a few years ago our paths crossed. We became friends and allies. I don't think I've ever known anyone with quite the degree of selfless devotion to public service and aggressive pursuit of the nation's interest put into one compact, brilliant person that I have seen in Warren Christopher.
I am honored by his service and by his friendship. And I thank you all for being here today to unveil his portrait.
Thank you very much. (Applause.)
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: Mr. President, Secretary Albright, ladies and gentlemen. Even when the artist is a man like Raymond Kinsler, someone full of courtesy and very good conversation, having your portrait painted is a strange experience -- and it hasn't gotten any stranger. (Laughter.)
At the same time, to anyone who has served in Washington, there is something oddly familiar about it: first, you're painted into a corner, then you're hung out to dry -- (laughter) -- and, finally, you're framed. (Laughter and applause.)
Mr. President, I was surprised and greatly honored that you found time to join us today. It has occurred to me several times that our tradition might well have been to depict institutions, rather than individuals, in the portraits that hang in this Department. If there were a tradition of commissioning paintings of our government and society at various moments in history, painting a picture of this administration's accomplishments, President Clinton's administration's accomplishment would be a great challenge for any artist. How would one convey on canvas America's unparalleled strength and prosperity at this moment, while simultaneously communicating that under the stewardship of this President, we've remained the most caring nation on Earth?
Mr. President, I'm afraid that even my friend, Raymond Kinsler, wouldn't be up to capturing all that you've achieved for America in this century. (Applause.)
I want to turn now to my host, Secretary Albright, and thank her for those exceedingly generous remarks. Psychologists tell us that twins have a special empathy for each other. A twin is said to be affected by any major event in the life of the other, even if it happens halfway around the world. Well, I have that kind of relationship with Madeleine Albright. When she flies to Beijing via Anchorage, then on to Thailand and Indonesia, and from there around the world to London, I feel as if I were with her. When she gets off the plane in London and has to steel herself for protests from Robin Cook over bananas -- (laughter) -- I sense it in my sleep in California. (Laughter.)
Madeleine, I feel your pain -- (laughter) -- and I don't even have to do my hair every morning. (Laughter.)
Madeleine is a remarkable Secretary of State. She's blazed a trail through the most challenging political and social terrain of our time. When I go to a university these days, I've found young women who tell me that they want to be Secretary of State, and thanks to Madeleine, they know that that's possible. Many are even brave enough to ask hard questions to grizzled old diplomats like me in the presence of their male counterparts. Madeleine, you get credit for all of that.
Joining the pantheon of former Secretaries on the wall of the Department inevitably prompts me to reflect on the accomplishments of some of my predecessors. Our first Secretary, Thomas Jefferson, went on to become President. Each of the next three Presidents -- Madison, Monroe, and John Quincy Adams -- first served as Secretary of State. Two of the later Presidents -- Martin Van Buren and James Buchanan -- were also elected as President after serving as Secretary of State.
But since 1850, no Secretary has gone on to be President. Madeleine might well have been the person to restore that grand tradition, but she is up against one obstacle that perhaps is even more formidable than she is -- the Constitution.
During most of the 19th century there was a balance of power in Europe that produced a degree of order and stability. In that period the role of the Secretary of State was mainly to make sure that Europe didn't meddle in our affairs or stifle our growth. For example, a central tenant of Secretary Seward's diplomacy was simple: keep the Europeans out of our civil war.
The 20th century has dramatically expanded the Secretary's role. Two world wars propelled the United States into a position of leadership in the free world, and, fortunately, our 20th century Secretaries were up to the challenge of ensuring America would ultimately triumph over communism -- democracy over communism.
When the Cold War was over the role of the Secretary became more, rather than less, challenging. The rise of global economies, extraordinary advances in technology -- both life enhancing and life threatening -- have greatly complicated the job of the nation's chief diplomat.
Madeleine, I'm glad to have been in your chair when things were a little easier.
I want to close with a word of thanks to the President; to Madeleine for hosting this lovely event; and to all of you for coming; and to the artist, Raymond Kinsler, for his special contribution, one that means more to me than perhaps he knows. Let me explain for just a second.
During the time I was Secretary, I worked to convince the media to adjust their view of my lifestyle and personal style. I had partial success. I remember the one paper which seemed particularly inclined to characterize me as an unspontaneous technocrat, published a nice photograph of me visiting the Sphinx in Egypt. (Laughter.) I was quite pleased until I noticed the caption identified me as the one on the right. (Laughter.) Don't get me wrong, I appreciated the effort. (Laughter.) But thanks to Raymond Kinsler, reporters of the future will be able to tell which one is the Sphinx. (Laughter.)
