The translation of the interview with Timothy Less (the director of Nova Europa specialist consultancy) published in the Croatian newspaper Jutarnji list on 8th January 2017

 https://www.novaeuropa.co.uk/interview-with-jutarnji-list

 

According to its web-page, Nova Europa "is a specialist consultancy which provides bespoke research and analysis of politics in Eastern Europe to the private and public sector. Its goal is to help clients understand how politics can affect their interests in Central Europe, the Baltic States, the Balkans and parts of the former Soviet Union. Nova Europa is able to take on a wide range of assignments and has built up a strong track record in the following:

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Among the analysis which Nova Europa has recently produced for clients are: populist parties in southeastern Europe; judicial reform in Albania; the new terrorist threat in Eastern Europe;  border disputes in the Balkans and the former Soviet Union; energy security in the Western Balkans; civil unrest in southeastern and central Europe; conflict settlement in Ukraine; and the role of oligarchs in the Bulgarian economy." (https://www.novaeuropa.co.uk/about-nova-europa)

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Gherson, London (https://www.novaeuropa.co.uk/clients)

 

Were you surprised with so many reactions to your Foreign Affairs article, so many of them being negative?

 

Not really. I wrote a hard-hitting article because it is vital to start a debate about the future of the Balkans that gets beyond the tired mantras about Euro-Atlantic integration. Had I wanted to play it safe, I could have repeated what every other Western commentator says – that the Balkans must be multiethnic, get on with reform and join the EU. However, this position is naive at best and dishonest at worst because, if the political crisis in the EU continues, the union won't enlarge any further and may not even survive at all.

 

Resistance to the article came from three main groups, all of which want to maintain the status quo. The first, most obviously, are those nations in the region that stand to lose territory to which they are sentimentally attached if, as I forecast, the Balkans moves towards the formation of nation states. The second are those commentators who are opposed to the idea of nation states in the Balkans for ideological reasons. And the third are those who accept in principle that nation states are a viable long-term settlement in the region but think the status quo should be preserved because of the risk of conflict involved in any transition.

 

My argument is essentially a Realist one which posits that the status quo is no longer a sustainable option because the process of EU enlargement is deadlocked. I don’t wish to exaggerate the dangers: for the moment, the Balkans is peaceful and there is no immediate risk of conflict. However, if we accept the logic which has underpinned Western policy for the last decade - that stability comes through integration with the EU - then we must also accept that, when this integration ends, there is a risk that instability begins.

 

Already, there is some evidence of the effects which the breakdown of the EU enlargement process is having, namely a wave of popular unrest that has swept across the region, starting in Bosnia and then moving to Macedonia, Kosovo, Montenegro and Serbia. It is no accident that all these states are simultaneously experiencing political turbulence, even if there are local factors at play in each country. People sense that there is no miracle European remedy to the day-to-day problems which they experience – poverty, corruption, injustice and so on. No one from outside is coming to help them and there is no light at the end of the tunnel, unless they create it themselves. As a result, they are now turning on their governments who they hold responsible for the problems in their lives.

 

More importantly, the breakdown of the enlargement process is also reviving the spectre of separatism as minorities try to take control of their destiny in countries where the central government always seems to prioritise the interests of the majority group. Since they cannot have the EU and the guarantees it once offered, Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats, Macedonian Albanians, Kosovo Serbs, Serbian Albanians and Montenegrin Albanians are all, in one way or another, demanding the right to have an autonomous territory run by their own politicians who can deliver the security, economic opportunity and rights which they desire. In the past, their scope to have this was limited. But with the controlling influence of the EU in decline, groups are now explicitly starting to challenge the status quo in order to exert more control over their own affairs.

 

So, it is high time that those who care about the stability of the region start to think seriously about alternatives to the existing policy. I’m not suggesting that my proposal - a transition to nation states - is the final word on the matter, although I do think that in the long term this will probably happen because of the powerful hold which nationalism has on the region. However – and I can’t stress this strongly enough – it is vital to have a proper debate, at both the local and international level, about the alternatives to Euro-Atlantic integration. Stability is not served by pretending everything is fine on the ground when the tectonic plates are shifting just below the surface.

 

To this end, I’m glad to note that after an initial emotional outburst, some people in the region are now starting to take my analysis seriously. In the last week, I have read some thoughtful commentaries, in the Bosnian press in particular, by writers who recognise that the Balkans is adrift, that there is a risk of renewed instability in the future and that there is a need for some fresh thinking about how to prevent this from happening. So, if the article has provoked people in both the Balkans and the West into recognising that a new approach is required, then it has served its purpose.

 

 

How well do you understand the situation at the Balkans?

 

As well as any outsider is likely to. I have worked on the region professionally for over fifteen years. I have lived in three of the countries: Albania, Macedonia and Bosnia, the last two as a diplomat. I have studied Balkan history to PhD level. I know two of the local languages – Serbian and Albanian. And I have thought hard about the politics for many years, especially when I was in Bosnia where things were obviously not going to plan.    

 

As a foreigner, what I cannot claim is to feel the emotions felt by the locals – their sense of history and collective identity, their likes and hates, their fears and hopes for the future, and so on. However, in one respect, that is an advantage when trying to understand the region because it gives me a detachment that, I hope, allows me to see things more dispassionately than those involved in the drama.  

 

 

Your thesis states that in order to bring peace and introduce stability in the Balkans, Great Serbia, Croatia and Albania would have to be founded. I presume you know that similar ideas led to 1991-1995 wars?

 

Yes, I’m well aware of what drove the wars of the 1990s which led to appalling violence and brutality. However, I would argue that the failure to establish properly-constituted nation states is the reason why the region is still at risk of instability.

 

I do not see the basic conditions in place in the Balkans for establishing successful multi-ethnic states, the test of which is that all citizens, regardless of their nationality, enjoy security, equal rights and economic opportunity. The region lacks a strong tradition of democracy and constitutional liberalism, which might otherwise give minorities confidence in shared institutions. A history of violence and atrocities has destroyed trust between the various national groups. And poverty and endemic corruption conspire to keep the people on edge.

 

From what I have observed in multi-ethnic states such as Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia, the lot of the minority is not a happy one. At a grassroots level, minorities face an uphill struggle to find work outside their own community, and risk insults, intimidation and even physical attack if they reside in the wrong areas. And the political institutions are dominated by the majority national group which discriminates against minorities when making policy and allocating resources. Underlying this daily reality, minorities express real fears that, if circumstances take a turn for the worse, the majority population will send its army into their villages, destroying property and murdering the inhabitants, as has happened repeatedly in the past.

 

Unsurprisingly, minorities have resisted multi-ethnicity from the moment Yugoslavia collapsed, taking up arms to avoid becoming trapped in what they see as someone else’s state. Subsequently, wherever these attempts at separation failed, minorities have struggled to secure as much autonomy as they can within their adopted state, in the form of a separate territory and separate political institutions. Unfortunately, since this aspiration runs contrary to the wishes of the majority population, the effect has been to build tension, dysfunctionality and the omnipresent risk of organised violence into the very structure of these multi-ethnic states.

 

For the last twenty years, the West has tried to contain the risk of a relapse into violence by imposing itself on fragile states such as Bosnia and Kosovo, while promising the locals membership of the EU and NATO and all the attendant benefits this brings - work, prosperity, good governance, and so on – providing they accept the current political arrangements. However, the West’s ability to discharge this role has started to decline markedly this decade because of the effective end of enlargement, as I mentioned, and the increasing hollowness of the EU’s claims to be the bearer of peace and prosperity. At the same time, new external powers, such as Russia, Turkey and China are pushing their own self-interested agendas in the region. As a result, separatist groups which never accepted their place as minorities in someone else’s state, are starting to revive their demands for greater separation in the form of decentralisation or even, in the case of Republika Srpska, threats of full independence.

 

In my view, the West cannot stop minority groups from cutting their links with the rest of the state, if they are determined to do so. Last September, the Bosnian Serbs successfully held a referendum on a Dayton issue which was endorsed by Russia and met no effective resistance from the West. Now, we see Bosnian Serbs and Croats demanding the expulsion of foreign judges from Bosnia’s Constitutional Court on pain of withdrawing their personnel from the state institutions within six months. Events are moving in a consistent direction, and seem to be accelerating

 

Elsewhere in the region, Albanians in Macedonia are talking more vocally about the idea of a binational state and Albanian parties in Montenegro, which have just entered the new government, have demanded that Tuzi becomes a separate municipality. Meanwhile, in Kosovo, Serbs are threatening to establish a community of self-governing municipalities without the agreement of the Kosovo parliament.

