(2) Bosnia Section: EUROPE Magazine: The Economist, February 26, 1994
Dateline: PALE
THE diplomatic landscape has been transformed in Bosnia. Bucked by their first real
success since war in Bosnia began 22 months ago, diplomats from Europe, America, Russia
and the United Nations met in Bonn on February 22nd to explore how to build on the
ceasefire and removal of siege guns around Sarajevo. The mood was upbeat, and turned more
so when the next day, Croat and Muslim commanders agreed on a ceasefire. The prescription
--"More of the same"--informed a draft UN Security Council resolution from France and
Britain calling for the relief of Tuzla, Vitez and Maglaj. But extending "the Sarajevo
model" to other parts of Bosnia will be easier said than done.
The Bosnian Muslims control Tuzla and its airport. But Serb guns are
close enough to threaten the runway. The UN aid people would like the
airport opened by March 7th. In January NATO agreed to lend the UN air
power to achieve this, but did nothing. The Serbs scoffed. After NATO's
successful Sarajevo ultimatum, they sound more pliant. Tuzla airport,
they say, can open if they get assurances that no arms will be shipped
in.
Some of the fiercest fighting has raged around Mostar between Bosnian
Muslims and Croats. Diplomats now hope for a lasting ceasefire there.
(Both sides have heavy guns inside the town, so threatening air strikes
there would be pointless.) A proper truce in Mostar could be the first
test of the Croat-Bosnian pact struck in Zagreb on February 23rd under
UN auspices.
This calls for an immediate end to the Croat-Bosnian war and to eventual union
or confederation between the Croat and Muslim bits of Bosnia, with some link to Croatia.
This will not be the first time these two have promised to stop fighting or, indeed,
to join up as allies. Until all three sides in Bosnia agree on which bits are whose,
it is hard to see how two of them can agree to share. A sceptical military eye might well
see this agreement as Croatia's pretext not to remove its 5,000 or so troops from western
Hercegovina.
In Sarajevo itself the UN was due to start talks with the Bosnian
government and Bosnia's Serbs on February 24th about the further
demilitarisation of the city and ways of putting it under UN control.
As with siege guns, this is a disputed phrase. The Franco-British proposal says the
UN should start by providing water, electricity and sewage to the city.
The Bosnian government wants to establish UN authority in Serb held parts--a step
towards eventual reunification of the city. The Bosnian Serbs, who hope for a division
of the city in any settlement, resist this. Slavisa Rakovic, a top official in their
government, want to restrict the UN's job to the provision of water and fuel.
Police and administration should, he thinks, stay divided, as now. In addition,
Mr Rakovic doubts whether gradually opening the city's exit roads—another aim of the
Bonn diplomats--can work when the two side's armies face each other not far away.
Sarajevo's future hangs, like all else in Bosnia, on a peace settlement.
The good news is that the Americans seem at last to accept the need for
a negotiated end to the war, having long hesitated to endorse any
agreement "imposed" on the war's chief victims, the Bosnian Muslims.
This does not mean America necessarily backs the deal previously
negotiated in Geneva in which Serbs, Croats and Muslims agreed on most
(though not all) points of partition. Charles Redman, America's special
Bosnia envoy, has said the "quality and survivability" of the territory
allocated to Bosnia's Muslim-led government would have to be improved
upon.
For their part, the Russians are against extending the Sarajevo model if this
means threatening air strikes again. Diplomatic pressure was the key, says their
mediator in Bosnia, Vitaly Churkin, adding a new and probably unhelpful twist of
country specialisation: the Americans should lean on the Bosnians, the Germans on
the Croats and the Russians on the Serbs. This is worrying because, if Bosnia goes
wrong again, outside powers could find themselves drawn into the Balkans on different
warring sides.
For the moment, however, the NATO-UN success in Sarajevo has given the
outsiders' confidence a terrific and justified boost. But the essentials of the
negotiations have not changed: who gets what land.
Many different constitutional set-ups have been agreed to by all three
sides at various times. They have never agreed to a territorial map. A
Bosnian-Croat confederation is not a new idea. Last year, Bosnia's
president, Alija Izetbegovic, even signed an agreement with the
president of the Bosnian Serb parliament, Momcilo Krajisnik, permitting
Bosnian Serbs, in time, to join Serbia. The rider was that territorial
claims had to be settled first.
As the NATO ultimatum expired on February 20th, a Bosnian Serb soldier,
looking down on Sarajevo, said: "This will never end . . . It will be
Lebanon." It has to be hoped that his was a voice from the past.
PHOTO: Hopes for rebuilding this rubble
Source: Economist, 2/26/94, Vol. 330 Issue 7852, p50, 2p, 1bw.
Item Number: 9403117769
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