Thank you all very much. (Applause.)




Meeting New Security Challenges, Anthony Lake (1996)



https://clintonwhitehouse5.archives.gov/WH/EOP/NSC/html/speeches/tlgwu.html

Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Remarks at George Washington University

March 6, 1996


"Defining Missions, Setting Deadlines: Meeting New Security Challenges in the Post-Cold War World"

I want to speak with you today about the most difficult issue any President has to address: when to use American force and to put young Americans in harm's way abroad. This is a good time for this discussion. Six weeks from now, the last of more than 20,000 American troops assigned to the U.N. mission in Haiti will come home. About an equal number are serving in Bosnia to help keep the hard won peace there. Both missions reflect answers to difficult questions about whento use force -- and especially how to use it.
Let me start by putting my thoughts in a larger context. Halfway between the end of the Cold War and the start of a new century, we're living a moment of very real hope. Our nation is secure. Our economy is strong. All around the world more people live free and at peace than ever before.
But the promise of this moment is also matched by its perils -- as the desperate and despicable acts of the enemies of peace in the Middle East have shown over the last week. Old threats like ethnic and religious violence and aggression by rogue states have taken on new and dangerous dimensions. And no one is immune to a host of equal opportunity destroyers: the spread of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking, environmental degradation. Individually, each could undermine our growing security. Together, they have the potential to cause terrible chaos around the world and in our own society.
Faced with both the promise and the problems of our time, there are those -- on both the left and the right and in both political parties -- who would have America retreat from its responsibilities.
Some proclaim that America must stay engaged -- but they then would deny us the tools and the resources to match their rhetoric. These backdoor isolationists would stop us from working with others to share the risks and the costs of engagement. They would gut our diplomatic readiness and cut our assistance to those who take risks for peace around the world. They fail to recognize that the global trend toward democracy and free markets -- and the opportunities it creates for our people -- is neither inevitable nor irreversible. It needs our support, our resources and our leadership.
Others -- call them neo-know-nothings -- argue that with the Cold War won, it's safe to return to a Fortress America. It is not the American way to retreat or refuse to compete. We can't build a wall high enough or dig a moat deep enough to keep out the threats to our well- being -- or to isolate ourselves from the global economy. As President Clinton said in his State of the Union address this year, we must confront these challenges now -- or we will pay a much higher price for our indifference later.
The century that we have seen makes this truth very clear. After World War I, America withdrew from the world -- leaving a vacuum that was filled by the forces of hatred and tyranny and we paid the price in World War II.. After World War II, we stayed involved, we worked with others and we led -- patiently, persistently and pragmatically. And we helped create the institutions that secured half a century of security and prosperity for us all.
For the past three years, the Clinton Administration has built upon this bipartisan legacy of leadership by reducing the nuclear threat, supporting peacemakers, spreading democracy and opening markets. And I'm proud of the results -- for our own people and for people around the world.
We stayed engaged with Russia and the other states of the former Soviet Union -- despite our differences -- because it is in the interests of the American people that we do so. Today, American cities and American citizens no longer live under direct targeting of Russian missiles. Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan are giving up the nuclear weapons left on their land when the Soviet Union collapsed. We are safeguarding nuclear materials and destroying nuclear weapons so they don't wind up in the wrong hands. And, we have taken the lead in securing, extending or promoting landmark arms control agreements: START I and II, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention.
We applied steady, patient pressure to North Korea. Now, it has frozen its dangerous nuclear weapons program.
We're waging a tough counter-terrorism campaign with stronger laws; increased funding, manpower and training for law enforcement; sanctions against states that sponsor terrorism and closer cooperation with foreign governments. Now, those responsible for the World Trade Center bombing are behind bars. We've foiled attacks on New York City and on our airliners abroad, and we've tracked down terrorists and brought them to justice around the world.
We sent our troops, ships and planes to the Persian Gulf when Saddam Hussein moved his forces closer to the Kuwaiti border. Now, Kuwait remains safe and the world's energy supply secure.
We backed diplomacy with force in Haiti. Now, the dictators are gone. Haiti has celebrated the first democratic transfer of power in its 200-year history, and the flood of refugees to our shores has ended.
Our troops are standing up for peace in Bosnia. Now, its playgrounds are no longer killing fields. A dangerous fire at the heart of Europe is not raging as it had been for four years. The Bosnian people now have their first real chance for peace.
We are standing with those who are taking risks for peace -- very real risks for peace -- through good times, and as in the Middle East now, through bad times.