 

All this points to a situation, perhaps early next decade, in which territories such as Republika Srpska have broken some, if not most, of their links from the centre and done so against the wishes of the majority population, risking a combustible situation on the ground. That is why I argued in Foreign Affairs that the West should take pre-emptive action to steer the region towards a stable outcome.

 

I suggested there were three approaches which the West could adopt – increasing the rewards to disaffected minorities to abandon their demands for decentralisation; sanctioning politicians who threaten separation; and overseeing a process that gives minorities  some of what they demand. I suggested that, in fact, only the third approach was viable because there is not much the West can offer the region and it has limited coercive power. Accordingly, I suggested that the West should put diplomatic pressure on majority groups such as Bosniaks, Macedonians and Kosovo Albanians to reach a new settlement with their minority populations that recognises not only their desire for greater separation but also their ability to seize it unilaterally if there is no negotiated solution. This would constitute a significant shift in policy, particularly in Bosnia, where talk of constitutional reform has always been about centralising the state, rather than decentralising it.

 

If all this happens, and it proves acceptable to minorities on the ground, then matters could rest there. However, if minorities decided that, for reasons of security or economic opportunity, they wished to establish shared institutions and common citizenship with their kin states across the border, I do not believe that the West should stand in their way simply for the sake of upholding the ideal of multi-ethnicity.

 

I also talked about a potential third and final stage, in which ethnic regions broke with their notional state. This is obviously a radical step, and there is no immediate calling for it anywhere in the region, because it seems such an elusive goal. However, it would be foolish to rule out such an outcome in principle because, for reasons I have already stated, nation states are the only form of polity in the Balkans which can genuinely uphold the long-term security and rights of their inhabitants. There are also practical limits to how far the Balkans can fragment before it needs to be reassembled in accordance with the nation state model, which still forms the basic organising paradigm in Europe.

 

I should emphasise that, nowhere in this framework am I suggesting that the emergent states need to be pure ethnic states. If Bosniaks have chosen to live in Republika Srpska because they have ancestral roots there, or Macedonians have chosen to remain in the Albanian-dominated parts of the country, then of course they should be allowed to stay and all efforts should be made to ensure their security and rights. Balkan states such as Serbia, Albania, Montenegro and Croatia have all demonstrated their ability to accommodate small numbers of another national group because these do not threaten the territorial integrity or identity of the state. However, this is a completely different proposition to the situation which exists in Bosnia, Macedonia and Kosovo today where large, disaffected minorities living in compact territories adjacent to their titular state harbour separatist ambitions, generating a state of a permanent tension and political dysfunctionality.

 

 

In essence, you believe that because the Balkans nations do not wish to live in multinational states, the international community is conducting a wrong sort of politics?

 

Yes, that is basically my position. I think that the West’s intentions towards the Balkans are benevolent but are based on an unrealistic premise, namely that different national groups with divergent interests and identities can be moulded against their will into a single political community if the West, as the hegemonic power in the region, can  construct the right balance of rewards and sanctions. 

 

To my mind, the West’s approach to the Balkans took a wrong step at the start of the 1990s when it chose to recognise the republics of the former Yugoslavia within their existing borders, regardless of their ethnic composition.

 

The reasons for this are well known. Western policymakers believed that recognising the Yugoslav-era borders would end the fighting that broke out in 1991. They were averse to rewarding the Yugoslav People’s Army for murder and ethnic cleansing. Recognition of states within their Yugoslav-era boundaries was consistent with the Badinter Committee’s interpretation of international law. And there was the practical problem of how to draw international boundaries in a region without clear ethnic boundaries. Alongside all this, the creation of multi-ethnic states was consistent with the prevailing ideology of the time, namely that nationalism was the source of instability in Europe and that the future lay in transnational citizenship – a sentiment embodied in the parallel creation of the European Union. This combination of factors set the stage for the Post-Yugoslav settlement that exists today: seven states, each occupying the territory they possessed in the former Yugoslavia.

 

The problem is that the states created by this settlement lack legitimacy in the eyes of most of their minority populations, who have resisted their belonging ever since. As a result, the West has struggled to realise its basic goals in the region, above all a permanent end to conflict. At first, it was compelled to take a coercive approach, deploying troops on the ground and establishing intrusive civilian missions in Bosnia and Kosovo that exercised authoritarian power over the locals. Subsequently, it has chosen to adopt a policy of enticement by offering the region membership of the EU and NATO.

 

Diplomats make a rational case for this: if disaffected minorities can park their grievances about security and territory long enough to address second-order issues such as political and economic reform, then these first-order issues will, theoretically, become irrelevant. NATO will provide the security they desire and the EU will allow disaffected minorities to unite with their ethnic kin inside a borderless union.

 

Unfortunately, this theory makes little sense on the ground where minorities remain fixated on unresolved issues of security and territory for the simple reason that these are the precondition for their survival as a community. By insisting that the locals focus on political and economic reform while ignoring the issues of territory and security, the EU is effectively asking them to construct the walls and the roof of their house while deliberately ignoring the foundations.

 

Unsurprisingly, things have not worked out as the bureaucrats in Brussels intended. Instead of reform, the political institutions in places like Bosnia have been gridlocked by intractable questions about the nature and identity of the state, and the division of power between the centre and the regions. Meanwhile, the normal development of the state has been seriously retarded. Democracy is stifled since the West has vetoed the most basic political demand of the various minority groups, namely their physical security. And this is turn has retarded the development of the economy since unresolved fears about security crowd out virtually every other political issue, allowing nationalists and strongmen who promise to protect their populations to run the economy corruptly in their own interests.

 

So, a quarter of a century on from the establishment of these multiethnic states, the West can take credit for having preserved the peace in the Balkans. There has not been any wide-scale organised violence in the region since the end of the conflict in Macedonia in 2001. However, the West has failed to resolve the underlying source of tension, namely, the mismatch of national and political boundaries, meaning the peace the West has created rests on shaky foundations. All this calls for an open discussion and radical rethink of Western policy towards the region which is the reason why I wrote the article.

 

 

Still, if your ideas were realized, that would mean the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Macedonia. In my opinion, such a scenario might cause more negative than positive consequences?

 

Well, the first thing to say is that these states are already de facto divided, so the division that you talk of is not conditional on realising my ideas. But I sense your question is really about the dangers implicit in moving from the current settlement based on multi-ethnicity to the formation of nation states. And to answer your question, we have to distinguish between processes and outcomes.

 

To take outcomes first, I think that the eventual emergence of nation states would be more positive than negative because, in the Balkan context, a territorially-defined nation state is the only form of polity than can properly guarantee the rights and security of its inhabitants. I explained earlier the reasons why I think this is the case: the weak tradition of liberal democracy, the lack of trust between different national groups and the tension created by poverty and social injustice, all of which work against the interests of minorities.

 

I also think that, at the international level, the creation of recognised nation states would end the territorial competition that blights the region. Diplomatic relations between Croatia and Serbia, or Serbia and Albania, or Albania and Greece are basically functional because, except for minor border disputes, none of them makes a formal claim on the territory of any of the others, and the inhabitants generally feel secure from external interference behind hard international borders.

 

This contrasts with the current reality in states such as Bosnia, Macedonia and Kosovo where the territory occupied by the minority group is implicitly, and sometimes explicitly, claimed by the majority group, leaving the minority group feeling profoundly uneasy. So, in arguing for the creation of nation states in the Balkans, I am responding to the desire of minorities on the ground for the kind of security that only comes with living behind an internationally-recognised border. In this respect, I am confident that, if those Serbs, Albanians and Croats who currently live in a state of vulnerability in someone else’s country were able to live securely in a properly-constituted nation state, the main source of tension afflicting the region would end.

 

However, I am not naïve about the difficulties involved in achieving this outcome, which I have traced back to the decision by the West to recognise the former Yugoslav republics within their existing borders. A great deal has happened since then: peoples have been ethnically cleansed from their homelands, raising profound moral questions about the right of Bosnian Serbs, in particular, to any kind of independence from the rest of Bosnia. And majority groups such as Bosniaks and Macedonians have obtained a right under international law to prevent the secession of their disaffected minorities.

 

That is why, as one of the possible solutions, I have suggested a graduated approach to the formation of nation states, which involves both minority populations, majority populations and various international partners in discussions, and which can be halted at any time if minorities express their content with the status quo.

 

I don’t claim to have all the answers. Far from it. These issues are profoundly difficult and policymakers have not even begun to think them through. But the point that must be kept firmly in mind is that, with the effective end of the policy of EU enlargement, the West’s existing approach is no longer viable and there is a growing risk of a breakdown in security. In this respect, the challenge for Western policymakers is no longer to work out how to make a success of multi-ethnicity. Rather, it is to decide whether to let the Balkans fragment in an improvised and uncontrolled manner; or to work with the locals to address the unresolved grievances of minorities and prevent a return to violence. It is vitally important to begin this discussion, based on realism not idealism.

 

 

How would a new Balkans reality look like? West Herzegovina in Croatia, Kosovo in Albania with Serbia stretching to Banja Luka?

 

If the region was reorganised on the basis of nation states in which the international political boundaries corresponded with the national boundaries, then the new map of the region would be as you describe. However, there is certainly scope for adjustments to the existing administrative boundaries, especially in Bosnia, with parts of Republika Srpska and the ‘Croat' cantons potentially included in a reconstituted Bosnian state. And, I will emphasise, you are taking the long view here. I am not proposing that the Balkans passes from the existing arrangements to the creation of consolidated nation states in a single leap.

 

 

I have a feeling this plan might suit Russia and Putin best?

 

I agree that the West needs to be cautious about Russian involvement in the Balkans although I don’t agree with your conclusion that Russia would automatically gain from any transition to nation states.

 

At the moment, Russia is able to exert influence in the region by exploiting ambiguity and discontent with the current political settlement. The Kremlin has managed to establish itself in Serbia because of its endorsement of Belgrade’s campaign to prevent international recognition of Kosovo. Since this endorsement can be withdrawn at any time, Serbia finds itself in a dependent relationship with Russia that gives Moscow significant leverage over Serbia’s internal affairs. That suits Russia well.

 

Similarly, Russia has managed to gain a foothold in Republika Srpska because it has backed the Bosnian Serbs’ attempts to distance RS from the rest of Bosnia. For what it’s worth, my reading is that Russia is content to keep Bosnia on edge to increase its room for manouevre in Ukraine. If the West ratchets up the pressure, Moscow can trigger a crisis in the Balkans that distracts the West and consumes its energy simply by promising the Bosnian Serb leadership Russian support for any independence bid it might make. In this respect, anything which can be done to reduce the underlying source of tension would diminish Russian influence in the region.

 

But there is another way to answer your question, which is to recognise that Russia sees the Balkans as a region of strategic interest, that it is not going to disappear and that the task is to try and harness Russian influence, especially over the Serbs, in a constructive rather a destructive way. If, as I suspect, the Bosnian Serbs continue to push for greater autonomy from the rest of Bosnia, then it is important to have Russia sitting at the negotiating table.

 

Russia’s greatest yearning in international affairs is to be treated seriously as a Great Power, and I suspect that, if the West were willing to involve Russia, it could turn out to be a helpful partner. There are precedents for this, especially in 1999 when Russia played a vital role in bringing the Kosovo conflict to an end. This, it would seem to me, is much better than engaging in a forlorn power struggle with Russia for influence in the Balkans in which it encourages the Bosnian Serbs to pursue its campaign for greater separation outside of any negotiating forum.

 

 

Do you believe the international community will change its policies towards the region in the next few years?

 

In the short term, I think it is unlikely. Foreign policy is impervious to revision once it has been made and only really changes when a serious and dramatic event renders the existing approach untenable. I don’t therefore expect a decisive shift in Western policy towards the Balkans in the absence of some major disruptive development, either in the Balkans or the EU. Instead, I expect that Western diplomats will continue to implore regional governments to prepare their countries for membership of the EU while engaging in ad hoc interventions to contain any crises that do break out. The one caveat to this is that, in private, the new administration in the United States may start to think through some different scenarios and policy approaches - at least, I hope it does.

 

However, in the medium term, I think events will force the West to change its approach because the policy of ‘stabilisation through integration’ is rapidly running out of road. If the West is to stay true to its long-standing goal of maintaining peace in the region, it must modify its policy.

 

Ideally, this would involve some recognition that the root cause of conflict is the mismatch of national and political boundaries in the region, and the formulation of some solution that addresses this. I have offered various suggestions, which can be quite subtle at first – above all, putting diplomatic pressure on reluctant majority groups to reach an accommodation with their disaffected minorities. Initially, this can be done without abandoning the underlying commitment to multi-ethnicity and the inviolability of borders. In time, the West could pursue a more explicit policy of nation state formation, ideally by means of an international conference on the Balkans that works out a new settlement for the region.

 

But the question of the West’s approach to the Balkans is not only about the policy it formulates but its willingness and ability to pursue it. And here the situation is very unclear. The Balkans has not been a policy priority for the US since last decade and its long-standing view is that the Europeans should take the lead in the region. Even though I have called on the new administration in the US to re-engage with the Balkans in a new way, I don’t see any immediate prospect of this happening. At the same time, the EU as an organisation is too weak, divided and distracted to play any kind of decisive leading role.

 

This points to a number of broad scenarios. The first and best-case scenario is that a coalition of powerful European states, working outside the structures of the EU, pursues a new policy in a more vigorous way. The most obvious candidates are the old Contact Group members – the UK, France, Germany and Italy, plus Russia and Turkey, with the US playing a supportive external role.

 

The second is that the US and the Europeans abandon the Balkans to Russia and Turkey, who treat the region as a proxy battlefield in a strategic dispute over the future of the Middle East and the Black Sea region, once their current marriage of convenience ends. This could happen if the EU starts to collapse, distracting Europeans from events in their backyard. And the third, and most worrying, is that the Great Powers all leave the field, creating the kind of void that existed at the end of the 1980s when the United States and the Soviet Union lost interest in Yugoslavia. This would cede all power to local separatists who would effectively be free to pursue their goal of separation, constrained only by the willingness of majority populations, and whatever external allies they can find, to prevent them from doing so.

 

I hope that neither of these latter two scenarios comes to pass. But the possibility should serve to focus attention on the need to reduce tensions in the short term, while the region is stable and the West retains some authority. It is high time for fresh thinking in the West and for majority populations in the region to start talking to their respective minorities in order to get beyond the current political impasse.

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This interview with the director appeared in an abridged form in the Croatian newspaper Jutarnji list on 8th January 2017

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STRAH OD TERORIZMA Hrvatskoj prijete ekstremisti iz regije koji se vraćaju iz sukoba u Iraku i Siriji? (Jutarnji list, 02.09.2014.)

 

ZABRINUTOST NAKON UPOZORENJA SOA-e

STRAH OD TERORIZMA Hrvatskoj prijete ekstremisti iz regije koji se vraćaju iz sukoba u Iraku i Siriji?

U slovenskom gradu Jesenicama, tvrde tajne službe, djeluje najveća i najekstremnija skupina vehabija

Piše: Tomislav Novak

Objavljeno: 02. rujan 2014. 10:58

 

 

Radikalni islamisti iz zemalja regije značajan su sigurnosni izazov za Hrvatsku, naglašeno je u prvom javnom izvješću Sigurnosno-obavještajne agencije, objavljenom prije dva dana. Izvješće SOA-e koje je naišlo na velik interes javnosti, među ostalim, navodi da je broj pripadnika radikalnih islamističkih skupina u jugoistočnoj Europi u porastu te kako sve više “džihadista” iz našeg susjedstva odlazi u Siriju i Irak da bi se borili na strani takvih skupina.

Opasna prijetnja

Kao faktore koji uzrokuju porast prihvaćanja radikalnog tumačenja islama u našoj regiji u SOA-i vide i izrazito lošu ekonomsku situaciju te pojavu vjerskih službenika koji prihvaćaju i šire takve radikalne stavove.

“Od 2012. godine u sukobima u Siriji i Iraku sudjelovalo je više stotina boraca iz država hrvatskog susjedstva. Neki od njih pripadnici su najradikalnijih skupina koje se tamo bore. U Hrvatskoj zasad takve osobe nismo identificirali. ‘Džihadisti’ naš teritorij koriste kao tranzitno područje. Po povratku u matične države oni postaju značajan sigurnosni rizik. U sukobima su dodatno radikalizirani, traumatizirani ratnim iskustvima i obučeni za oružanu borbu”, piše među ostalim u izvješću.