Now, in Northern Ireland, the determination of Prime Minister Major and Prime Minister Bruton is pushing the peace process back on track -- and a date certain for negotiations and, we hope, a new cease-fire is on its way.
In the Middle East, we know, tragically, that fanatics will stop at nothing to kill the hope for peace. As you know, the President has ordered a series of steps to express our complete support for the peacemakers as they combat terrorism.
We must also not lose sight of the tremendous progress that has been made toward a comprehensive peace -- or the fact that the overwhelming majority of people, Palestinians and Israelis, want peace. We will not rest until that desire becomes a reality.
What the terrorists want here is what we must not give them. We are going to be very tough and absolutely steadfast in the way we stand with Israel and the way we help the Palestinian Authority combat terrorism. But what the terrorists are trying to do is get us, in the process, to abandon the possibilities for peace itself, and to give up on peace. To abandon the peace process now in our very legitimate and natural anger at what has happened would be to do precisely what the terrorists want -- it would give them the victory, a victory that must be ours.
And we negotiated a better deal for America as we opened markets abroad. Now, our exports are at an all time high and hundreds of thousands more Americans have jobs at home. With Japan alone, this Administration has completed 20 specific trade agreements. The sectors covered by those agreements -- from auto parts to medical equipment -- have seen their exports increase by 80 percent. That's almost twice as much as exports from other sectors -- which are also growing fast.
Not one of these achievements came about easily or automatically. They happened for a number of reasons. First, because we kept our military strong while adapting our alliance to new demands. Because we acted with others where we could and alone where we had to. Because we were patient enough to stick with diplomacy but prepared to use force. Because we rejected isolationism but refused to become the world's policeman. Because in each and every instance, we brought together our interests and values, and we acted where we could make a difference.
Some people, in a curious bit of nostalgia for the Cold War, complain that our policy lacks a single, overarching principle -- that it can't be summed up on a bumper sticker. But while we are operating in a radically new international environment, America's fundamental mission endures. The same ideas that were under attack by Communism, and before that by Fascism, remain under attack today as we are seeing in the Middle East. Now, as then, we are defending an idea that has many names -- tolerance, liberty, civility, pluralism -- but shows a constant face: the face of the democratic society. Now, as then, our special role in the world is to defend, enlarge and strengthen the community of democratic nations against all of these new threats and seizing these new opportunities.
Let me be very clear that in pursuing this mission, our interests and ideals converge. We know from experience that democracies rarely go to war with one another or abuse the rights of their people. They make for better trading partners. And each one is a potential ally in the struggle against the forces of hatred and intolerance -- whether those forces take the shape of rogue nations, ethnic and religious hatreds or terrorists trafficking in weapons of mass destruction.
What we have left behind are the certitudes and simplifications of the past -- and that's not necessarily a bad thing. During the Cold War, policymakers could justify every act with one word: containment. We got the big things right -- containment was the right policy and it succeeded and we won the Cold War and we are all far, far better for it. But even the best policy can become the worst straitjacket if it is pursued too rigidly and reflexively -- as we saw in Vietnam.
Now, we have the opportunity to think anew about the best ways to promote America's interests and ideals. Our tools of first resort remain diplomacy and the power of our example. But sometimes, we have to rely on the example of our power. We face no more important questions than when and how to use it. From our experience in countering traditional aggression -- as in the Persian Gulf -- and contending with more novel crises -- as in Haiti and Bosnia -- there are some principles on the use of force that I would like to discuss with you.
First, let me cite one underlying and enduring principle: We will always be ready to use force to defend our national interests. Until human nature changes, power and force will remain at the heart of international relations.
This begs the question of just what those interests are that we will defend. I would cite seven circumstances, which, taken in some combination or even alone, may call for the use of force or our military forces:
  1. To defend against direct attacks on the United States, its citizens, and its allies; 1
  2. To counter aggression; 1
  3. To defend our key economic interests, which is where most Americans see their most immediate stake in our international engagement; 1
  4. To preserve, promote and defend democracy, which enhances our security and the spread of our values; 1
  5. To prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, international crime and drug trafficking; 1
  6. To maintain our reliability, because when our partnerships are strong and confidence in our leadership is high, it is easier to get others to work with us, and to share the burdens of leadership. 1
  7. And for humanitarian purposes, to combat famines, natural disasters and gross abuses of human rights with, occasionally, our military forces.
Not one of these interests by itself -- with the obvious exception of an attack on our nation, people and allies -- should automatically lead to the use of force. But the greater the number and the weight of the interests in play, the greater the likelihood that we will use force -- once all peaceful means have been tried and failed and once we have measured a mission's benefits against its costs, in both human and financial terms.