U vrijeme kada svijet sa strepnjom gleda na jačanje ISIL-a i brutalne činove egzekucije kojima se ta krajnje radikalna i brutalna sunitska skupina hvali, a SAD Islamski kalifat proglašava prijetnjom puno opasnijom nego što se u početku činila, izvješće SOA-e pokazuje da se i hrvatski sigurnosno-obavještajni aparat aktivno uključio u nadzor ekstremnih islamističkih skupina.

Pogrdni naziv

Tim više što je ISIL, kada je krajem lipnja objavio petogodišnji plan globalne dominacije, najavio da planiraju osvojiti i dio Europe - Austriju, Mađarsku, Španjolsku te Hrvatsku. U takvom kontekstu postavlja se pitanje koliko su radikalni islamisti rašireni kod nas i u zemljama koje nas okružuju i kako se unutar toga treba odnositi prema zajednicama poput vehabijskih koje postoje i u Sloveniji, BiH, Srbiji i Crnoj Gori, a koje su često meta policijskog nadzora i racija.

Vehabije se prije svega odbijaju tako nazivati, taj izraz smatraju pogrdnim. Smatraju se muslimanima koji slijede izvorni islam i ne priznaju vjerske novotarije, odnosno nazivaju se selefijama.

Izvorni islam

U rijetkim istupima odlučno odbijaju povezanost s terorizmom, a medije koji o fenomenu vehabizma izvještavaju optužuju za iskrivljavanje činjenica, neznanje i namjerno neprijateljstvo. Stoga su takve zajednice redovito zatvorene i nepovjerljive prema javnosti i okruženju u kojem postoje. Riječ je o konzervativnom pokretu u islamu koji je početkom 18. stoljeća utemeljio Muhamed ibn Abdul Vahab.

U suštini je riječ o zajednicama koje inzistiraju na izvornoj interpretaciji islama. Vehabije se često povezuje s poticanjem i ideološkom osnovom za terorističke grupe u Afganistanu, Saudijskoj Arabiji i Iraku.

Prihvaćanje interneta

Među najpoznatijima u susjednim zemljama su one u Gornjoj Maoči u BiH i slovenskim Jesenicama. Prva je bila meta policijskih zapljena oružja i uhićenja te je iz nje potekao i osuđeni terorist Mevlid Jašarević. Pripadnici zajednice u Jesenicama priznaju također da ih policija nadzire i da ih je nekoliko puta ispitivala. Članovi obiju zajednica prepoznatljivi su po karakterističnim bradama i odjeći, zabranjeni su im, naravno, alkohol i glazba, negiraju bilo kakve vjerske novotarije, ne rukuju se sa ženama, klanjaju pet puta dnevno, ne slave rođenje proroka Muhameda, sporove rješavaju među sobom po šerijatskom pravu, a ne na sudovima...

S druge strane, obilato se koriste internetom i društvenim mrežama poput Facebooka, Twittera i YouTubea. Zajednica u Jesenicama koju vodi Alim Hasanagić i koja djeluje pod okriljem udruge građana Resnica-haq, primjerice, ima vlastitu web stranicu na kojoj objavljuju videoisječke, tekstove, intervjue i fotografije. S druge strane, Gornja Maoča je još 2010. bila na udaru policije koja je s oko 600 pripadnika upala u njega i uhitila sedam ljudi i pronašla oružje.

Fenomen vehabija, odnosno selefija, nije novost za regiju. Možda najekstremniji slučaj koji je na njih bacio trajno negativno svjetlo upravo je slučaj Mevlida Jašarevića koji je lani osuđen na 15 godina zatvora zbog napada na američko veleposlanstvo u Sarajevu 28. listopada 2011. godine.

Odriču se članova

Jašarević je tog dana ispred ambasade stigao s automatskom puškom u ruci i ukupno pet ručnih granata i brdom municije. Počeo je pucati po zgradi i, prije nego što je i sam ranjen i uhićen, uspio je raniti policajce koji su ga pokušali zaustaviti.

Ispucao je 105 hitaca.

Riječ o Srbinu iz Novog Pazara koji je bio pripadnik vehabijske zajednice u Gornjoj Maoči, a koju je iz protesta napustio tijekom suđenja. Njegov odvjetnik Senad Dupovac tada je potvrdio da je Jašarević razočaran jer ga “braća” iz Maoče nisu podržala niti mu pomogla nakon što je uhićen. Dapače, iz vehabijske zajednice su se od njegova postupka ogradili, nazivajući ga neispravnim. U završnoj je riječi Jašarević ipak ponovio da američke ciljeve neće prestati napadati sve dok Amerikanci ne prestanu ubijati muslimane.

Demantirao terorizam

Vehabije su se širili i na Hrvatsku. Mediji su nakon napada otkrili vezu Jašarevića i njegova instruktora Seada Plojovića koji je tada živio na zagrebačkoj adresi, a s njime se družio u Gornjoj Maoči. Veze s terorizmom odlučno je, u kontaktu s novinarima, demantirao. Tada su se pojavile informacije da od 2005. godine i u Zagrebu djeluje vehabijska zajednica.

U razgovoru za Jutarnji list bivši vehabija Adnan Mešanović potvrdio je da je 1999. vehabizam širio i po Puli. Upravo je on otkrio da je zajednica u Jesenicama izrazito ekstremna.

Vehabije, odnosno selefije izrazito su zatvorena zajednica koja odbija suradnju s medijima jer su u njima prikazivani s negativnim konotacijama. S druge strane, svojim djelovanjem potiču nepovjerenje zajednice u kojoj žive i djeluju, često i zbog tajnovitosti i doktrine po kojoj smatraju da je jedini ispravan način onaj na koji oni vide i propovijedaju islam. Svoju verziju islama predstavljaju kao drevnu, čistu, neiskvarenu i čvrstu.

Sve više žena odlazi u Siriju

Zanimljivo, u SOA-i primjećuju da sukobi u posljednje vrijeme privlače i izvjesni broj žena koje sklapanjem šerijatskih brakova s ‘džihadistima’ odlaze u područje sukoba kao njihova potpora. Kao instrument za širenje ekstremističkih stavova i privlačenje istomišljenika u Agenciji vide internet i posebno društvene mreže. Iako u Hrvatskoj zasad nisu locirani pripadnici takvih ekstremističkih skupina, ministar unutarnjih poslova Ranko Ostojić jučer je napomenuo da Hrvatska, iako se ne mora bojati, mora biti na oprezu dijelom i zato što je članica EU i NATO-ova saveza te sudjeluje u mirovnim misijama u Afganistanu.

 

 

Saving Bosnia's past from the ashes (By Guy De Launey BBC News, Sarajevo) - 17 January 2015

 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30798537

 Saving Bosnia's past from the ashes (By Guy De Launey BBC News, Sarajevo) - 17 January 2015

 

Image caption,

Rioters intentionally burned down the national archive last February

The interior of Sarajevo's Presidency building would make any historian wince. Not the decor itself - but the charred papers, piled against the walls.

This display of damaged documents stretches away down the ground floor corridors of the building, leaving dark smears on the white paint, leading to a heap of burned books, boxes and manuscripts in a stairwell.

These scorched remains were part of one of Bosnia's most important historical archives. They had somehow survived not only two world wars but also the siege of Sarajevo in the 1990s - only to be destroyed in an afternoon of rioting during anti-government protests last February.

The deputy director of the Presidency Archive, Simun Novakovic, grimaces as he offers a guide to the damage, lifting a thin, blue, plastic sheet to reveal more singed papers - some with text still visible, others almost certainly blackened beyond restoration.

"These were materials relating to the Habsburg era and the first and second world wars. There were also hand-written documents from the Ottoman era. It's depressing that in the course of one day people could cause so much damage."

Among the documents confirmed as destroyed were three shelves of boxes and folders from the era of Austro-Hungarian rule in Bosnia, covering "Military, Education, Religion, Informers". 

 

Image caption,

Bosnia boasts a rich history but there is little support for preserving what remains of its heritage

Military archives from World War One were also incinerated - along with records from the Ustasa Croatian fascist movement, which governed Bosnia during World War Two.

No funds or facilities

Turkey has funded a new, more secure archive facility - but it is unclear what might be placed there.

Mr Novakovic says that he and his colleagues are still classifying the damaged material - but there are no facilities or funds for restoring the documents.

Image caption,

Skilled operators can digitise 300-400 pages per hour

In fact, for a country boasting such a rich history, Bosnia offers very little support for the preservation and display of its heritage.

Cuts to the culture budget led to the closure of the National Museum in 2012, after its employees had gone for a year without pay. A valuable Jewish manuscript, the Sarajevo Haggadah - a symbol of the city's proud multi-cultural history - remains inside the abandoned building.

Archivists managed to rescue some of the most valuable items from the old City Hall during a fire in 1992. But they have never been returned to dedicated storage facilities.

Historic importance

"They have not been housed in an adequate fashion - something had to be done," says British journalist and historian Chris Bennett.

He launched the Foundation for the Preservation of Historical Heritage, along with three other long-term foreign residents of Sarajevo. They aim to preserve Bosnia's archives in digital form - before any further calamities.

Mr Bennett points out that saving the documents is a matter of more than just local concern, given the importance of events in Bosnia and its neighbours before and during World War One.

Image caption,

Photographer Jim Marshall is helping to digitise what is left

"We have all the background information here to the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand. The investigations, contemporary press reports and the obituary in the German-language newspaper for Bosnia at that time. The focus usually tends to be on the Western front - but the war started and ended in the Balkans."

Many of the documents salvaged from the 1992 fire are passing through a small room in the National and University Library in Sarajevo, where the Foundation has installed a simple but high-quality rig for digitising the archives.

Share don't touch

"Skilled operators can get through 300-400 pages an hour, digitising a serious amount of material," says British photographer Jim Marshall, another member of the Foundation.

"Delicate documents belong in a safe. The central point is that the image can be viewed and shared without having to touch the documents."

Image caption,

Nadina Grebovic-Lendo says the National and University Library is looking for international funding

The aim is to make the archive material available online for researchers around the world. Such systems already exist in many other places, but Bosnia remains an extremely unusual country, where completing even a simple project can be a cause for celebration.

"Co-operation is very important to us," says Nadina Grebovic-Lendo, who is overseeing the digitisation project for the National and University Library.

"There was no financial help from the government for the preservation of our collections. So we're finding ways to do it ourselves."

The Foundation members are keen to mention that they could do with some funding themselves, so that they can increase their preservation efforts.

It may be too late for the material which burned last February - but perhaps there could still be a future for Bosnia's unique reminders of the past?

 

 

 

 

Politics of Revenge in Bosnia's Una Sana Canton Systematically Violate the Dayton Accords and International Law (HRW, August 7, 1997)

 https://www.hrw.org/news/1997/08/07/politics-revenge-bosnias-una-sana-canton-systematically-violate-dayton-accords-and?fbclid=IwAR2nWzVsy9eUWhd8B09Tnwmau1USdFu5b2e8w56pop04gEz2oPtSH-LEdfE

 Human Rights Watch, August 7, 1997

The Una Sana cantonal authorities in Bosnia are engaged in a campaign of intimidation, harassment and violence against their political opposition that violates both their commitments under the Dayton accords and their obligations under international law. In Bosnia and Herzegovina: Politics of Revenge: The Misuse of Authority in Bihac, Cazin and Velika KladusaHuman Rights Watch/Helsinki charges that Alija Izetbegovic's Party of Democratic Action (SDA) systematically persecutes non-SDA members, particularly those who fought on the Bosnian-Serb side during the war.

"The international community is obliged to become involved when the Dayton agreements are being flouted," declared Holly Cartner, Executive Director of Human Rights Watch/Helsinki. "Those who have abused their official positions to attack the political opposition should be held accountable. Any economic aid destined for the Una Sana canton should be conditioned on the end of these attacks on the opposition and compliance with both the Dayton agreement and international law."

Human Rights Watch/Helsinki investigations in the canton reveal a pattern of severe abuses. Opposition groups have little or no access to the media and are severely restricted in their pre-election campaigning activities and in their access to participation in local politics. Local police commit frequent abuses, including the beating of individuals at the time of arrest and torture and ill-treatment during interrogation, with individuals frequently targeted for their political opinions.

Cantonal judicial authorities are currently holding ten individuals in the Luka Cantonal prison in Bihac on charges of war crimes. These arrests are in violation of the "rules of the road" agreement signed in Rome by the parties to the Dayton Peace Accord. The "rules of the road" require that local authorities obtain prior authorization from the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) before arresting anyone suspected of having committed war crimes or crimes against humanity. This authorization is designed specifically to avoid domestic prosecutions for war crimes that might be motivated by revenge and to ensure that the authorities possess sufficient evidence of individual guilt to warrant prosecution.

Human Rights Watch/Helsinki offers an extremely detailed set of recommendations to improve the human rights situation in Una Sana canton. Among them:

Human Rights Watch/Helsinki calls upon the Una Sana cantonal authorities, under Cantonal Governor Mirsad Veladzic, and including Bihac Mayor Adnan Alagic, Cazin Mayor Sabid Lipovic, and Velika Kladusa Mayor Ejup Alagic, to:

• inform all cantonal and municipal employees publicly and in writing that discrimination, harassment, and attacks against persons based upon their political affiliation will not be tolerated, and will result in punitive measures;
• end discrimination against non-SDA members in employment;
• dismiss any and all officials who participate in or officiate over harassment, intimidation, or attacks against persons based upon their political affiliation;
• cease immediately any and all direct and immediate incitement of acts of violence, discrimination or criminal harassment or intimidation against the opposition through television and radio;
• ensure that all political candidates and parties have equal access to the state-owned media in the Una Sana canton;
• provide security as necessary to ensure that the DNZ party members elected to the cantonal assembly can participate without fear of attack;
• immediately establish cooperative relationships with the federation ombudsmen's office, and with all international organizations involved in the implementation of the provisions of the Dayton agreement, according to their obligations under the Dayton agreement and under the federation constitution;
• grant equal access to humanitarian aid for all persons regardless of political affiliation.
• comply with the letter and spirit of the Rome Agreement by ensuring that all orders to arrest persons suspected of war crimes are based on evidence that has been determined to be sufficient by the ICTY. Specifically, the files of individuals whose names appear on any local lists of war crimes suspects, but who have not yet been arrested, should immediately be forwarded to the ICTY for review;

Human Rights Watch/Helsinki calls upon the presidents of the local branches of the SDA, including cantonal SDA President Mirsad Veladzic , Biha SDA President Alaga Adinovic, Cazin SDA President Alaga Topic , and Velika Kladusa SDA President Ejup Alagic to:

• cease immediately any and all intimidation, discriminatory practices, harassment or ill-treatment of persons not affiliated with the SDA and/or members and candidates of opposition parties, and their families. Publicly direct the SDA membership to cease any such practices;

Human Rights Watch/Helsinki calls upon the Una Sana cantonal judicial authorities, and specifically Hasan Pjanic, president of the cantonal court, to:

• drop war crimes charges against those whose files are determined by the ICTY to contain unsubstantiated or inadequate evidence of war crimes;
• ensure that those who appropriately remain in the custody of local cantonal authorities are guaranteed fair criminal justice procedures and protections. Specifically, immediately inform all suspects of their rights and the charges against them; allow immediate access to counsel of their choice; inform the suspects' families of their whereabouts within twenty-four hours of the detention, according to the provisions of domestic law; promptly bring detainees before a judge; subject each extension of detention to judicial review; ensure the right to trial within a reasonable time or release the defendant; guarantee public proceedings before an independent and impartial tribunal; provide adequate and thorough medical care for prisoners;
• ensure that testimonies and confessions taken under duress or signed as a result of torture or other ill-treatment by law enforcement officials are not used in any court proceedings, except in proceedings against the perpetrators of the abuse.