In Haiti, when we saw democracy stolen from its people, a reign of brutality take hold in our hemisphere, a flood of refugees to our shores, international agreements consistently violated and efforts to resolve the impasse through negotiations and sanctions fail, the case for intervention was compelling. In Bosnia, the worst atrocities in Europe since World War II -- a dangerous fire at the very heart of the continent -- our commitments to our NATO allies and a peace agreement the parties were calling on us to secure required us to act, and the President decided to do so.
But more than the "when" of using force, Haiti, Bosnia and some other recent interventions highlight principles that get at a harder question, perhaps, and that is the "how" we should use force.
First, threatening to use force can achieve the same results as actually using it -- but only if you're prepared to carry through on that threat. The best-trained, best-equipped and best- prepared fighting force in the world has a unique ability to concentrate the minds of our adversaries without firing a shot. In Haiti, when the military regime learned that the 82nd Airborne literally was on the way, those leaders got out of the way. In the Persian Gulf, as soon as President Clinton moved American forces into the region, Iraq moved its troops away from Kuwait. And by backing diplomacy with the presence of U.S. military forces to deter attack on the South, we convinced North Korea to freeze its dangerous nuclear weapons program.
A second principle is that the selective but substantial use of force is sometimes more appropriate than its massive use -- provided that the force is adequate to the task, and then some. President Clinton refused to engage our troops in a ground war in Bosnia because he knew that no outside power could force peace on the parties. To do so would have risked a Vietnam-like quagmire. But this summer, the combination of NATO's heavy and continuous air strikes, Bosnian and Croat gains on the ground, and our determined diplomacy convinced the Bosnian Serbs to stop making war and start making peace. Now, our troops are in Bosnia not to fight a war through a massive intervention, but to secure a peace they produced through the deliberate, calibrated use of force.
A final principle is this: Before we send our troops into a foreign country, we should know how and when we're going to get them out. Sounds simple, even obvious. But it is not an uncontroversial point. But carefully defined exit strategies for foreign interventions have not been a hallmark of our foreign policy in recent decades. Now they are -- and that makes sense for America, for America's military and for the people we're trying to help.
I don't want to be doctrinaire in asserting an exit strategy doctrine. When it comes to deterring external aggression -- as in the Persian Gulf or the Korean Peninsula -- or fighting wars in defense of our most vital security interests, a more open-ended commitment is necessary. But increasingly, our interests require that our military keep peace in the wake of internal conflicts. For these operations to succeed, tightly tailored military missions and sharp withdrawal deadlines must be the norm.
The logic is this: The first step is to give our Armed Forces a clear mission with achievable military -- I repeat, military -- goals, as President Clinton did in both Haiti and Bosnia. In Haiti, we asked our Armed Forces to return the elected government to power and restore a secure climate so that civilians could train a police force, hold elections and begin reconciliation. In Bosnia, our soldiers are overseeing the implementation of the military side of the Dayton accords -- separating the armies, maintaining the cease-fire, securing transferred territory -- while civilian authorities help the Bosnian people rebuild their lives and their land. In both places, our troops are highly trained and heavily armed, with very clear rules of engagement. And the Executive Branch and Congress are united in their commitment to our military's goals and success, as they were in Operation Desert Storm.
Contrast these operations with Vietnam, Lebanon and Somalia. There, clear and achievable missions for our military were not defined. In Vietnam, our society blamed our soldiers for a defeat that was not theirs. Because we neglected to ask the right questions and establish clear military goals from the start, our fighting men and women paid a terrible price, both in Vietnam and on their return home. We must never put them in that position again. Never. It just mustn''t happen. v The next step, then having defined clear military missions, is to set deadlines for withdrawal based on the accomplishment of those missions. In Haiti, our military leaders informed the President that our troops could complete their military tasks in about a year and a half and in Bosnia in about one year -- and they will.
Here's why setting deadlines is so important:
Neither we nor the international community has either the responsibility or the means to do whatever it takes for as long as it takes to rebuild nations. There are many reasons for this.
First, providing a security blanket for an indefinite period without making clear it's on loan -- and not for keeps -- only gives those we are trying to help the comfort to believe that they can evade their own responsibilities for the future of their own societies. It creates unreasonable expectations that the hard work will be done for them not by them.
Second, assuming too much responsibility for a nation's future tends to undercut the very government you are trying to help. In Vietnam, the more we assumed responsibility for a weak Saigon administration, the more dependent it became -- and the more open to charges it was a puppet regime beholden to foreigners. Unless you make clear that your mission is limited in scope and duration, you risk de-legitimating a government in the eyes of its own people and you will lose a conflict that is, at its heart, political, and not military.