Human Rights Watch/Helsinki calls upon the Una Sana cantonal law enforcement officials, under the authority of cantonal Minister of the Interior Edhem Veladzic and Chief of Criminal Investigations Halid Velagic to:

• bring an immediate end to torture and ill-treatment of detainees by the police in Una Sana canton.
• institute and announce a policy that the beating and harassment of detainees is prohibited and that any officer suspected of violating the human rights of a detained person will be immediately suspended from duties, pending an investigation by IPTF and/or local police authorities; the officer will be permanently dismissed if found by either body to be responsible for abuse;
• institute disciplinary measures and criminal prosecution for any and all law enforcement personnel who are found to have been involved in beatings or other serious abuses of human rights;
• ensure that police take appropriate actions to stop attacks by others against persons based upon their political affiliation or ethnic origins, or based upon their employment with international organizations;
• void any statements or testimonies taken under duress or signed as a result of torture or other ill-treatment by law enforcement officials;
• ensure that conditions in the Luka Cantonal Prison continue to meet international standards of humane treatment, and that the rights of the detained are respected. Human Rights Watch/Helsinki commends the Una Sana cantonal law enforcement and judicial authorities on the maintenance of satisfactory conditions in the Luka Cantonal Prison.

Human Rights Watch/Helsinki calls upon the minister of education, science, culture and sports, Fahrudin Rizvanbegovic, and federation minister of health, Bozo Ljubic to:

• insist that persons be chosen for employment in medical and educational institutions based solely on merit, and not on political affiliation or ethnic origin;
• insist that educational and health facilities provide equal services to all persons regardless of political affiliation or ethnic origin.

Human Rights Watch/Helsinki calls upon the OSCE, the IPTF, and the Office of the High Representative (OHR) to:

• form a civilian implementation council or task force, as recommended by the International Crisis Group, chaired by the OHR, which would have the authority to dismiss officials who have seriously obstructed or violated the Dayton Peace Agreement, as documented by the IPTF, the Stabilization Force (SFOR), the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsperson, the OSCE, or the OHR itself. Human Rights Watch/Helsinki recommends that such a council include representatives from the federation and from the Republika Srpska. Independent organizations and individuals, including human rights or advocacy NGOs or groups should be permitted to submit evidence to the civilian implementation task force.
• protest at the highest levels all breaches of the "rules of the road" and/or violations of international human rights standards;
• ensure that all proceedings in domestic war crimes cases are carefully monitored by qualified international staff with knowledge of human rights standards. Human Rights Watch/Helsinki commends those organizations-in particular the IPTF and the OSCE-that have monitored these cases, and encourages the continuation of such monitoring;
• press cantonal officials and federation authorities to remove officials determined to have participated in or ordered the commission of human rights abuses;
• use all political and diplomatic means possible to ensure the cooperation of the local authorities with the institution of the federation ombudsmen;

Human Rights Watch/Helsinki calls upon the IPTF commissioner to:

• ensure that any and all law enforcement officers and officials found responsible for human rights abuses are expeditiously removed from the police force. The list of those to be considered for removal from the police should include but not be limited to cantonal Minister of the Interior Edhem Veladzic, Cazin Chief of Police Cazim Budimli, Velika Kladusa Chief of Police Fikret Hadzic , Bihac Criminal Investigations Inspectors Asmir Bakrac, Mujo Koricic, and Izet Sahinovic, Velika Kladusa Criminal Investigator Besir Rizvic, Velika Kladusa Deputy Station Commander Jasmin Aldiz, Cazin police officer Sanel Osmancevic, and Todorovo police officer Serif Celebic, cantonal Chief of Criminal Investigations Halid Velagic, Bihac police officer and former Cazin Chief of Police Sead Kaukovi . Allegations against these individuals are described in this report;
• order IPTF in Bihac to conduct regular inspections of the Ministry of the Interior/Criminal Investigations building and the area behind the building, especially any garage facility or similar structure which has been used as a place of detention and abuse, and monitor the activities of the criminal investigations unit and inspectors working out of the facility to ensure that no one is detained or mistreated in that facility;
• conduct a special investigation into police abuses in the Velika Kladusa and Cazin municipalities, and publicize the results;
• due to IPTF's major role in the screening and training of the local police in Bosnia and Hercegovina, IPTF monitors have a special duty to publicize police abuses as they occur. IPTF should publicize any and all human rights abuses at the hands of the police in a way that will protect the safety and privacy of victims. The IPTF should make public the names of the police officers when its investigation reveals evidence of police abuses, and call for their prosecution. Human Rights Watch/Helsinki urges the IPTF to fulfill its commitment that it will "publish the names of the officers involved and will ensure that they no longer serve as policemen," as stated by IPTF spokesperson Alexander Ivanko at a June 3, 1997 press conference in Sarajevo;
• publicize immediately any denial of access or obstruction of IPTF's mandate by local authorities;
• immediately end the ban on sharing information on human rights abuses with other organizations, except in cases where the sharing of information would jeopardize the safety of specific victims. Information regarding human rights abuses should not be withheld due to political considerations;
• resume the human rights training of the local police that had been taking place in the Una Sana canton until March 1997 by IPTF in collaboration with several international organizations, including UNHCR and the OSCE;

Human Rights Watch/Helsinki calls upon the OSCE to:

• urge the EASC to use its mandate in as broad a manner as possible to strike from the ballot any candidates for public office and political parties in the Una Sana canton, and throughout Bosnia and Hercegovina, who have violated the provisions of Annex III of the Dayton agreement and the Provisional Election Commission Rules, and to consider striking from the ballot candidates who have violated the provisions of the Dayton agreement other than Annex III. Among possible candidates whose names should be considered for striking from the ballot should be cantonal Governor Mirsad Veladzic, Bihac Mayor Adnan Alagic, Cazin Mayor Sabid Lipovic, Velika Kladusa Mayor and SDA President Ejup Alagic, Sanski Most Mayor Mehmed Alagic, Velika Kladusa Chief of Police Fikret Hadzic, Deputy Chief of Police Velika Kladusa Jasmin Aldiz, Cazin Chief of Police and SDA delegate to the cantonal assembly Cazim Budimlic, former SDA President of Cazin and Director of Cazin Hospital Selim Toromanovic, Director of Una Sana Cantonal Television and Radio Nedzib Veladzic, Director of Cantonal Criminal Investigations Halid Velagic, teacher Dzeko Bibujica, Cazin Minister of Education Jasmin Mureskic. Individuals who are struck from the ballot should be given the opportunity to have their cases heard in an independent review process in a manner which is in accordance with international legal standards;
• consider striking the SDA party from the ballot in the municipalities of Bihac, Cazin, and Velika Kladusa due to eighteen months of ongoing discrimination against non-members and systematic attacks against opposition members and their families;
• ensure that all political parties have equal access to media for the pre-election campaign period. If necessary, SFOR and IPTF should be requested to provide security through their presence for pre-election campaigning activities. The OSCE, IPTF, UNHCR, and SFOR should collaborate in monitoring and taking steps to prevent pre-election intimidation of voters;
• ensure that the EASC penalizes immediately any party member or party which engages in voter intimidation, as was done in other towns and municipalities, such as Prijedor, Banja Luka, Kotor Varos, and Gradisa for the upcoming municipal elections;
• develop a canton-specific plan, with the cooperation of SFOR and IPTF, for the protection and transition into office, of opposition members, DNZ or others, who may win in the municipal elections.

Human Rights Watch/Helsinki calls upon the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia to:

• expedite its review of all files submitted by the parties pursuant to their obligations under the Rome Agreement in order to facilitate the quickest possible arrest of individuals against whom the ICTY has found sufficient evidence;

Human Rights Watch/Helsinki calls upon the international community, and donor countries and organizations to:

• cease immediately any and all economic aid to SDA-controlled institutions-such as transportation, postal and telephone companies, businesses and factories, medical and educational facilities-that are shown to deny equal opportunity for employment and equal services to individuals based on political affiliation or ethnicity. Any such institution that changes its discriminatory policy should be rewarded with the aid which had been previously withheld;
• deny the award of small business loans or other international economic aid to individuals when they are determined to have participated in war crimes or human rights abuses;
• ensure that the OSCE is provided with sufficient funding to carry out its election monitoring role, including enabling all parties to participate equally in pre-election campaigning activities, and voter education.
• ensure that the EASC is provided with sufficient funding and resources necessary to perform its function.
• ensure that the ICTY has the financial resources and personnel necessary to review all files submitted to it pursuant to the Rome Agreement in an expeditious manner.

 

Intervju sa Zdravkom Šurlanom, glavnim tajnikom Internacionalne lige humanista (Motrišta 45-6, 2009.)

 INTERVJU S POVODOM: prof. Zdravko ŠURLAN, glavni tajnik
Internacionalne lige humanista – lige za mir i svjetsko jedinstvo
Rat i tranzicija stavili su nas pred
velike izazove i nedoumice
MOTRIŠTA: Prof. Šurlan, ove godine navršava se 35. obljetnica Dubrovačke deklaracije o miru i povjerenju koju su, krajem studenoga 1974., napisali utemeljitelji Internacionalne lige humanista. Možete li nam, u kratkim crtama, reći - što je ILH danas i kako ćete obilježiti ovu značajnu obljetnicu?

 

ŠURLAN: Teško je u nekoliko rečenica sažeti sve ono što je prošla Internacionalna liga humanista - od ideje do danas. Ipak ću, u kratkim crtama, iznijeti samo neke od podataka, kako bi čitatelji mogli steći što cjelovitiju sliku o ILH.Ideja o pokretanju osnivanja novoga pokreta za mir i svjetsko jedinstvo – današnje Internacionalne lige humanista - potekla je od našega, u svijetu poznatog znanstvenika, filozofa, romanopisca, dramatičara (humanista 20. stoljeća) svjetskoga ugleda, blagopreminulog akademika Ivana Supeka (Hrvatska). Po rođenju humanist, po opredjeljenju antifašist, po djelovanju demokrat, nakon Drugoga svjetskog rata pridružio se međunarodnim pokretima za mir i dokinuće nuklearnog oružja. Sudjelovao je na mnogim međunarodnim konferencijama za mir s kojih je uputio mnoge apele, uvijek podržavajući načela općega i potpunog razoružanja. U cilju zalaganja za politički pluralizam (demokraciju) kao uvjet za razoružanje, mir i blagostanje, 1966. pokrenuo je časopis
Encyclopaedia Moderna kao glasilo za filozofiju znanosti i mir, zajedno s Jugoslavenskim pagvaškim društvom. Encyclopaedia Moderna imala je značajan utjecaj u cijeloj zemlji. I ne samo to, kao rektor Sveučilišta u Zagrebu od 1968. do 1970. i od 1970. do 1972. godine, poticao je reformu studija u skladu sa znanstvenom revolucijom i načelima humanizma. Na konferenciji Međunarodnoga udruženja sveučilišta u Montrealu, u ljeto 1970., zalagao se za veću suradnju u promicanju razumijevanja između raznih religija (različitih političkih sustava), što bi proširilo put prema svjetskom miru. Prihvaćen je
njegov prijedlog da se ustanovi mjesto za suradnju između sveučilišta i ubrzo je otvoren  Interuniverzitetski centar u Dubrovniku (1971) s više od 220 sveučilišta kao članova, kao primjer univerzalnoga duha znanosti i umjetnosti.

 
MOTRIŠTA: Dakle, Dubrovnik je mjesto rođenja Internacionalne lige humanista...
 

ŠURLAN: Točno tako. U Dubrovniku krajem studenoga 1974. godine, na inicijativu Ivana Supeka, sastao se bard mirotvoraca (Prvi međunarodni komitet humanista – univerzalista): Ava i Linus Pauling (dvostruki dobitnik Nobelove nagrade 1952. i 1962), Philip Noel-Baker (nobelovac), Aurelio Peccei (predsjednik Rimskog kluba), Sophia Wadia (književnica). Nakon deset dana intenzivnog rada u Interuniverzitetskom centru dali su analizu tadašnjeg svijeta i viziju željene budućnosti. Supekova načela humanizma sažeta u 10 točaka, kao sastavni dio Deklaracije, postali su polazište za rad i djelovanje Međunarodnoga pokreta za mir i svjetsko jedinstvo - Internacionalne lige humanista. Njima su dodana razmišljanja Abdus Salama (nobelovca), Dalai Lame (nobelovca), Guylord P. Hruwela (poznatoga istraživača iz Pensilvanije), koji, iz opravdanih razloga, nisu mogli nazočiti u razgovorima u Dubrovniku. Dubrovačka deklaracija razaslana je diljem svijeta i postigla je izvanredne pozitivne reakcije mnogih uglednih ljudi diljem svijeta, čiji su komentari pretočeni na Kongresu Svjetskoga
jedinstva u Filadelfiji.

 
MOTRIŠTA: Kad ste spomenuli Filadelfiju, što se sve događalo na Prvome svjetskom kongresu humanista?

 

ŠURLAN: „Biti ili ne biti, za ljude postojati, ovisi o našim sposobnostima da razvijamo sveopću civilizaciju koja će težiti miru, opstanku i humanim osjećanjima.“, istaknuo je Ivan Supek, prvi predsjedavajući Kongresa i njegov prvi predsjednik, prigodom otvaranja Kongresa. Bez presedana, taj Kongres održan u Filadelfiji od 21. do 24. svibnja 1976., okupio je značajne svjetske humaniste – nobelovce sa svih kontinenata i, na promišljen način, uspostavio prirodne osnove za pozitivan razvoj suvremene civilizacije, te stvorio nadu svim ljudima svijeta. Kongres je prihvatio Dubrovačku deklaraciju, koja se od tada zove Dubrovačko – filadelfijska deklaracija. Uz tu Deklaraciju, razvijena je i prihvaćena Dubrovačka izjava i Dubrovačka deklaracija o povjerenju. Kongres je utvrdio STATUS Internacionalne lige humanista. Neovisna, neutralna od vlasti, politike, religije. Djeluje u svim državama gdje se ukaže potreba. Internacionalna liga humanista nije ni američka, ni engleska, ni jugoslavenska, niti bilo koje zemlje iz koje su idejni tvorci, već INTERNACIONALNA, sa sjedištem u onoj zemlji koju odredi Kongres ILH i koja ponudi uvjete za rad i djelovanje misije, bez miješanja u misiju. Internacionalna liga humanista ima status međunarodne organizacije od javnog interesa, s ciljem da zastupa interese svih građana i radi na promicanju mira u svijetu. Liga je ustanovljena s namjerom da se planovi za mir ostvare diljem svijeta u njegovom punom smislu. Sve što je potrebno za dostizanje svih ovih svjetskih težnji sažeto je u Dubrovačko – filadelfijskoj deklaraciji i Deklaraciji o povjerenju koje predstavljaju akcelerator evolucije istinske civilizacije.

 
MOTRIŠTA: Kojim ćete aktivnostima ove godine obilježiti 35. obljetnicu Internacionalne lige humanista?

 

ŠURLAN: Planiran je niz aktivnosti na planu obilježavanja 35. obljetnice Internacionalne lige humanista, među kojima ću spomenuti najvažnije:
Održavanje Svjetskog kongresa jedinstva humanista posvećenog dvjema krucijalnim temama današnjice, a to su „Djeca svijeta ranjenog djetinjstva“ (djeca bez djetinjstva) i problemima odgoja i obrazovanja za 21. stoljeće „Obrazovanjem protiv siromaštva – odgojem protiv nasilja do kulture mira“.
Kongres će se održati od 23. do 26. listopada 2009. godine, u Dubrovniku. Za predsjednicu Internacionalnog komiteta majki solidarnosti za djecu svijeta ranjenog djetinjstva, imenovana je gđa Jadranka Kosor. Za predsjednicu Komiteta majki solidarnosti za Republiku Hrvatsku imenovana je prof. Dubravka Šuica. Drugi značajan događaj koji planiramo organizirati krajem rujna 2009. godine jest
Mala olimpijada sporta i kulture mira „Juan Antonio Samaranch“, uz sudjelovanje mladih i sportskih veterana iz država Zapadnog Balkana. Planirano je da mladi budu srednjoškolskog uzrasta. Svaka država predstavit će se s 11 srednjoškolaca, 3 veterana iz nogometa i 3 olimpijske legende. Razumije se da će tu sudjelovati velik broj ostalih stručnjaka i simpatizera mira i sporta.
Treći događaj odnosi se na obilježavanje Dana Internacionalne lige humanista, od 21. do 24. svibnja 2009. godine. Tim povodom, u Dubrovniku će se održati Svečana akademija posvećena miru, zaštiti ljudskih prava i dostojanstva. Na Akademiji će sudjelovati poznate osobe iz oblasti ljudskih prava, slobode i misije mira Internacionalne lige humanista. Sudionicima će se posebno obratiti laureat odvjetnik Josip Muselimović, dobitnik Zlatne povelje „Linus Pauling“ s Plaketom i Značkom, u znak trajne zahvalnosti za njegov humani i etički pristup obrani obespravljenih, pod nazivom „Poštovani suci, zašto?“.
Svečana ceremonija proglašenja g. Josipa Muselimovića Internacionalnim odvjetnikom obespravljenih, uz uručenje ranije dodijeljenih priznanja, održat će se u Mostaru, najvjerojatnije, 7. lipnja. Priznanja će uručiti dr. Elisabeth Rehn, predsjednica Internacionalne lige humanista. Prema propozicijama i Pravilima o nominiranju, valorizaciji nominacije i izboru nije dopušteno davati obrazloženje prije službenog izbora.