Third, overstaying one's welcome ultimately breeds resentment of our presence and provides an easy target for blame when things go wrong. And believe me, that target will be us.
By carefully defining the mission and clearly setting a deadline, we serve notice that our only goal is to give governments and people the breathing room they must have to tackle their own problems. This "tough love" policy may sound harsh to some. It may strike others as a gamble. But consider the alternative: self-defeating efforts to take on responsibilities that are not ours -- to create unsustainable dependencies instead of giving nations a chance to act independently. It is a dangerous hubris to believe we can build other nations. But where our own interests are engaged, we can help nations build themselves -- and give them time to make a start at it.
I believe we can see the benefits of our exit strategy doctrine in Haiti and Bosnia.
Given the chance, the Haitian people quickly focused on the ballot, not the bullet; on trade, not terror; on hope, not despair. In just a year and a half, with our civilian help, they have completed presidential, parliamentary and local government elections; trained a police force, that is as yet imperfect, but showing great progress. They have dramatically, despite problems, improved the human rights situation and begun to reverse the economic decline of the coup years. Haiti remains the poorest nation in the Americas. There is no guarantee democracy will take hold or the economy will prosper. But its people now have a real chance to build a better future for themselves and their children -- and for the U.S. forces who have acted in Haiti with such strength and with such skill are leaving when we promised they would, we can say "mission accomplished."
The same logic applies in Bosnia and the same opportunity lies before the people of Bosnia. Its people understand they have a window of opportunity that our military opened and will hold open for the remainder of this year to decide their future in peace: to freely choose their own leaders in elections later this summer; to begin to rebuild their roads and schools, their factories and their hospitals; to reunite children with their parents and families with their homes. At the end of this year, when our troops leave, we can reasonably hope that the people of Bosnia will have developed a greater stake in peace than war -- that peace will have taken on a life and logic of its own. That is all that can be asked of us.
But let me make one point absolutely clear -- the breathing room our military is providing in Haiti and Bosnia must be filled with the oxygen of economic reconstruction assistance. What we call civilian implementation is the vital and necessary companion to any peacekeeping operation. Our allies agree. That's why they are providing about 80 percent of the civilian assistance for Haiti and for Bosnia. The sooner people in conflicted countries recover the blessings of a normal life, the surer the chances our troops will leave behind them a legacy of peace and hope as they are doing in Haiti.
That's why Congress should now un-freeze the modest amount of outstanding development assistance for Haiti to fund primary education, child care and immunizations. They should do it now. And that's why we are working with Congress on our request for $200 million to assist civilian reconstruction in Bosnia -- money that will support economic revitalization and reform, the deployment of international police monitors and our demining efforts. Money that is needed now.
In both Haiti and Bosnia, our Armed Forces are doing everything we have asked of them -- and more. We should live up to their example on the civilian side in both the Executive branch and Congress. Their missions will only succeed if we do so. Holding back the dollars we need for relief and reconstruction doesn''t serve our soldiers, it doesn't serve the people we're trying to help and it doesn't serve our Nation's interests.
One of the great privileges of my job is to travel around the world and to see firsthand the extraordinary respect our Nation now enjoys. People look to us for leadership not only because of our size and our strength but also because of what we stand for -- and what, as today in the Middle East, what we're willing to stand against. Now, perhaps more than any other time in our history, America has a unique ability to make a difference for our own people and for people around the world.
Our duty is to help use this power as wisely as possible -- to steer by the stars of our interests and our ideals. As President Clinton has said, we can't be everywhere. We can't do everything. But where those interests and ideals demand it -- and where we can make a difference -- we must not hesitate to lead. We haven't -- and we won't.
You must not hesitate, either. Many of you here today are embarking, I hope, on careers in foreign policy. Whether you do so as teachers or researchers, government officials or journalists, you will have an opportunity to weigh in on the great foreign policy questions of our time. Weigh in with passion, weigh in with argument -- but above all, weigh in. America needs to hear your voices. It needs to feel your enthusiasm.
Right now, no question is more fundamental -- and no outcome more important -- than America's role in the world. We can succeed, this is an absolute certainty, only if we continue to lead -- not merely be engaged, but lead. That is the lesson of what has come to be called the American Century. If we heed its call, we can remain a force for freedom and progress around the world as we are today, and for real security and prosperity at home. And the next century will be an American century, too. And the world will be a better place for it.
Thank you.