 
MOTRIŠTA: Već dulje vrijeme Internacionalna liga humanista istražuje najpovoljnije lokalitete za otvaranje Međunarodnog centra za sport i kulturu mira koji bi nosio ime „Juan Antonio Samaranch“. Imamo nekih naznaka kako bi to mogao biti lokalitet sadašnjeg rekreacijskog centra Buna. O čemu se, zapravo, radi?

 

ŠURLAN: Poznato je da je Peti kongres Internacionalne lige humanista održan u Dubrovniku od 23. do 26. listopada 2005. u znak priznanja za doprinos miru u svijetu za vrijeme njegova mandata na čelu MOK-a, NJ. E. Juana Antonia Samarancha proglasio Humanistom 20. stoljeća i prvim počasnim veleposlanikom sporta i kulture mira, uz najviša humanistička priznanja. Internacionalne liga humanista odobri Ligi korištenje njegovog imena i lika za razvijanje mira, solidarnosti, borbe protiv droge i nasilja u korist stvaranja mostova prijateljstva među mladima diljem svijeta, kroz razne oblike djelovanja s mladima putem razvoja amaterskog sporta.
Na temelju Projekta koji smo uradili na spomenutu temu, NJ.E. Juan Antonio Samaranch dao je EKSKLUZIVNO PRAVO Internacionalnoj ligi humanista da se može koristiti njegovim imenom i likom, na način kako to Liga humanista radi, sa zaštitom i korištenjem lika i imena svojih osnivača. Za zaštitu svoga lika i imena osobno je zadužio glavnoga tajnika Internacionalne lige humanista.
U želji da stvorimo Međunarodni centar za mlade koji bi se odgajali u duhu mira i prijateljstva, pod imenom Juana Antonia Samarancha, od 2006. godine do danas, tražimo lokaciju koja bi zadovoljila kriterije za jedan takav centar. Prema našim propozicijama, najviše bi odgovarao lokalitet Bune, o čemu smo informirali gradonačelnika Mostara, predsjednika Vlade HNK/ž, te našega laureata iz Mostara gosp. Josipa Muselimovića. Hoće li svi ovi i drugi subjekti moći, znati i htjeti prepoznati značenje jednog ovakovog centra za sveukupnu afirmaciju ne samo Mostara već regije, države BiH, pa i zemalja u okruženju, ostaje vidjeti. Oni su na potezu. Poslije njih idemo u Hrvatsku.

 
MOTRIŠTA: Koje nam najznačajnije planove i programe, uz ove već spomenute, možete istaknuti kao prioritetne u ovoj godini?

 

ŠURLAN: Više je aktivnosti koje se odvijaju u okviru Internacionalne lige humanista i pod pokroviteljstvom Lige. Spomenut ću samo neke od njih:
Prvo, ustrojavanje našega Internacionalnog univerziteta Philip Noel-Baker u sveučilišnu ustanovu internacionalnog tipa po Bolonjskoj deklaraciji, s fakultetima za turizam i hotelijerstvo, za informatiku i aktuarstvo, za biznis i menadžment i druge, s vlastitim Institutom za znanstveno – istraživački rad i razvoj. Na ovom planu imamo veliku znanstvenu i pragmatičnu potporu od Sveučilišta u Dubrovniku, koje je prvi potpisnik Sporazuma o suradnji.
Drugi, izuzetno važan projekt jest uključivanje Internacionalne lige humanista u proces održivog povratka u Bosni i Hercegovini, uz primjenu svoga vlastitog projekta „Istinom do održivog povratka“. Naša je želja da se svi vrate na svoja ognjišta, pod uvjetima koji odgovaraju dostojanstvu čovjeka 21. stoljeća.
Treći projekt, koji se nastavlja iz godine u godinu, jest zaštita djece od zloporabe i nasilja, zaštita zdravlja građana, borba protiv droge i nasilja, uključivanje mladih u demokratske procese u BiH, itd.
Četvrta aktivnost koja nas preokupira jest „Humano i etičko upravljanje okolišem“, zaštita prirodno – atraktivnih resursa od zagađenja i uništenja. Otvaranje edukacije za mlade pod nazivom „Humani i etički preduvjeti za izgradnju pozitivnog odnosa prema okolišu“. Odgoj i obrazovanje mladih u osnovnim školama za zdrav okoliš te niz drugih nespomenutih programa i projekata. 

MOTRIŠTA: Poznato je da ste 2008. obilježili 30. obljetnicu kako Liga bira i promovira pojedince, organizacije i institucije iz zemlje i svijeta te dodjeljuje određena priznanja. O kakvim se priznanjima radi, kako se biraju dobitnici i dodjeljuju priznanja?
 

ŠURLAN: Od 1978. do danas, svake godine po posebnim kriterijima, metodologiji i Pravilima, obavlja se nominacija, selekcija i dodjela priznanja laureatima koji su ispunili tražene kriterije iz područja znanosti, kulture, ljudskih prava, socijalne politike, umjetnosti, liderstva i drugih nespomenutih područja. Svaka oblast ima svoje priznanje od Zahvalnice, Diplome, Plakete, Zlatne značke, do najviših priznanja koja nose ime naših utemeljitelja, kao što su Povelja Linus Pauling, Povelja Philip Noel-Baker do počasnih priznanja, poput Ambasador sporta i kulture mira, Internacionalni odvjetnik obespravljenih, državnik desetljeća, stoljeća, i sl.
Od nominacije do izbora ponekad zna proći dosta vremena. Nakon što netko od uglednih osoba (fizička ili pravna) nominira kandidata, tada se, putem elektronske pošte, na adrese 11 – 15 osoba iz više zemalja, koje su iz određenog područja iz kojeg se kandidat nominira, koje ne znaju jedna za drugu, traži mišljenje. Ako od 15 članova odabranih za ocjenu nominacije 14 da pozitivnu ocjenu, kandidat je prošao. Ako se dobije manje od 14 glasova, kandidatura se može ponoviti, ali za iduću godinu i s promijenjenim članovima. Tako od nominacije do izbora, za neke traje izbor dvije godine, tri, pa i četiri godine, dok nisu u prvome krugu dobili glasove. Do sada su Povelju Linus Pauling dobili: Sveti Otac Ivan Pavao II., Juan Antonio Samaranch, dr. Mahathir bin Mogamad (Malezija), acc. Luko Paljetak, acc. Ivan Supek, msgr. dr. franjo Komarica, acc. Seid Huković...

 
MOTRIŠTA: Kako sa stajališta misije Internacionalne lige humanista, njezinih humanih i etičkih načela, ocjenjujete današnje naše društvo?

 

ŠURLAN: Pa, bilo bi bolje da ste pitali g. Josipa Muselimovića, našega v.d. predsjednika Internacionalnog komiteta za humanizam, etiku, zaštitu ljudskih prava i društveni poredak, koji bi Vam najbolje dao ocjenu moralnosti društva. Što kazati? Neizlječiva gangrena „bolesne“ politike i nadobudnih političara zahvatila je naše društvo - od vrha do dna. Posvađana politika uvela nas je u jednu vrstu mirnodopskoga drugog rata najniže razine i grubih udaraca.

Ne puca se, ali se ratuje ubojitim
riječima od kojih se, također, može poginuti. Ušli smo u neku vrstu poslijeratnog rata, koji je veoma okrutan i opasan za izgradnju zdravih društvenih odnosa. Rat i tranzicija su, umnogome, izokrenuli uobičajena pravila društvenih ponašanja i stavili nas na taj  način pred velike izazove i nedoumice. Kako pobijediti Sedam smrtnih grijeha suvremene civilizacije, kako ih je definirao Mahatma Gandi: 1) bogatstvo bez rada; 2) užitak bez savjesti; 3) znanje bez karaktera; 4) posao bez morala; 5) znanost bez čovječnosti; 6) religija bez žrtve; 7) politika bez načela.

 Kako ove smrtne grijehe pobijediti?!